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Abstract 
 
This project analyses some of the key texts from Jacques Derrida‟s autobiographical 
thought and organizes these texts chronologically in terms of their relation to other 
figures who are part of the history of autobiographical thought itself.  The five chapters 
of the main body consider Derrida‟s relation to five such figures: Augustine, Rousseau, 
Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud.  The central argument of this project is that Derrida‟s 
conceptualization of autobiography provokes the reconceptualization of human 
subjectivity.  The central aim of this project is thus to set the groundwork for this 
reconceptualization.  Derrida is known for inventing lots of new words (neologisms) as 
a way both of circumventing traditional philosophical problems and of renaming them 
by highlighting their fundamental gaps.  One of the many neologisms that he invents 
around autobiography is „heterothanatography‟.  Where autobiography designates the 
life of the self, in contrast heterothanatography designates the opposite: namely, the 
death of the other.  In Derrida‟s thought more generally, it is characteristic of his 
deconstructive philosophy that an opposite of a metaphysical concept becomes that 
concept‟s condition of possibility.  This juxtaposes the opposites in such a way that 
develops an undecidable impasse, thereby opening them up to the differences of degree 
between them.  Hence, the introduction to this project, „The Death of the Other‟, sets up 
heterothanatography as the condition of possibility of autobiography.  After the analysis 
of the main body, the conclusion to this project, „Paradoxes of Subjectivity‟, provides 
clues to the groundwork for the deconstructive reconceptualization of subjectivity.  This 
occurs primarily by taking the opposites at work in the deconstruction of autobiography 
itself: that is, self/other and life/death.  The central outcome of this project is a 
deconstructive deepening of the existential understanding of human subjectivity, based 
on the difficulties surrounding the actual experiences and events of people‟s lives.  The 
overall contribution to knowledge is thus in the original interpretation of this project 
concerning the radical psychological insight that Derrida‟s thought possesses for the 
philosophical understanding of human subjectivity. 
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Introduction 
 
The Death of the Other 
The purpose of the present study on Jacques Derrida‟s thought is twofold.  First, to 
demonstrate how Derrida conceptualizes the word „autobiography‟ in such a way that 
gives it a philosophical force and signification.  And second, to argue that this 
conceptualization of autobiography is undertaken in order to provoke the 
reconceptualization of the more traditional philosophical concept of „subjectivity‟.  The 
concept of subjectivity generally refers to an inner-psychical space whose topological 
form is given a particular conceptual series of mental contents: e.g., identity, 
consciousness, autonomy, rationality, volition, thought, feeling, understanding, 
perception, intuition, intention, etc.  For Derrida, this mental content has become the 
basis of the vocabulary of philosophy in its logocentric organization as the metaphysics 
of self-presence.  The conceptualization of autobiography in his thought thus offers a 
primordial complication of the boundary between inside and outside: where the 
autonomous inside of the self‟s mind becomes contaminated by the heteronomous 
outside of the self‟s life.  This primordial complication provokes the reconceptualization 
of subjectivity by arguing the following: that each individual subject must be 
understood not via pre-given ideas of how the inner-psychical space is structured; but 
rather by alluding to the way in which the outer-life circumstances of each individual 
forms the underlying basis of their idiosyncratic responses to those very same 
circumstances.  The purpose or end of the present study thus rests on an attempt to 
answer the question: In Derrida‟s thought, what is the nature of human subjectivity?  
The conceptualization of autobiography acts as the means to this end. 
In such a rethinking of human subjectivity, it is not that each individual person 
has no subjective experience or inner thoughts and feelings; but rather, that such 
subjectivity is ultimately mediated by each individual‟s own idiosyncratic experience of 
the outer world around them.  In Derrida‟s thought, this mediation involves the 
conceptualization of intermediary terms, such as autobiography, in which the very 
oppositions between inside and outside, subject and object, self and other, life and 
death, etc, become possible; and yet also impossible via the complication of their 
primordial contamination.  In this way, more generally, Derridean deconstruction 
involves a process of textual intervention into the inherited conceptual oppositions of 
the metaphysical tradition by transforming absolute polar oppositions into differences of 
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degree.  In arguing for the necessity of this intervention provided by the work of 
mediation, and by putting this work into practice in the conceptualization of 
intermediary terms, his thought aims to resituate human subjectivity.  As he says in an 
interview entitled „Deconstruction and the Other‟: 
 
To deconstruct the subject does not mean to deny its existence.  There are subjects, „operations‟ or 
„effects‟ of subjectivity.  This is an incontrovertible fact.  To acknowledge this does not mean, however, 
that the subject is what it says it is.  The subject is not some meta-linguistic substance or identity, some 
pure cogito of self-presence; it is always inscribed in language.  My work does not, therefore, destroy the 
subject; it simply tries to resituate it (Derrida, in: Kearney, 1984, p.125). 
 
What I will be arguing here is that, in Derrida‟s thought, the so-called „deconstruction 
of the subject‟ is inseparable from his thinking around the topic of the autobiographical; 
and this insight is radically new in terms of how both subjectivity and autobiography 
have thus far been considered in the context of the contemporary scholarship on his 
thought. 
 The scholarship on Derrida‟s thought is typically divided between the 
philosophical and the literary strands of research.  It is important to underline how this 
division between philosophy and literature affects the topic of autobiography directing 
the present study.  As Derrida says in „That Strange Institution Called Literature‟, 
autobiography acts as a strange sort of intermediary between philosophy and literature 
in his thought: 
 
And since what interests me today is not strictly called either literature or philosophy, I‟m amused by the 
idea that my adolescent desire – let‟s call it that – should have directed me towards something in writing 
which was neither the one nor the other.  What was it?  „Autobiography‟ is perhaps the least inadequate 
name, because it remains for me the most enigmatic, the most open, even today (in: Derrida, 1992, p.34). 
 
This can be understood in different ways; and so far in the field of scholarship it has 
been understood in two different ways.  First, and most importantly, via Robert Smith‟s 
(1995) book, Derrida and Autobiography; and also Joseph G. Kronick‟s (2000) essay, 
„Philosophy as Autobiography: The Confessions of Jacques Derrida‟.  Here, there has 
been a tendency to understand Derrida‟s interest in autobiography in a literary-
institutional sense: i.e., by arguing that the growing body of literature around so-called 
„autobiographical theory‟ has so far concentrated on the „auto‟ and the „bio‟, but not the 
„graphy‟, of autobiography.  The dimension of writing has been excluded from 
autobiographical theory; and in the discipline of literary criticism, the discipline which 
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dominates the scholarship in Derrida‟s thought, this is given an institutional 
significance.  This is mostly as a result of the work of Derrida‟s friend and colleague 
Paul de Man, which we will consider in more detail later on.  And second, via Jill 
Robbins‟s (1995) essay, „Circumcising Confession: Derrida, Autobiography, Judaism‟; 
Gideon Ofrat‟s (2001) book, The Jewish Derrida; Hélène Cixous‟s (2004) book, 
Portrait of Jacques Derrida as a Young Jewish Saint; and the collection edited by 
Bettina Bergo, Joseph Cohen, and Raphael Zagury-Orly (2007), under the title, 
Judeities: Questions for Jacques Derrida.  Here, the autobiographical element of 
Derrida‟s thought has developed an interest in the details of Derrida‟s own life, in 
particular with regard to his religious upbringing as a Sephardic Jew.  But the question 
either of the particularities of Derrida‟s own life history, or of the significance of his 
thought for Judaism, matters little to us here.  In contrast, I will try to outline here a 
„third way‟, so to speak, for the significance of autobiography to Derrida‟s thought. 
 As can be seen from the opening paragraph of this introduction, the argument of 
the present study offers a radical change of thematic terrain from this pre-existing work 
on Derrida‟s autobiographical thought.  The interest is much more „psychological‟.  Not 
in the institutional social science sense of the „science of the mind‟, but rather in the 
colloquial sense (which in present times is undoubtedly psychotherapeutic) of how to go 
about „understanding people‟; or in more philosophical vocabulary, of how to go about 
understanding „human subjectivity‟.  Undoubtedly, there would be a number of caveats 
to consider: e.g., the way in which the very terms „human‟ and „subjectivity‟ and 
„understanding‟ and „people‟ would all but put in quotation marks by Derrida to 
highlight some metaphysical problem or other contained within the traditional usages of 
their concepts.  But in a way, this is not the concern here: for by doing this one would 
have to keep in mind that the vocabulary that one oneself uses without quotation marks 
– in order to complicate the vocabulary used in the present study without quotation 
marks – can just as easily have quotation marks put around it, thereby highlighting 
problems with it in its turn.  All words and concepts are problematic.  But in order to 
say something in a way it becomes necessary to delay the process of problematization 
(ironically delaying the work of deconstruction itself; deconstruction as self-delaying so 
as to never be absolutely completed) and actually use words that we know are 
problematic, because they are the only ones that we have available.  Indeed, the very 
process of problematization will take certain words for granted in order to problematize 
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some other words.  The question then becomes: What is it that you want to discuss?  
What theme or topic do you want to enquire into? 
In the field of scholarship on Derrida‟s thought there is an implicit sense that 
one should avoid using words and phrases like „psychology‟, „metapsychology‟, and 
„moral psychology‟, to characterize and classify it.  But I think there are certain 
definitions of these terms in which his thought finds its most poignant point of 
application.  Indeed, one scholar has argued that we should use the word „emotion‟ 
rather than „subject‟: Rei Terada in her book, Feeling in Theory: Emotion After the 
“Death of the Subject”, argues for the development of a „poststructuralist emotion‟ 
(Terada, 2001, p.8) at the expense of the concept of the subject.  In contrast, I would 
argue that there are no grounds to privilege the word „emotion‟ over the word „subject‟; 
conceptually it is just as problematic – as is, equally, the word „poststructuralist‟ (see: 
Culler, 1982, pp.17-30).  Hence, the groundwork that must first be done is instead to 
rethink how human subjectivity is itself formed; only on the basis of this groundwork 
would a theory of emotion begin to make sense.  For this groundwork to be done, we 
must take recourse in Derrida‟s emphasis around the concept and conceptualization of 
autobiography.  Here, it is useful to remember that, although the autobiographical form 
is ancient, traditionally considered as originating in Augustine‟s Confessions 
(Augustine, 1961), the actual word „autobiography‟ is a modern invention.  Derrida‟s 
work alludes to this fact in that he himself invents so many neologisms around the 
word: „otobiography‟ in The Ear of the Other (Derrida, 1988a); „autothanatography‟ 
and „heterothantography‟ in The Post Card (Derrida, 1987); 
„autobioheterothanatography‟ and „circumfession‟ in „Circumfession‟ (Derrida, 1993); 
„autobiographicity‟ in „I Have a Taste for the Secret‟ (Derrida, 2001); „zootobiography‟ 
in The Animal that Therefore I Am (Derrida, 2008); and so on. 
 In Feeling in Theory, Terada takes it for granted that the „death of the subject‟ is 
an event that has actually occurred, instituted by poststructuralist theorists, and so the 
concept of the subject is one that we can leave behind us.  In this, she might have taken 
a leaf out of Seán Burke‟s book, which was originally published in 1992, The Death and 
Return of the Author: Criticism and Subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault and Derrida.  
Here, Burke argues more paradoxically that the thinkers who are credited with the 
popular statement of the „death of the author‟ in literary criticism are the very same 
thinkers who subtly allow the author to return from the dead.  In this way, Burke offers 
a critical reading of Barthes, Foucault, and Derrida, arguing that in effect they contradict 
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themselves on this point.  But he also argues that the popular reception of their work has 
not caught up with the fact that they also institute the author‟s spectral return, and so 
their thought is much richer than some might give it credit for.  Since the statement of 
the „death of the author‟ concerns, in literary criticism, the issue of to what degree one 
allows the author‟s psychobiography to determine the meaning of their writing, Burke 
thus takes a passing interest in the theme of the autobiographical – although it rarely 
occurs in his three chapters that form the main body of his book (on Barthes, Foucault, 
and Derrida respectively).  Here, his task is more a demonstration of how these three 
thinkers contradict themselves with regards to the „death of the author‟, rather than any 
conceptualization of the autobiographical which might be relevant to a theory of 
subjectivity.  For example, Burke‟s chapter on Derrida, „Misread Intentions‟, is 
restricted to the question of the presence of authorial intention in relation to their work, 
as this question appears in Derrida‟s thought: i.e., „that a text finally says quite the 
reverse of what its author intended‟ (Burke, 2008, p.119). 
In contrast, I would argue that the question of authorial intention in the literary 
critical reading of the text can only ever offer a rather restricted philosophical 
interpretation of the nature of human subjectivity.  Derrida‟s thought on subjectivity 
becomes much richer than this specific question when we account for his 
autobiographical thought – and does so in the particular way that the present study 
identifies.  „Misread Intentions‟ picks out Derrida‟s reading of Rousseau in Of 
Grammatology, and his reading of Plato in Dissemination, to show how his thought 
engages with the above principle of deconstructive literary critical reading.  For 
instance, Burke‟s main criticism of Derrida‟s reading of Rousseau is that, in the entire 
history of logocentrism that Derrida identifies, he has offered no reasons for privileging 
Rousseau amongst others: „no especial significance is accorded to Rousseau‟s text as 
such‟ (Burke, 2008, p.116).  This is actually a misreading, as the reasons for picking 
Rousseau are given in Derrida‟s short „Introduction to the “Age of Rousseau”‟ in Of 
Grammatology, where Rousseau is said to begin: „from a new model of presence: the 
subject‟s self-presence within consciousness or feeling‟ (Derrida, 1976: p.98).  By the 
end of „Misread Intentions‟, Derrida‟s force is given by Burke as a literary critic rather 
than as a philosopher: „If Derrida is to be remembered as a great philosopher, it will be 
as the individual in whom – for the first time – the philosopher becomes exclusively a 
reader-critic‟ (Burke, 2008, p.161).  As I will show in this introduction, this also is a 
misreading.  And in the end, Burke‟s chapter on Derrida is less concerned with the 
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problem of human subjectivity (as his subtitle suggests) and more concerned with the 
problem of how Derrida reads, or indeed misreads, other thinkers.  However, the 
misread intentions are perhaps Burke‟s own. 
 Because of the dismissive approach to subjectivity that the statement of the 
„death of the subject‟ implies, and the limited approach to subjectivity that the statement 
of the „death of the author‟ implies, the present study aims instead to take a more direct 
approach to the question of individual subjectivity.  However, in true Derridean style, 
this „direct‟ approach is itself obliquely mediated by a proxy that presents us with 
another route into subjectivity: viz., the proxy of autobiography.  The argument I would 
like to propose here is that, for Derrida, autobiography supplements subjectivity.  
Indeed, as we can see from the numerous neologisms that Derrida has invented around 
this word, clearly he thinks that by itself the word autobiography is paradoxically both 
important and inadequate.  But these neologisms themselves also act as proxies or 
supplements to the concept of autobiography, which is itself here understood as a 
supplement to the more traditional philosophical concept of subjectivity.  That is, as 
supplements, just as the concept of autobiography shows the concept of subjectivity to 
be fundamentally lacking, so Derrida‟s neologisms around the concept of autobiography 
show how it itself is also fundamentally lacking.  The neologism that most interests us 
here is the one from The Post Card: heterothanatography.  On a banal definition, the 
word autobiography refers to the life of the self.  In contrast, this neologism of Derrida‟s 
refers to the death of the other.  As such, heterothanatography therefore stands in a 
precise quasi-transcendental relation to autobiography: i.e., what autobiography most 
lacks is what it most excludes, which appears in the oppositions of life/death and 
self/other.  The relation of life to death, and of self to other, is thus symbolic of the 
subject‟s interiority to what is radically exterior. 
 In Derrida‟s thought, the concept of autobiography is also shown to suffer from 
metaphysical saturation.  Even though the concept of autobiography prima facie alludes 
to the exterior life of the self, thereby including what is exterior into the traditional 
interiority of human subjectivity, at the same time it alludes to this very exteriority via a 
hidden and more pervasive underlying metaphysical ideal of subjective interiority.  
Where the metaphysics within the concept of subjectivity is transparent, in contrast the 
metaphysics within the concept of autobiography is more opaque.  As such, it is not a 
simple matter of taking the concept of autobiography toward the concept of subjectivity 
in order to undermine the latter‟s metaphysical biases, since the metaphysics of 
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subjectivity is already implicit within the concept of autobiography.  Paradoxically, the 
concept of autobiography is both what will come to disrupt the metaphysics of 
subjectivity, and what shows this theoretical metaphysics in practice.  Something more 
radically exterior than the life of the self must therefore act as the condition of 
possibility of human subjectivity, even though the life of the self offers the initial stage 
of exteriority to the radical interiority of the subject.  With the neologism of 
heterothanatography, Derrida offers this radical exteriority by placing the death of the 
other as the condition of possibility of the life of the self.  And yet, precisely because its 
opposite is its condition of possibility, it is also therefore, in quasi-transcendental 
manner, its condition of impossibility: i.e., since its opposite is its condition, it begins in 
a condition of impasse; a condition marked by a radical difficulty to make progress. 
Derrida‟s quasi-transcendental style of argumentation affects his 
autobiographical thought by the invention of neologisms that become the very condition 
of possibility and impossibility of autobiography itself.  His affirmation of 
autobiography is also a supplementation of what is lacking in its concept, and a putting 
into question of what is metaphysical in its concept.  As such, it is also necessary to 
consider how autobiography has become significant to Derrida‟s philosophical thought 
more generally.  In an interview in Points entitled „There Is No One Narcissism 
(Autobiophotographies)‟, Derrida says: „I am tempted to take a word from everyday 
language and then make it do some work as a philosophical concept, provoking thereby 
restructurations of philosophical discourse.  That interests me‟ (Derrida, 1995b, p.210).  
Indeed, we could say that Derrida also takes words from literary language and makes 
them do some work as philosophical concepts.  For our present purposes, whether the 
word „autobiography‟ is first of all a word of everyday language or of literary language 
matters less than the work it does as a philosophical concept.  Here, I would like to 
further distinguish my interpretation of Derrida from Smith and Kronick, who are less 
concerned with the work that the word „autobiography‟ does as a philosophical concept 
and more concerned with what Derrida refers to as the „restructurations of philosophical 
discourse‟.  This institutional significance is not here the concern.  That is, what impact 
the conceptualization of autobiography has on the philosophical tradition as an 
institutional body of writing is not what interests me.  What interests me is the work of 
conceptualization itself, the work of concept formation, and the way in which it 
provokes the reconceptualization of subjectivity. 
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 On this point of concept formation, it is necessary to turn to Gasché‟s account of 
Derrida in The Tain of the Mirror.  Gasché calls the fundamental concepts in Derrida‟s 
early work „quasi-synthetic concepts‟ and „infrastructures‟ (Gasché, 1986, p.7): i.e., the 
concepts of arche-writing, différance, trace, supplement, iterability, re-mark, etc.  This 
is because they intermediate between the oppositional nature of a particular conceptual 
opposition – for example arche-writing between writing and speech – in such a way so 
as to act as the quasi-transcendental ground of that opposition, thereby synthesizing 
them up to a point through which they become not opposites but differences of degree 
(in the case of arche-writing, different modes of communication).  Although I agree 
with Gasché up to a point, I would also like to take issue with him, so as to make clear 
how Derrida‟s work of concept formation is understood in the present study.  I think 
there is a danger with Gasché‟s interpretation in which the concepts become just a little 
too abstracted from the context of their production.  In his chapter „A System Beyond 
Being‟, where he summarizes what he calls this „infrastructural chain‟ of Derrida‟s 
concepts, in his account of the concept of re-mark, he says: „As in our previous 
analyses, I shall discuss this infrastructure in abstraction from the rich context in which 
it is produced within Derrida‟s work‟ (p.218).  However, this abstraction can sometimes 
miss the point.  For instance, in his account of iterability, Gasché fails to show how the 
formation of the concept of iterability in „Signature Event Context‟ (in: Derrida, 1988b) 
works to counteract certain features of Austin‟s concept of the performative in How to 
Do Things with Words (Austin, 1962).  For this reason, in the present study, sometimes 
Derrida‟s concepts will be referred to as counter-concepts. 
This notion of the counter-concept is particularly applicable with regard to his 
neologisms surrounding the concept of autobiography, as they could be perceived to be 
counteracting an implicit metaphysics within this concept.  In his earlier chapter, 
„Deconstructive Methodology‟, Gasché describes the way in which Derrida‟s thought 
demonstrates the fundamental gap between the concept formations of philosophical 
thought and the rhetorical structures of the texts within which those concepts are 
formed: „Derrida‟s parallel inquiry into the formation of philosophical concepts and the 
argumentative, discursive, and textual structures of philosophy leads to the recognition 
of an essential nonhomogeneity between the concepts and philosophical texts or works 
themselves‟ (Gasché, 1986, p.128).  Indeed, but surely it is precisely this paradox that 
makes it problematic to abstract the concepts to quite the degree that Gasché himself 
does in „A System Beyond Being‟.  Perhaps this abstraction is symptomatic of Gasché‟s 
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placement of Derrida‟s philosophical thought firmly within the context of 
phenomenology (Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger).  Sometimes, because of the abstraction, 
the concrete point of reference is lost in some of the sentences that he constructs – 
which would seem to be an effect of phenomenological vocabulary more generally that 
Derrida‟s thought puts into question.  And ironically, as much as Gasché distances 
Derrida‟s thought from „the literary-critical enterprise‟ (p.1), in a way it can also mimic 
it because the abstract language of phenomenological vocabulary is equally as opaque 
as creative poetic writing.  What it lacks in terms of opaque fragmentation it makes up 
for in terms of opaque abstraction.  The emphasis here on the value of prose writing is 
thus a way of circumventing the obscurity that occurs in both camps of scholarship on 
Derrida‟s thought (philosophy and literature) where there is a tendency to sacrifice 
clarity for profundity. 
This latter point can be demonstrated by considering the way in which 
subjectivity has been thought by scholars who, like Gasché, interpret Derrida‟s thought 
primarily as evolving out of the phenomenological context.  Here, there are two books 
in the field, two edited collections, coming from this perspective: Who Comes After the 
Subject? (Cadava, Conner, and Nancy, 1991), and Deconstructive Subjectivities 
(Critchley and Dews, 1996a).  While the essays in these two books are insightful for 
their accounts of the way in which the concept of subjectivity organizes the metaphysics 
of the philosophical tradition, what they do not do is offer a reconceptualization of 
subjectivity itself.  Like the work of Smith and Kronick, they appear to be more 
concerned with the institutions within which they work more than the concepts that they 
are actually working with.  Hence why, in the respective introductions to the edited 
collections, there appears to be more concern with reworking the philosophical tradition 
than with reworking the concept of subjectivity.  Jean-Luc Nancy opens his 
„Introduction‟ by saying: „Philosophy, today, world-wide: what might this mean?‟ 
(Nancy, 1991, p.1).  A little later, after having considered the problem of the idea of the 
self-identical  „philosophical community‟ (p.2), he wonders about his title: „the question 
asks “who?”  Which means that the question of essence – “What, existence?” – calls 
forth a “who” in response‟ (pp.6-7).  The philosophy of the subject is grounded in an 
undecidable aporia between the „who‟ (the internal subjectivity of the subject) and the 
„what‟ (the subject understood as an external object).  But also the problem of before 
and after: „“Before/after the subject”: who‟ (p.7).  Nancy‟s mode of articulation on this 
latter point is particularly confusing. 
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Nancy is quite clear when it comes to his problematization of the philosophical 
tradition near the beginning, but comparatively unclear when it comes to the depiction 
of the nature of human subjectivity from the deconstructive perspective – other than to 
enigmatically allude to a few basic distinctions.  Ultimately he is more interested in the 
paradoxical problems posed by how we phrase the question of subjectivity in the first 
place.  As Derrida‟s early work clarifies, the question „What is...?‟ is the question of 
ontological essence.  And yet, to ask „Who am I?‟ is to ask who I am in my true self, my 
eternal essence; whereas to ask „What am I?‟ is to ask what have I become in my 
worldly, temporal existence.  On the one hand, the „what‟ can pose the question of 
objective essence whereas the „who‟ can pose the question of subjective perspective; but 
on the other hand, the „who‟ can also pose the question of subjective essence and the 
„what‟ can also pose the question of objective character traits.  At any rate, in their 
„Introduction‟ to Deconstructive Subjectivities, Simon Critchley and Peter Dews 
perhaps go one stage further than Nancy: 
 
[W]hen the full range of what has been thought under the concept of the “subject” comes into view, and 
when the possibilities of genuine alternatives are addressed, then the subject may appear, in many of its 
guises, to be one of the driving forces behind – rather than the prime defense against – that unravelling of 
metaphysics which has come to be known, after Derrida, as “deconstruction” (Critchley and Dews, 
1996b, p.1). 
 
Here, like Nancy, they allude to the deconstructive work that must be done in relation to 
the „unravelling of metaphysics‟; i.e., in relation to the metaphysical tradition of 
thought.  But they also keep in reserve behind this work the concept of subjectivity as 
one which must be returned to after a certain amount of unravelling of metaphysics has 
been undertaken. 
 However, if we take Critchley‟s own essay in Deconstructive Subjectivities as an 
exemplary example, „Prolegomena to any Post-deconstructive Subjectivity‟, then we 
can begin to see some of the difficulties.  The main problem to consider is the 
inadequately abstract nature of phenomenological vocabulary to explain the essence of 
human subjectivity.  Here, there develops the concern that the descriptions surrounding 
subjectivity are too generalized to make sense; as if their abstractness carries some sort 
of profundity that is supposed to speak to us somehow.  For example, on Heidegger, 
Critchley says: „For the later Heidegger, the human is no longer a subjective master of 
entities but, rather, the shepherd of Being, and it exceeds metaphysics in its ecstatic 
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openness to the temporal donation of the truth of Being, the appropriative event of das 
Ereignis‟ (Critchley, 1996b, p20).  On Levinas, he says: „The ethical subject is an 
embodied being of flesh and blood, a being capable of hunger, who eats and enjoys 
eating‟ (p. 30).  A little further on: „what Levinas calls the “psyche,” is structured in a 
relation of responsibility or responsivity to the other.  The psyche is the other in the 
same, the other within me in spite of me, calling me to respond‟ (p.31).  In three 
citations the point of reference in such examples is far too abstracted from the web of 
complex practicalities that form everyday life for my liking; and as such they actually 
say very little about their stated topic of subjectivity.  Of course, philosophy can be 
written like that, but surely when it is about the human experience of everyday life one‟s 
ideas should have a certain pragmatic tangibility about them.  It is tempting to cite 
Rorty‟s „Response to Simon Critchley‟ in the edited collection, Deconstruction and 
Pragmatism: „I don‟t find Levinas‟s Other any more useful than Heidegger‟s Being – 
both strike me as gawky, awkward, and unenlightening‟ (Rorty, 1996, p.41). 
The present study therefore not only performs a radical change of terrain in the 
scholarship on Derrida‟s autobiographical thought, but by arguing autobiography to 
supplement subjectivity, it also performs a radical change of direction in the scholarship 
on Derrida‟s thought on subjectivity itself.  And of course, to draw on Rorty‟s name 
here is not to subscribe to everything he says.  Rather, we do so to invoke a somewhat 
forgotten neologism of Derrida‟s: pragrammatology.  For example, in a footnote in 
„Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion‟, in Limited Inc, Derrida says: 
 
Grammatology has always been a sort of pragmatics, but the discipline which bears this name today 
involve too many presuppositions requiring deconstruction, very much like speech act theory, to be 
simply homogeneous with that which is announced in De la grammatologie.  A pragrammatology (to 
come) would articulate in a more fruitful and more rigorous manner these two discourses (Derrida, 1988b, 
p.159). 
 
Pragmatism and pragmatics are perhaps not the same thing (the one an empirical 
philosophy concerning the understanding of abstract philosophical concepts in relation 
to the practicalities of existence; the other the empirical analysis of practical instances 
of language use), but it is not a far stretch to argue that they imply one another.  Indeed, 
Derrida alludes here to presuppositions „very much like speech act theory‟ contained 
within pragmatics.  Perhaps it is unfair to use Rorty to criticize Critchley without 
allowing the latter some space also to respond to the former.  In his essay, 
12 
 
„Deconstruction and Pragmatism – Is Derrida a Private Ironist or a Public Liberal?‟ (the 
essay that provokes Rorty‟s „Response‟), Critchley argues that Rorty‟s celebration of 
the bourgeois liberal „can be read as a (re)descriptive apologetics for the inequality, 
intolerance, exploitation and disenfranchisement within actually existing liberal 
democracies‟ (Critchley, 1996a, p.24).  One general criticism of pragmatism from a 
deconstructive perspective could therefore be to pose the question of „who‟: i.e., 
pragmatism concerns the practicalities of whose existence?  If there is indeed a complex 
web of practicalities to account for, then around whose life circumstances are such 
practicalities formed?  Presumably everybody‟s – but in that case not just the bourgeois 
liberal.  In the context of such critical questioning, it follows that pragmatics, like 
speech act theory, must also critically consider the broader relation to its underlying 
worldview regarding the nature of the world and its underlying psychology regarding 
the nature of the psyche. 
For Derrida, such critical considerations begin with our underlying philosophy 
of language, in particular concerning the theoretical relation of language to worldly 
reality (outside) and to the human mind (inside).  These considerations return us to our 
theme of autobiography, understood in a pragrammatological manner.  That is, 
autobiography in Derrida‟s thought becomes a question of what links his concept of 
arche-writing to the complex web of practicalities, everybody‟s practicalities, that forms 
the human experience of everyday life and language.  In Of Grammatology Derrida 
distinguished writing in the narrow sense that we more commonly understand (as a 
specific form of communication which inscribes words onto surface material), from 
what he calls arche-writing.  Arche-writing was intended not to make a point about 
writing per se; it was rather more directed at speech, and in particular at the way in 
which the idea of „hearing-oneself-speak‟ is used by the metaphysical tradition to 
confirm to itself the self-proximity and self-presence of the subject.  Arche-writing is 
therefore an umbrella term which is intended to cover the essential structure of all 
communicative language (writing, speech, gesture, etc), insofar as that structure 
involves the distance and absence which writing itself traditionally contains.  Logically, 
this means the following: viz., that arche-writing involves a paradoxical sense of writing 
without writing.  That is, even if one communicates without writing in the „narrow 
sense‟ of the term, one still communicates with writing in the broader sense of arche-
writing, in which one‟s communication must still conform to the structure of writing 
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more generally.  The question then becomes: How does this impinge upon our thinking 
regarding autobiography? 
 First of all, it is important to consider the following argument: viz., that the 
concept of autobiography is hyperbolic.  That is, it overflows its intended point of 
reference.  Autobiography is the story of „my life‟, not yours; and yet, like the word 
„my‟ the word „autobiography‟ is deictic; in principle it can be utilized by anyone and 
everyone.  Although autobiography is the story of my life, the singularity of my life 
represents the otherness of my life to everybody else.  Hence, as Peggy Kamuf 
paradoxically notes in Signature Pieces: On the Institution of Authorship: 
„autobiography is always already the autobiography of the other‟ (Kamuf, 1988, p.126).  
In order to write one‟s own autobiography, one must refer to one‟s relations with others: 
family members, friends, family friends, lovers, friends of friends, lovers of friends, 
lovers of family members, work colleagues, etc.  But the moment one refers to others, 
one is touching upon the autobiography of others even though one is still discussing 
one‟s own: the other‟s autobiography is thus radically implicated in one‟s own 
autobiography.  What is more, from the perspective of the other‟s autobiography, one‟s 
own autobiography is counted as the other‟s autobiography.  As such, there is in a 
strange way no such thing as one‟s own autobiography, for the ownership always 
already belongs to someone else, in part.  Indeed, this part that belongs to the other is 
also partly what precludes the metaphysical access to the whole of one‟s own life and 
self.  If deconstruction is the demystification of the metaphysical ideal of totality, then 
this is not merely to do with the completeness of philosophical systems or cosmological 
accounts; it also applies itself to the understanding of life and self. 
In which case, autobiography is not merely the autobiography of the other, but is 
also the autobiography of death.  Derrida broadly subscribes to Nietzsche‟s concepts of 
life-death and tragic affirmation: death is radically implicated in life, and we are left to 
affirm the inevitable hardships of life, of which death is the ultimate symbol, 
paradoxically with both a wry smile and with tears.  Even if you were to live a 
financially comfortable and emotionally stable life, perhaps even with a fair share of 
life‟s ecstatic and exciting experiences, death will still catch you up.  Of course, such a 
„happy life‟, a life that gives us that joie de vivre, is for the fortunate minority of the 
world.  And with this question of life‟s fortune, it becomes necessary to account for the 
fate of the position of birth: e.g., to be born into privilege or stillborn into squalor (or 
somewhere between).  Generally, of course, to be born into privilege is considered 
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better; but there are cultural and psychological possibilities to account for.  One can be 
born into privilege but be held back by a family who is unkind; or conversely, one can 
be born into squalor but have the kindest of families.  But although there are 
possibilities, there are also probabilities to account for: e.g., although it is possible to be 
born into privilege and yet be held back in other ways, it is nonetheless probable that it 
is better to be born into privileged living conditions than it is to be born into squalor.  Or 
although it is possible to be born into squalor and yet progress into privileged living 
conditions as life goes on, in all probability this is less likely to occur than it is if one is 
already born into privilege.  This means that, in principle, one born into squalor is not 
only forced to work harder than one born into privilege, but also requires more luck 
than them, if one is to exist in privileged living conditions – as each individual a priori 
deserves. 
In the field of scholarship on Derrida‟s thought concerning autobiography, this 
issue of touching base with actual living conditions or life circumstances, in all their 
complex web of practicalities, is strangely absent.  Instead, there is more of a concern 
for the strange literary ironies that occur in the act of writing an autobiography.  
Undoubtedly, this is due to the influence of the main protagonist of deconstructive 
literary criticism, Paul de Man, whose essay „Autobiography as De-facement‟ in The 
Rhetoric of Romanticism offers a unique interpretation of the issues that are relevant to 
the theorization of autobiography.  Broadly speaking, as Martin McQuillan notes in 
Paul de Man, de Man‟s book puts forward the way in which language is rhetorically 
organized by the dynamics of figuration and disfiguration: „figuration (the power of 
texts to posit their own meanings) and disfiguration (the internal structure of a text that 
erases such meanings)‟ (McQuillan, 2001, p.69).  For de Man, the epistemic or 
cognitive function of human experience is not found inside the human subject or 
psyche, but rather in rhetorical language; that is, in all language, insofar as all language 
is considered as rhetorical, figurative, tropological, etc.  On de Man‟s interpretation, this 
figurative function gives language the power to hide (disfigure) what it simultaneously 
presents.  As he succinctly puts it in his „Criticism and Crisis‟, which opens his 
founding book Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary 
Criticism: 
 
It is the distinctive privilege of language to be able to hide meaning behind a misleading sign, as when we 
hide rage or hatred behind a smile.  But it is the distinctive curse of all language, as soon as any kind of 
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interpersonal relation is involved, that it is forced to act this way.  The simplest of wishes cannot express 
itself without hiding behind a screen of language that constitutes a world of intricate intersubjective 
relationships, all of them potentially inauthentic.  In the everyday language of communication, there is no 
a priori privileged position of sign over meaning or of meaning over sign; the act of interpretation will 
always again have to establish this relation for the particular case at hand.  The interpretation of everyday 
language is a Sisyphean task, a task without end and without progress, for the other is always free to make 
what he wants differ from what he says he wants (De Man, 1983, p.11). 
 
This citation is particularly apt here for it refers to „everyday language‟ instead of 
„literary language‟ or the „literary text‟.  That is, it is given a more generic pragmatic 
emphasis whose point of reference is to the „real world‟ or „real life‟, as distinct from 
the specific institutional emphasis of literature departments in educational systems 
(although the latter dominates in de Man‟s work and in deconstructive literary 
criticism).  But how does this paradoxical dynamic of simultaneous presentation and 
hiding, figuration and disfiguration, impinge on his autobiographical theory? 
In „Autobiography as De-facement‟, de Man is critical of the Romantic tendency 
to treat autobiography as if it were ideal grounds for complete self-knowledge.  Indeed, 
this is a tendency he also reads as problematic within some authors in the growing 
discipline of autobiographical theory, and he briefly refers to the example of the works 
of Philippe Lejeune.  But de Man‟s stronger interest rests more in a reading of the 
English poet William Wordsworth, with particular reference to his short work, „Essay 
upon Epitaphs‟ (in: Wordsworth, 1854).  De Man cites Wordsworth to the effect that the 
latter denounces the workings of rhetorical language in order to save the goodness of the 
human soul: „The language so violently denounced [by Wordsworth] is in fact the 
language of metaphor, of prosopopeia and of tropes, the solar language of cognition that 
makes the unknown accessible to the mind and to the senses‟ (De Man, 1984, p.80).  
This is expressed by de Man in a paradoxical tone („is in fact‟) because he had earlier 
argued that Wordsworth appears, in his „Essay upon Epitaphs‟, to propose prosopopeia 
as a characteristic feature of epitaphic or autobiographical discourse: „The dominant 
figure of the epitaphic or autobiographical discourse is, as we saw, the prosopopeia, the 
fiction of the voice-from-beyond-the-grave‟ (p.77).  McQuillan notes the etymology of 
the word „prosopopeia‟: „The etymology of the word “prosopopeia” comes from the 
Greek prospon poien, to confer a mask or face (prosopon)‟ (McQuillan, 2001, p.78).  
Prosopopeia is etymologically linked to the face, and so is linked to the rhetorical 
feature that de Man calls de-facement or disfigurement, for: „Interestingly in French the 
word “figure” can mean “form or shape” as well as “face”‟ (p.69).  Indeed, if we 
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transpose the point of reference from language to life, then „disfigurement‟ applies itself 
in the first instance to the face; it is the deforming or blemishing of the facial features. 
In his text „Mnemosyne‟ in Memoires for Paul de Man, Derrida himself 
provides a reading of de Man‟s „Autobiography as De-facement‟.  „Mnemosyne‟, like 
another essay of Derrida‟s on de Man, „Psyche: Invention of the Other‟ (in: Derrida, 
2007), was written soon after de Man‟s death, and so acts as a work of mourning for his 
colleague and friend – Derrida borrows, and at times adjusts, this term from Freud‟s 
„Mourning and Melancholia‟ (in: Freud, 2001c).  Derrida begins his reading of 
„Autobiography as De-facement‟ by alluding to the way in which it begins, before it 
turns to the reading of Wordsworth and to the figure of prosopopeia.  He succinctly 
summarizes the opening themes of the essay: „In this particular text, the problem of 
autobiography seems to elicit several concerns: that of genre, of totalization, and of the 
performative function‟ (Derrida, 1989, p.23).  The emphasis on „seems‟ thus alludes to 
the way in which de Man‟s more explicit focus is on the figure, or rather the 
disfigurement, of prosopopeia – even though it does not appear this way from the outset 
of his essay.  The triadic structure that Derrida draws our attention to has a strange sort 
of quasi-dialectical feature to it, in which autobiography-as-genre is problematized by a 
performative element, mediated by the problem of totality.  For the problem of genre, de 
Man argues that autobiographical theory has so far understood autobiography as a 
distinctive literary genre whose boundaries are identifiable.  Derrida produces the 
following quotation from the opening page of de Man‟s essay: „By making 
autobiography into a genre, one elevates it above the literary status of mere reportage, 
chronicle, or memoir and gives it a place, albeit a modest one, among the canonical 
hierarchies of the major literary genres‟ (De Man, 1984, p.67).  In his citation, Derrida 
italicizes the word „memoir‟ (which in the text Derrida is working with is plural, 
memoirs, without the „e‟ that Derrida uses in the title of his book, Memoires for Paul De 
Man), thus highlighting the strange connection between memoir and autobiography. 
Derrida‟s delicate adjustment of de Man (via his insertion of the „e‟) also creates 
the space for a delicate transition – „prosopopeia is also the art of delicate transition‟ 
(De Man, 1984, p.76) – from de Man‟s style of deconstruction to his own, as I will 
show in a moment.  But to continue with the triad: demarcating autobiography as a 
literary genre is highlighted as problematic by de Man when considering the 
performative function of literature or fiction.  That is, on the one hand, autobiography is 
meant to be factual: „It seems to belong to a simpler mode of referentiality, of 
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representation, and of diegesis‟ (p.68).  But on the other hand, its rhetorical construction 
ironically undermines the access to its factuality: autobiography can never be merely 
about facts, for is also about desires, dreams, fantasies, likes, dislikes, hopes, fears, etc, 
in relation to which evidential access becomes impossible.  We only have the author‟s 
own word; but as the author‟s life becomes mirrored in the autobiographical text, he/she 
becomes both the object and the subject of his/her own discourse.  De Man refers to this 
strange performative self-division as the „specular structure‟ (p.70) of autobiographical 
writing.  With this performative dimension, not only does autobiography become 
taxonomically impossible to classify as a genre, but it also undermines the authority of 
the author as a guarantor of total and complete self-knowledge.  In de Man‟s argument, 
the latter is sought after not only in Romantic autobiographies but also in more 
contemporary autobiographical theory: „The interest of autobiography, then, is not that 
it reveals reliable self-knowledge – it does not – but that it demonstrates in a striking 
way the impossibility of closure and totalization (that is the impossibility of coming into 
being) of all textual systems made up of tropological substitutions‟ (p.71). 
At this point, it is useful to consider the way in which de Man‟s argument about 
genre has been utilized by literary critical interpretations of Derrida‟s autobiographical 
thought.  It must be remembered that much of de Man‟s thought, and much of the 
literary critical reception of his thought, has concerned the enigmatic institution of 
literary studies.  Indeed, in „Mnemosyne‟ Derrida himself notes this: „De Manian 
criticism or deconstruction is always, also, an analysis of “resistances” and of the 
symptoms they produce (for example, the “resistance to theory” in literary studies)‟ 
(Derrida, 1989, p.31).  Derrida himself is also the author of a notable essay 
contaminating literary genres, „The Law of Genre‟ (in: Derrida, 1992).  It is not, then, a 
far stretch for literary scholars working in the field to interpret Derrida‟s thought, in 
light of de Man‟s arguments, as impinging on autobiographical theory (although in this 
essay it is not autobiography but Derrida‟s concept of the re-mark which performs this 
primordial contamination).  Indeed, the influence of Derrida‟s essay has been notable 
for subsequent scholars working on autobiography to help understand the problem from 
a poststructuralist perspective.  For example, Laura Marcus, in her (1994) book 
Auto/biographical Discourses: Criticism, Theory, Practice entitles her penultimate 
chapter „The Law of Genre‟; and Linda Anderson, in her (2001) book Autobiography 
entitles the second section of her introduction „The Law of Genre‟.  The argument that I 
would like to put across here is not that Derrida‟s thought does not make contact with 
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literary themes; it evidently does.  It is rather that, where it is a major feature in de Man 
it is comparatively minor in Derrida.  But because Derrida‟s thought has been given 
more space in literature than philosophy, this feature of his thought has been given a 
somewhat disproportionate consideration in relation to his more philosophical 
tendencies. 
Indeed, such tendencies can be seen if we compare the two texts we are 
presently discussing: de Man‟s „Autobiography as De-facement‟ and Derrida‟s 
„Mnemosyne‟.  The latter is much more philosophically rich than the former in that de 
Man‟s thought is directed more to literature whereas Derrida‟s thought is directed more 
to life.  It is not that de Man says nothing about life and Derrida says nothing about 
literature; but that what they each say about these things is comparatively less than their 
main focus and point of reference.  What is a major thematic emphasis in de Man is in 
this case a comparatively minor one in Derrida, and vice versa.  For example, in 
„Autobiography as De-facement‟, memory is alluded to by de Man: „For just as 
autobiographies, by their thematic insistence on the subject, on the proper name, on 
memory, on birth, eros, and death, and on the doubleness of specularity, openly declare 
their cognitive and tropological constitution, they are equally eager to escape from the 
coercions of this system‟ (De Man, 1984, p.71).  In contrast, in „Mnemosyne‟, 
autobiographical memory is Derrida‟s topic – given in its very title, which utilizes the 
name of the ancient Greek goddess of memory.  Derrida also reproduces the above 
citation from de Man, and in doing so italicizes the word „memory‟ just as he had done 
with the word „memoirs‟.  A little later on he adjusts de Man‟s definition of prosopopeia 
from „voice-from-beyond-the-grave‟ to „memoirs-from-beyond-the-grave‟ (Derrida, 
1989, p.29), thereby alluding to an impasse between rhetoricity (the rhetorical 
construction of the event) and historicity (the eventual contextualization of rhetoric) – 
an impasse between the rhetoric of temporality and the temporality of rhetoric. 
For Derrida, deconstruction has multiple forms.  In „Mnemosyne‟ he says: „If I 
had to risk a single definition of deconstruction, one as brief, elliptical, and economical 
as a password, I would say simply and without overstatement: plus d‟une langue – both 
more than a language and no more of a language‟ (Derrida, 1989, p.15).  A little later he 
continues: „there is no sense in speaking of a deconstruction or simply deconstruction as 
if there were only one‟ (p.17).  As such, perhaps the impasse between rhetoricity and 
historicity is at work more acutely in Derrida‟s concept of the work of mourning itself.  
For example, memory and mourning are etymologically linked; and Derrida alludes to 
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this when he considers what it is to speak „in memory of‟ someone after their death; in 
his own case in the memory of de Man: „In memory of him: these words cloud sight and 
thought.  What is said, what is done, what is desired through these words: in memory 
of...?‟ (p.19).  Derrida here poses a question – a very philosophical gesture in 
comparison with de Man who, in The Rhetoric of Romanticism, says: „To question is to 
forget‟ (De Man, 1984, p.118).  McQuillan succinctly expands on this point: „Asking a 
question closes off alternative ways of thinking and reiterates the structure of meaning 
we are attempting to interrogate‟ (McQuillan, 2001, p.70).  That is, to pose a question is 
to phrase it in a particular way, and so to close off alternative ways of posing the same 
question which would make it carry meaning or force from a slightly different 
perspective or angle; or even of posing a different question altogether.  Indeed, this 
problem is the basis of Nancy‟s hesitation between the „who‟ and the „what‟ that was 
discussed earlier.  The paradoxical problem that Derrida poses is that, even so, it 
remains necessary to ask questions to facilitate the process of thinking – although 
furthering the impasse, of course this is not to say that Nancy and de Man ask no 
questions of their own, or that Derrida himself does not also pose the same problem of 
questioning. 
In „Mnemosyne‟, Derrida poses a paradox between the traditional notion of a 
successful memory, a memory without forgetting, and what he calls, from the opening 
page, „impossible mourning‟ (Derrida, 1989, p.3).  This is a paradox which is performed 
by the concept of the work of mourning.  The work of mourning is a process in which, 
after the death of a loved one, the period in which we live in memory of them must 
gradually pass, and we must learn to forget them in order to get on with our lives post 
hoc.  In other words, mourning is an impossible labour because it demands both that we 
live „in memory of‟ someone and we simultaneously „learn to forget‟ them.  The gap 
(écart) between memory and forgetting in the work of mourning is therefore impossible 
to close, which is why Sean Gaston‟s book The Impossible Mourning of Jacques 
Derrida allusively refers to: „an impossible mourning on the gap‟ (Gaston, 2006, p.12).  
That is, the historical traces of memory in the work of mourning, and so in the work of 
mourning as an exemplary example of the work of memory itself (as we live „in 
memory of‟ the dead), these traces have a paradoxical function: on the one hand, they 
make it impossible to forget; on the other hand, they inscribe gaps in our memory such 
that it is also impossible to remember.  As Gaston puts it: „mourning is both 
unavoidable and impossible‟ (p.vii).  The paradox of simultaneous necessity and 
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impossibility is a characteristic feature of Derrida‟s thought: that which is impossible is 
also that which is most needed; meaning that which is most needed is that which is most 
difficult to acquire – not just in language (e.g., finding the right words), but also in life 
(e.g., finding the right words). 
It is thus in the work of mourning that Derrida‟s rhetorical feature of the „death 
of the other‟, conceptualized in his neologism heterothanatography, makes an explicit 
appearance in his thought.  For example, Derrida uses this phrase notably in the final 
paragraph of „Mnemosyne‟, in which he also alludes to his other essay on de Man, 
„Psyche: Invention of the Other‟ (Psyche of course being another major ancient Greek 
figure; though not initially a goddess, she possessed a godlike beauty such that Eros 
himself fell in love with her): 
 
In the strict and almost institutional domain of rhetoric, all figures, modes, or types – be they classifiable 
or unclassifiable – receive their (unclassifiable) possibility from these paradoxical structures: first, the 
inclusion in a set of a part that is greater than the set; second, a logic or an a-logic of which we can no 
longer say that it belongs to mourning in the current sense of the term, but which regulates (sometimes 
like mourning in the strict sense, but always like mourning in the sense of a general possibility) all our 
relations with the other as other, that is, as mortal for a mortal, with the one always capable of dying 
before the other.  Our “own” mortality is not dissociated from, but rather also conditions this rhetoric of 
faithful memory, all of which serves to seal an alliance and to recall us to an affirmation of the other.  The 
death of the other, if we can say this, is also situated on our side at the very moment when it comes to us 
from an altogether other side.  Its Erinnerung becomes as inevitable as it is unliveable: it finds there its 
origin and its limit, its conditions of possibility and impossibility.  In another context, I have called this 
Psyche: Psyche, the proper name of an allegory; Psyche, the common name for the soul; and Psyche, in 
French, the name of a revolving mirror.  Today it is no longer Psyche, but apparently Mnemosyne 
(Derrida, 1989, pp.38-39). 
 
„Apparently‟ Mnemosyne, then, because, as a „revolving mirror‟, as Psyche twists its 
reflection back into itself, it is not its true self that it sees but another figure of itself.  
For example, regarding another person exterior to oneself whom one loves, before any 
actual „relationship‟ occurs there is the prior knowledge of one another‟s mortality.  
Every meaningful relationship that one has is therefore structured in advance by the 
death of the other.  This also implies that every relationship that one wants to have but 
is thus not within one‟s own autonomous control to make happen (for it heteronomously 
requires the other‟s consent), is also structured in advance by the death of the other: 
meaning that, although the relationship might happen, it also might not happen.  Hence, 
the death of the other, and so impossible mourning, becomes applied as the a priori 
structure not only of every actual loving relationship, but also of any longed-for love 
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that is fantasized after but not achieved in actuality.  They are Derrida‟s names for the 
impossibly difficult experiences of the heartbroken.  The death of the other is the 
heartache of the life of the self.  And although this heartache has a radically temporal 
phenomenon in the context of one‟s own life, it also something that, in its own way, is 
also impossible to date.  Heartache is historicity without „dating‟. 
Coming towards the conclusion to this introduction, let us consider the impact of 
this for distinguishing the present study from Robert Smith‟s Derrida and 
Autobiography.  This book, with such a simple title, is very complex.  In „Philosophy as 
Autobiography: The Confessions of Jacques Derrida‟, Joseph G. Kronick says that 
Derrida and Autobiography is „a straightforward title for an oddly circuitous work‟ 
(Kronick, 2000, p.1007).  Indeed.  So in the context of such circumlocutions, what is 
Smith‟s argument?  Smith‟s book is divided into three parts: „The Book of Esther‟, 
„Clarifying Autobiography‟, and „The Book of Zoë‟.  The first part builds itself up to an 
oblique reading of Derrida‟s semi-autobiographical text „Circumfession‟, but does so 
via a strong emphasis on Hegel‟s philosophy.  In „Circumfession‟ Derrida himself 
provides a circumlocutionary reading of Saint Augustine‟s Confessions, in which he 
abbreviates Saint Augustine‟s name into the acronym SA.  He does this in order to 
make a parallel between the French term for „absolute knowledge‟, savoir absolu, and 
in which his earlier book Glas, where he provides a reading of Hegel, he also uses the 
acronym SA to refer to the latter‟s concept of „absolute knowledge‟ (Derrida, 1986).  By 
turning Saint Augustine‟s name into the same acronym, Derrida makes an implicit 
connection between the theological thought of Augustine and Hegel.  The first part of 
Smith‟s book depends on this implicit parallel, even though it is not a feature that Smith 
himself directly discusses.  But in this way, Hegel becomes relevant to Derrida‟s own 
autobiographical text.  As Smith moves into the first chapter of the second part, entitled 
„Worstword Ho: Some Recent Theories‟, he clarifies the use of Hegel further in relation 
to „the anxieties over method analysed above in relation to Hegel‟s protocol for 
philosophical enquiry‟ (Smith, 1995, p.52).  That is, Hegel‟s self-consciousness trying 
to provide stable grounds for philosophical method mimic the self-consciousness of 
writers on autobiography trying to provide stable grounds for their own theoretical 
enquiries. 
„Worstword Ho‟ is the key to understanding Derrida and Autobiography as a 
whole.  The third part of the book, „The Book of Zoë‟, contains three chapters that are 
formed of the three terms in the word autobiography: „auto‟, „bio‟, and „graphy‟.  While 
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in one way this might appear like neat organization, in another way it is difficult to 
think what the point of it could be.  This is where Smith‟s literary-critical influence 
becomes clearer, and „Worstword Ho‟ clarifies the point further.  As the subtitle of 
„Worstword Ho‟ implies, the chapter offers an account of some recent autobiographical 
theories – and towards the end of the chapter Smith positions Derrida‟s thought in 
relation to them.  Smith argues that autobiographical theory has been dominated by 
„humanist-existentialist‟ (Smith, 1995, p.55) approaches in which the „auto‟ and the 
„bio‟ of autobiography is privileged, and the „graphy‟ aspect is excluded.  For Smith, 
this has contributed to autobiography becoming „a watered-down, self-help, gospelised 
existentialism more or less concerned with claiming autobiography as a means of 
consumerist “self-realization,” to which a value of truth, as wholesome sincerity, is 
often superadded‟ (p.55).  He then compares these existential-humanists (notably 
Philippe Lejeune, James Olney, and Christophe Miething) with more deconstructive, 
and so what he considers to be less existential-humanist, thinkers (including de Man, 
Kamuf, and Nancy), as a prelude to the figure of Derrida himself.  Here, the general 
criticism by the latter set of thinkers made against the former is that the 
autobiographical subject is thought to perform a „form of (attempted) subjective self-
closure‟ (p.67).  While, with the existential-humanists, this attempt is thought to be 
successful in autobiographies; in contrast, the deconstructionists, with their emphasis 
more on the „graphy‟ in relation to the institution of literary biography itself, argue this 
attempt to be radically unsuccessful. 
In turning towards Derrida in this debate, Smith produces the following citation 
from Signsponge, furthering the deconstructive interpretation: 
 
The academic conventions of literary biography presuppose at least one certainty – the one concerning the 
signature, the link between the text and the proper name of the person who retains the copyright.  Literary 
biography begins after the contract, if one may put it like this, after the event of signature (Derrida, 1984, 
p.24). 
 
For some reason Smith leaves out the word „academic‟ from his citation (perhaps it is a 
typo).  At any rate, not long after this citation, Smith says: „The institution of literary 
biography, so entrenched for so long, suddenly looks very shaky‟ (Smith, 1995, p.70).  
We now have a better sense, then, of why Smith structures the third part of Derrida and 
Autobiography, „The Book of Zoë‟, into the chapters „auto‟, „bio‟, and „graphy‟.  It is, 
in effect, to give back to the institution of literary biography its very literariness; the 
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writing which is so excluded in its dominant existential-humanist interpretation.  That 
is, it is so that writing gets the last word in deconstructive autobiographical theory – a 
theory which only begins, as Derrida notes above, „after the event of signature‟ which 
opens the institution of literary biography itself.  Indeed, this emphasis on signature, 
countersignature, proper name, etc, produces some curious literary ironies in relation to 
autobiography.  For example, Smith notes that: „in autobiography the name takes on [a] 
titular status‟ (p.71).  In principle, the title of the autobiographical text is the name of 
the text‟s very author.  Along these lines perhaps we could say that the signature, as 
autograph, is what brings death to autobiography since life (bio) is what is absent from 
it. 
So in what way is the present study different from Smith‟s interpretation?  To 
begin with, the strange ironies that might occur in the act of writing an autobiography 
are not the concern here.  In effect, the present study extracts the word „autobiography‟ 
from its literary-institutional context in order to conceptualize it philosophically.  The 
reason for this is to provoke the reconceptualization of subjectivity.  From the 
perspective of deconstructive philosophy, the conceptual oppositions at work in the 
concept of autobiography, life/death and self/other, offer a very economical initiation 
into what I will call the paradoxes of subjectivity: that is, where the essence of 
subjectivity, where that which enables us to understand subjectivity, must find its point 
of application in the complex and contradictory web of practicalities that form and 
transform each individual existence.  Here, understanding subjectivity is about looking 
to each individual subject‟s own life circumstances and life history.  Of course, to say 
this is not to imply that such understanding is ever complete, just as it is not to imply 
that there is complete „self-closure‟ for subjectivity itself.  Deconstruction demonstrates 
the impossibility of totality; but this is only the first stage, for paradoxically, it is 
therefore what makes the idea of this totality necessary.  Consider the etymology of the 
word „totality‟.  It is related to the words „health‟ and „heal‟; which are themselves 
related to the word „therapy‟.  This means that the paradoxes of subjectivity that are to 
be rethought in deconstructive philosophy must find their point of application in the 
idea of the promotion of a healthy mind, and therefore in the very meaning of the words 
psychotherapy and psychiatry.  Smith himself might not like the fact that autobiography 
is used for a „watered-down self-help gospelised existentialism‟; but I consider this to 
be one of its strengths, if it can be harnessed differently.  But philosophically speaking, 
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there are some existentialisms, and some of what Hillis Miller (1991, p.ix) calls 
„deconstructionisms‟, that have points of intersection. 
The metaphysical philosophy of the subject presupposes the autonomy of the 
individual person.  That is, it presupposes that the individual psyche pre-exists the 
individual‟s life.  In contrast, the emphasis on the life circumstances of the individual 
point towards the radically heteronomous inscription of the subject into life itself: it is 
not that the psyche pre-exists the life, but that the life pre-exists the psyche.  And if life 
pre-exists the psyche, then any psychological theory must be brought first and foremost 
before death and the other.  So it follows that we then have to reverse the relation 
between writing, self, and life that appears in Derrida and Autobiography.  It is not that 
writing gets the last word, but rather that it gets the first word.  It is necessary to begin 
with Derrida‟s concept of writing, as arche-writing, in order to then return to questions 
of self and life.  Here it becomes not a matter of moving from Derrida‟s concept of the 
signature to his autobiographical theory (as in Derrida and Autobiography), but rather 
of moving from his concept of autobiography to his theory of subjectivity.  In this way, 
we also return to deconstruction its radically existential concerns.  There might be 
metaphysical problems of „humanist-existentialism‟ in literary-cum-autobiographical 
theory, but in the history of philosophy existentialism is precisely what begins to put 
into question the essentialism of metaphysical humanism.  In this respect, 
deconstruction is a radical existentialism; and one of the aims of the present study is to 
demonstrate the way in which this occurs in Derrida‟s work. 
But how do we begin with arche-writing, which inscribes a priori the relation to 
death and the other into all communication, and turn towards the life of the self?  
Remember that it was stated earlier that arche-writing is a kind of „writing without 
writing‟ in relation to the other forms of communication that it structures.  So the 
answer to this question brings us to what we meant when we said that autobiography is 
hyperbolic.  Autobiography is hyperbolic not merely because of any strange ironies that 
might develop in the literary act of writing one.  But rather because, whether written or 
not, the concept of autobiography carries with it the conceptual force of a potentially 
universal application to everyone in their singular existence; as a way not only of 
connecting with oneself but also with the autobiographies of others; as a way not only 
of connecting with the living conditions of life but also with the expectation of death.  
The conceptualization of autobiography applies itself to an understanding of the relation 
between specific and generic, self and other, life and death, in such a way that operates 
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as if everyone was writing their autobiography in the very act of living their lives.  The 
paradoxes of subjectivity that are involved in Derrida‟s deconstruction of autobiography 
are grounded in the fact that, in living a life, one is writing one‟s autobiography.  Living 
a life is life-writing without life-writing; it is autobiography without autobiography.  
One does not need to write down one‟s life in order to write an autobiography, because 
the very process of living a life, which fundamentally includes the process of dying a 
death (and in a strange way they are the same process), this very process is 
autobiographical; it is both autobiographical and heterothanatographical.  Indeed, 
perhaps, then, it is also pragrammatological, insofar as, by connecting up with actual act 
of living life, it is what alludes to the complex web of practicalities that forms and 
transforms each of our lives. 
 
Chapter Summary 
The first chapter, „Confessing Truth: Augustine & Derrida‟, picks out the relation 
primarily between Augustine‟s Confessions and Derrida‟s „Circumfession‟.  Of 
particular interest is the concept that Derrida develops in „Circumfession‟, making truth.  
Derrida‟s deconstructive approach to truth, in particular as it presupposes the ethics of 
alterity (in „Circumfession‟ via the concept of „pardon‟), impinges on the theologics of 
confessional truth.  In order to demonstrate this, a debate is set up between two works; 
each from a different scholar of Derrida‟s thought: John D. Caputo‟s The Prayers and 
Tears of Jacques Derrida and Martin Hägglund‟s Radical Atheism.  Here, Caputo and 
Hägglund offer opposing interpretations of Derrida‟s thought, particularly via 
„Circumfession‟: Caputo rests on the „negative theology‟ side and Hägglund rests on the 
„radical atheism‟ side.  Towards its end, the chapter therefore mediates between the two 
by offering its own interpretation of Derrida‟s thought via „Circumfession‟: viz., that 
Derrida‟s thought proposes a form of radical agnosticism.  This means, primarily, that 
agnosticism is not so much about the metaphysical problem of whether or not God 
exists, but is rather about an ethical mode of relation to the other which allows them the 
space to believe what they want.  Consequently, the chapter develops the concept of 
autobiographical agnosticism, by which is meant that Derrida‟s autobiographical 
thought accounts for the singularity of the other‟s life according to each individual‟s 
own upbringing and characteristics.  In „Circumfession‟ Derrida argues that God is the 
origin of tears.  Towards the end of the chapter this is interpreted as counteracting the 
Augustinian cogito by positioning the concept of feeling before that of thought.  And 
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Derrida‟s interest in Augustine‟s moral psychology is reinterpreted via the distinction 
between confession as apology and as apologia. 
 The second chapter, „Confessing Desire: Rousseau & Derrida‟, begins by 
picking up where the last chapter left off: i.e., with the thought/feeling polarity.  
Rousseau is invoked by Derrida in Of Grammatology as the main source of inspiration 
in the history of philosophy by which this polarity becomes reversed, but which, he 
argues, the priority of feeling nonetheless remains metaphysical.  This chapter picks out 
the relation primarily between Rousseau‟s Confessions and Derrida‟s chapter in Of 
Grammatology, „That Dangerous Supplement‟.  In „That Dangerous Supplement‟ the 
autobiographical theme in Derrida‟s work regarding the relation between life and work 
is addressed.  However, this relation is more often than not given a literary critical 
emphasis, and so this chapter picks out two critical readings of Derrida‟s reading of 
Rousseau in Of Grammatology: Seán Burke‟s chapter on Derrida in The Death and 
Return of the Author, „Misread Intentions‟; and Paul de Man‟s essay on Derrida in 
Blindness and Insight, „The Rhetoric of Blindness: Jacques Derrida‟s Reading of 
Rousseau‟.  Against these two critics, this chapter argues that what tends to occur in the 
literary critical appropriation of Derrida‟s thought is the marginalization of his 
philosophical insight.  In particular, that his concept of the text as structured by a 
potentially infinite number of supplements is not appreciated as itself a „metaphysical‟ 
statement regarding the nature of the so-called subjective human experience of the 
objective real world.  Towards the end of the chapter this insight is given an 
autobiographical emphasis in which his concept of supplement is shown to have radical 
implications for reconceptualizing the way in which feelings can be supplemented when 
they become unsatisfied. 
 The third chapter, „Learning to Live: Marx & Derrida‟, begins by picking up on 
a dominant theme of the previous chapter: viz., Derrida‟s philosophical insight.  It 
argues that, if Derrida‟s deconstruction can become a form of literary criticism, then it 
can also become a form of philosophical criticism.  By the latter is meant, in particular, 
the calling into question of the very foundations or underlying premises of a discourse, 
an idea, or an argument; and on this point an alliance is made with Rodolphe Gasché – 
whose work offers a springboard for the idea of a deconstructive philosophical 
criticism.  Derrida‟s Spectres of Marx is given as a case in point, of this philosophical 
criticism, in which he undermines the very moment of identification of the proletariat 
qua proletariat.  As this identification is primarily a psychological one, it becomes a 
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dominant feature of Derrida‟s Rousseauian opening „Exordium‟ regarding the 
autobiographical theme from Émile of „learning to live‟ – a theme touched on in the 
previous chapter.  On the one hand, since the emphasis is on Marx‟s philosophy rather 
than his political economy, the reading addresses primarily his early work such as 
Critique of Hegel‟s „Philosophy of Right‟, The German Ideology, and The Communist 
Manifesto.  On the other hand, given the originality of the interpretation of Derrida‟s 
Spectres of Marx given in this chapter, various secondary sources are drawn up so as 
both to consider the other themes in Spectres of Marx that are not considered and to 
demonstrate this originality in contradistinction to these secondary sources.  These 
sources are: Simon Critchley‟s essay in Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity, „The Hypothesis, 
the Context, the Messianic, the Political, the Economic, the Technological: On 
Derrida‟s Spectres of Marx‟; a return to the religion-atheism-agnosticism problem via 
the two sources of Caputo and Hägglund; and a couple of chapters on Spectres of Marx 
in Peggy Kamuf‟s Book of Addresses, „The Ghosts of Critique and Deconstruction‟ and 
„The Haunts of Scholarship‟.  Towards the end of the chapter it is argued that Derrida‟s 
„learning to live‟ watchword in Spectres of Marx positions Marx between Rousseau and 
Nietzsche, thus alluding to Nietzsche‟s existential concern with individuality in the 
following chapter. 
 The fourth chapter, „Autobiographical Riddles: Nietzsche & Derrida‟, takes 
seriously the general impression in the field of scholarship that Derrida‟s thought is 
grounded in Nietzsche‟s – particularly with the critique of metaphysics that the latter 
offers.  Where Nietzsche‟s thought offers the sceptic‟s affirmation of life‟s egocentrism, 
it is argued that Derrida‟s thought paradoxically offers a simultaneous adoption and 
supplementation of Nietzsche‟s thought.  Derridean reaffirmation invokes the relation to 
death and the other in a way that is at once more melancholic and more ironic in tone 
even than Nietzschean tragic affirmation.  The main texts up for discussion are 
Nietzsche‟s autobiographical Ecce Homo, and Derrida‟s section on it, „Logic of the 
Living Feminine‟, in his essay „Otobiographies‟ in The Ear of the Other.  Here Derrida 
addresses a riddle that Nietzsche invents in „Why I Am So Wise‟ concerning the strange 
relation to his mother and father.  It is through this autobiographical riddle that this 
chapter is written, with particular emphasis on Nietzsche‟s notion of the „free spirit‟ 
articulated in Human, All Too Human.  The sources on Derrida utilized here are 
Christopher Norris‟s essay, „Deconstruction Against Itself: Derrida and Nietzsche‟; and 
Robert Smith‟s chapter in Derrida and Autobiography called „Labyrinths‟.  Here it is 
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argued that Norris concentrates more on the political part of Derrida‟s „Otobiographies‟ 
– the second half entitled „The Otograph Sign of State‟ – and so is less concerned with 
the autobiographical part.  This helps to highlight further the demarcation of the 
autobiographical theme as primarily a psychological rather than political one.  In 
contrast, Smith‟s chapter, „Labyrinths‟, is shown to be useful insofar as it addresses 
precisely this autobiographical riddle; however, his analysis of it is so brief, particularly 
regarding the temporal structure of the relation between life and death, that a deeper 
analysis is given of this structure in this chapter.  The chapter ends by considering 
Nietzsche‟s psychological emphasis on self-defence, thereby returning to the distinction 
from the first chapter between apology and apologia.  And it argues that Derrida‟s 
thought mediates between the „who‟ and the „what‟, invoked by Nietzsche, by 
emphasizing the „how‟ – thus leading to Freud. 
 The fifth chapter, „Autobiographical Speculation: Freud & Derrida‟, has a 
double concern: on the one hand, the relation of their two respective intellectual 
movements (psychoanalysis and deconstruction); and on the other hand, the specific 
concern with what, in his essay „To Speculate – On “Freud”‟, Derrida calls 
autobiographical speculation.  In this essay Derrida reads Freud‟s essay „Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle‟.  It is argued in this chapter that Derrida reads „Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle‟ in a similar manner to that in which, in his earlier essay „Freud and the Scene 
of Writing‟, he read Freud‟s „A Note upon the “Mystic Writing-pad”‟: viz., as symbolic 
of the need for the restructuration of psychoanalytic concepts.  The difference between 
Derrida‟s two essays argued for in this chapter is thus that, where the first, „Freud and 
the Scene of Writing‟ calls the psychoanalytic concepts into question; the second, „To 
Speculate – On “Freud”‟, begins the groundwork from which a new deconstructive 
metapsychology can be developed.  This is so in particular because the relation between 
life and death becomes of heightened importance in Freud‟s „Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle‟.  Regarding the general relation of deconstruction to psychoanalysis, towards 
the end of the chapter an important, but, it is argued, misguided essay by Geoffrey 
Bennington in Interrupting Derrida, „Circanalysis‟, is drawn upon in order to develop a 
perspective on the issue.  Bennington draws upon Derrida‟s „Circumfession‟, arguing 
that it implicitly turns around Freudian themes and yet never explicitly mentions 
Freud‟s name.  He concludes from this that the troubled history between psychoanalysis 
and deconstruction is grounded in the fact that the latter understands more than the 
former because it is attentive to its conceptual inheritance from the metaphysical 
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tradition.  This chapter, however, argues that this cannot be the case, because in order to 
understand more than psychoanalysis deconstruction must think the psychoanalytic 
object (individual psychological development) better than psychoanalysis itself, 
whereas Bennington changes the topic of conversation between them.  In arguing this, it 
is suggested that Derrida‟s conceptualization of autobiography offers the groundwork to 
rethink the psychoanalytic object. 
 And finally, the Conclusion, „Paradoxes of Subjectivity‟, synthesizes the main 
insights from each chapter.  From here it develops these insights towards the argument 
that Derrida‟s autobiographical thought offers the reconceptualization of subjectivity via 
an initial process of considering the paradoxes that the conceptualization of 
autobiography itself offered.  In particular, the two oppositions of life/death and 
self/other culminate in the suggestion for the development of a future deconstructive 
metapsychology and moral psychology.  This suggestion begins with the problem of 
language that Derrida‟s thought poses, particularly since it is concerned with mediating 
the boundary between objective reality and subjective experience.  The relation of 
deconstruction to both existentialism and psychoanalysis is deepened in the context both 
of this problem, and of the themes of autobiography.  Here, it is argued that Derrida 
utilizes existentialism against psychoanalysis in a bid to wager that adolescence is 
perhaps a more important stage than childhood in the development of psychological 
problems.  The central argument of this research thus concludes by highlighting the way 
in which the deconstruction of autobiography undermines the metaphysics of the 
autonomous subject. 
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Confessing Truth: Augustine & Derrida 
 
Introduction 
In his semi-autobiographical text „Circumfession‟ Derrida provides a reading of the 
Confessions of Augustine; a reading which is paradoxically both critical and friendly.  
For the most part, Derrida‟s reading of Augustine is oblique: there are citations from the 
Confessions, in the original Latin, in which Derrida barely provides an exegesis of what 
he is citing.  On the one hand, the citations are there as a sort of friendly intertextual 
allusion to the debt that we all owe to Augustine‟s Confessions; since, traditionally 
speaking, it is understood to represent the historical origins of the autobiographical form 
and genre.  Certain events of Augustine‟s life that are documented in Confessions, such 
as the death of his mother in the ninth book, are both emotionally touching and, perhaps 
for precisely this reason, do not conform to traditional standards of philosophical 
rationality.  Indeed, this lack of conforming to philosophy is an issue which Derrida‟s 
thought more generally considers as philosophically important.  For the events of life, 
and the complex web of practicalities that form these events, have their place in the 
formation and transformation of the very fabric of our personal identity.  And so the 
philosophical concept of identity cannot therefore master the essence of human identity 
if it excludes certain essential features of our identity‟s very formation.  Derrida is thus 
friendly towards those apparently non-philosophical moments of Augustine‟s 
Confessions in order to find in them a certain philosophical significance. 
On the other hand, through these citations from Augustine‟s Confessions, 
Derrida highlights a particular concept that Augustine uses, near the beginning of the 
tenth book of the Confessions, of making truth.  Augustine says: „I wish to act in truth, 
making my confession both in my heart before you and in this book before the many 
who will read it‟ (Augustine, 1961, p.207).  In „Circumfession‟ Derrida makes a curious 
point about the relation between confession as the confession of truth or as a request for 
pardon (or forgiveness), and does so by invoking this above citation from Augustine 
which purports to make truth.  Derrida says: 
 
[M]aking truth no doubt has nothing to do with what you call truth, for in order to confess, it is not 
enough to bring to knowledge, to make known what is, for example to inform you that I have done to 
death, betrayed, blasphemed, perjured, it is not enough that I present myself to God or you, the 
presentation of what is or what I am, either by revelation or by adequate judgement, „truth‟ then, having 
never given rise to avowal, to true avowal, the essential truth of avowal having therefore nothing to do 
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with truth, but consisting, if, that is, one is concerned that it consist and that there be any, in asked-for 
pardon (Derrida, 1993, p.48). 
 
The work that Derrida demands this concept of making truth to perform is quite 
remarkable, and impinges on a number of themes which are critical of Augustine‟s 
thought more generally; but in particular his moral psychology.  For the first principles 
of Augustine‟s metaphysical thought offer both the theological foundations of reality 
(by positioning God at the origin of the world), and the psychological foundations of 
ethics (by positioning the soul at the origin of humanity).  In „Circumfession‟ Derrida is 
critical of this metaphysical order of priority that is given by Augustine to the 
theological and psychological; and this can be seen in the way in which he utilizes the 
concept of making truth.  Indeed, much like on other occasions in his work where he 
emphasizes an apparently passing word or comment in a text by another author, this 
„concept‟ of making truth is undecidable between Augustine and Derrida: i.e., it is not 
clear between them who owns it as a concept.  In a way it is Augustine‟s since it is 
contained within his text; and yet, because it is not contained in his text in such a way as 
to carry apparent conceptual force, while it does in Derrida‟s text, in this way it as much 
Derrida‟s concept as it is Augustine‟s.  In this chapter we will refer to it as Derrida‟s, 
since he is the one who puts the concept to work. 
 The overriding theme of this chapter is based on the following question: How 
does Derrida‟s concept of making truth not only deconstruct Augustine‟s metaphysical 
assumptions, particularly regarding his psychological theory, but also offer the 
groundwork to reconstruct them?  In order to answer this question, we will have to go 
down certain roads that appear to centrifugally distance ourselves from our stated 
question, but in order to centripetally return back to it with a more knowledgeable 
answer.  Indeed, the very meaning of Derrida‟s neologism of circumfession alludes to 
this centrifugal-centripetal dynamic as it puts into effect the rhetorical practice of 
periphrasis or circumlocution.  „Circumfession‟ is an experiment or an exercise – 
Derrida calls it a „technical exercise‟ (Derrida, in: Caputo and Scanlon, 2005, p.88) – in 
wandering around the periphery of a confession rather than going straight to the heart or 
the centre of a confession.  The neologism of circumfession refers to the idea of a 
hesitant confession: a confession which paradoxically confesses while holding 
something back and keeping something secret.  It is therefore an experiment that 
explores the boundary between language and self, in order to see to what degree the 
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rhetorical opaqueness of language mediates between the assumed transparency that is 
traditionally perceived to exist (by metaphysics) between language and self.  But 
although „Circumfession‟ is an all too self-conscious literary or textual performance, at 
the same time there is a critique of the very concept of the performative that is at the 
heart of Derrida‟s conception of making truth, and which fundamentally impinges on 
the said relation between language and self. 
 Augustine‟s Confessions not only presents a powerful statement of the different 
stages of life that human beings go through at the biological level, but also at the level 
of the psychical capacity required of us in order to go through such stages.  It is on these 
two levels that the autobiographical interpretation of Augustine will concentrate here.  
The discussion of Derrida‟s relation to Augustine will pick up on two competing 
interpretations of Derrida‟s text, by Caputo and Hägglund, in which the problem of 
religion and atheism will be addressed. 
 
Confessing Truth 
In the context of the history of philosophy before him, Augustine‟s thought represented 
a remarkable inward turn, reflexively turning the human mind back into itself.  
Augustine converted to Christianity in 387AD and published his Confessions a decade 
or so later.  Between his conversion and his Confessions he authored some significant 
books which represent this inward turn.  One of his books prior to writing Confessions 
is called Soliloquies – and just as the former represents the historical origins of the 
autobiographical genre, the latter represents the historical origins of the very word 
„soliloquy‟.  Augustine, like Derrida, was in his day an inventor of words, of 
neologisms.  As a dialogue that one has with oneself in one‟s mind (in short, talking to 
oneself), soliloquy is akin to what Derrida more generally calls „auto-affection‟ or 
„hearing-oneself-speak‟: it refers to the presence of the mind to itself in consciousness; 
to self-presence.  Another of Augustine‟s books prior to writing his Confessions is On 
Free Choice of the Will – which perhaps also marks the historical origins as the first 
book on free will.  Like soliloquy, „free will‟ also represents what Derrida more 
generally calls self-presence.  In order for the will or the mind to be free, absolutely 
free, it must be free from the material constraints not only of the body which contains it 
(which in its fragility will eventually become disabled and die, if it is not born that 
way), but also of the constraining position of this body in relation to other bodies 
surrounding it (i.e., of the relation to other people).  So before even writing Confessions, 
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Augustine was no stranger to the human mind; in many respects it was his overriding 
fascination. 
Indeed, the Confessions itself gives its own powerful account of the human 
mind, not merely in the autobiographical narrative, but notably in the tenth and the 
eleventh books; which, after the narrative, provide a theoretical account of the nature of 
memory and time that such a narrative alludes to.  Here, memory is the subjective 
human experience of objective time; and so the linking of these theoretical themes 
together is not out of place in a narrative which has been written from the memory of 
one‟s own life history and experience.  The narrative itself tells the story of Augustine‟s 
reasons for conversion to Christianity, with the purpose or the moral of the story of 
course being that we should all convert to Christianity.  In this way, the Confessions 
highlights Augustine‟s concept of „original sin‟ (Augustine, 1961, p.102) – a concept 
that is based on the Biblical story of the Fall of mankind.  As the Confessions 
documents his early years in the first and second books (his infancy, childhood, and 
adolescence) he presents an image of himself, as an example of humans generally, as 
born sinners; corrupted by temptation.  Towards the end of the first book he depicts the 
childish immoral „debasements‟ of his childhood: 
 
I was blind to the whirlpool of debasement in which I had been plunged away from the sight of your eyes.  
For in your eyes nothing could be more debased than I was then, since I was even troublesome to the 
people whom I set out to please.  Many and many a time I lied to my tutor, my masters, and my parents, 
and deceived them because I wanted to play games or watch some futile show or was impatient to imitate 
what I saw on the stage.  I even stole from my parents‟ larder and from their table, either from greed or to 
get something to give to other boys in exchange for their favourite toys, which they were willing to barter 
with me.  And in the games I played with them I often cheated in order to come off the better, simply 
because a vain desire to win had got the better of me.  And yet there was nothing I could less easily 
endure, nothing that made me quarrel more bitterly, than to find others cheating me as I cheated them.  
All the same, if they found me out and blamed me for it, I would lose my temper rather than give in. 
Can this be the innocence of childhood?  Far from it, O Lord!  But I beg you to forgive it (p.39-40). 
 
Augustine‟s picture of humanity is that we are ultimately born into a „debased‟, animal-
like existence.  As such, life becomes a constant struggle to get out of the „quarrels‟ that 
we get ourselves into in our morally corrupt state.  In the sentence that follows the last 
one cited, he says: „these same passions remain with us while one stage of life follows 
upon another‟ (p.40).  In other words, in childhood we learn how to be morally corrupt 
without having much free choice in the matter; and as childhood moves into 
adolescence, and adolescence moves into adulthood, that which we have learned in 
34 
 
childhood forms habits of action within us that become very difficult to break out of.  
The problem is that the habits and the actions in question are bad ones, and as we get 
older we learn that they are bad, and so our soul begins to struggle between doing evil 
(which we are already in the habit of doing) and doing good (for which we need to 
struggle to retrain ourselves into new habits). 
In particular, as we move into adolescence, the transformation of our bodily 
hormones gives us the desire for sex.  This is a desire that Augustine was well aware 
continues into adulthood; and his depiction of „adolescent sex‟ near the beginning of the 
second book is particularly poignant: 
 
I cared for nothing but to love and to be loved.  But my love went beyond the affection of one mind for 
another, beyond the arc of the bright beam of friendship.  Bodily desire, like a morass, and adolescent sex 
welling up within me exuded mists which clouded over and obscured my heart, so that I could not 
distinguish the clear light of true love from the murk of lust.  Love and lust together seethed within me.  
In my tender youth they swept me away over the precipice of my body‟s appetites and plunged me into a 
whirlpool of sin (Augustine, 1961, p.43). 
 
Adolescence is a period of life in which love and lust are confused: love is the caring 
connection between two minds, „the bright beam of friendship‟; lust is the caring but 
„murky‟ connection between two bodies.  But Augustine‟s depiction here of the sense of 
the loss of control over both his body and his mind highlights an important feature 
regarding the nature of adolescence more generally: viz., that the „exuded mists‟ of 
„adolescent sex‟ which „seethed within me‟ invokes a confusing relation to oneself in 
the transformation of one‟s own bodily desires.  His depiction of course contains the 
value judgement that it is sinful to be like this; a value judgement against such bodily 
desires and the act of sex more generally.  But nonetheless his characterization of what 
it is to be like this, to be an adolescent lost in lust, is quite powerful, and surprisingly 
refreshing coming from a Church Father writing in the fourth century.  Doubtless, over 
the centuries and into the present day and beyond, the Church‟s rulebook when it comes 
to the act of sex owes a certain debt to Augustine; but this should not stifle such candid 
portrayals of his youthful passion, for his point is that we all go through this stage of 
life.  It is just that, for him, the point does not end there: for Augustine it follows that we 
all sin, or have a desire to sin, since the act of sex is exemplary in what counts as sinful 
insofar as it represents the love of the lower animal body rather than the love of the 
higher deified soul.  Sex or lust is judged from the perspective of the love for the 
summum bonum. 
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Caught between the bodily desires which form „the sins of the flesh which 
defiled my soul‟ (Augustine, 1961, p.43) on the one hand, and the spiritual desire „to 
cure all the diseases of my soul‟ (p.234) on the other hand, Augustine portrays himself, 
and by extension all humans, as caught between two wills: 
 
It is therefore no strange phenomenon partly to will to do something and partly to will not to do it.  It is a 
disease of the mind, which does not wholly rise to the heights where it is lifted by the truth, because it is 
weighed down by habit.  So there are two wills in us, because neither by itself is the whole will, and each 
possesses what the other lacks (p.172). 
 
This is a curious thing to say coming from a thinker who had earlier written On Free 
Choice of the Will, where it is argued that: „God gave us free will‟ (Augustine, 1993, 
p.30).  How can we have two wills if God gave us free will?  Rather than suggest some 
sort of radical inconsistency in Augustine‟s argument for the „two wills‟, let us instead 
hypothesize the following: for Augustine, the will is only free when we use it to turn our 
attention to the love of God and all that he represents as eternally Good and True.  
Before this happens, the will is divided between both love for temporal phenomena and 
love for eternal phenomena.  This division between the temporal and the eternal we will 
come to in a moment.  But first, there is another feature of love for temporal phenomena 
that is related to the will: viz., the continence or incontinence, the strength or weakness, 
of the individual will itself. 
 In the first book of Confessions, Augustine says: „if babies are innocent, it is not 
of lack of will to do harm, but for lack of strength‟ (Augustine, 1961, p.28).  His 
depiction of childhood and adolescence as where we begin to see „original sin‟ form in 
the selfishness of our actions and passions cannot be thought in quite the same way in 
infancy, since infants do not have the strength to even will to do harm.  But this does 
not mean that, if they did have the strength, then they would be pillars of continence – 
and the immature child is evidence of this.  Therefore, even infants are barely innocent.  
But as we grow older, into the maturity of adulthood, we begin to feel guilty for the sins 
which we have already committed.  We desire not to commit any more sins but do not 
quite know how to conjure up the strength within ourselves to do so: 
 
Time was passing and I kept delaying my conversion to you, my God.  Day after day I postponed living 
in you, but I never put off the death which I died each day in myself.  I longed for a life of happiness but I 
was frightened to approach it in its own domain; and yet, while I fled from it, I still searched for it.  I 
thought it would be too much for me to bear if I were to be deprived of a woman‟s love.  In your mercy 
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you have given us a remedy to cure this weakness, but I gave it no thought because I had never tried it for 
myself.  I believed that continence was to be achieved by man‟s own power, which I knew that I did not 
possess (p.128). 
 
As Augustine says here in the sixth book, God is the answer, the only answer, to our 
incontinence.  By himself, mankind is simply not strong enough to overcome his 
incontinent emotions.  The willpower required to live a continent life comes from God; 
and this divine willpower is the condition of possessing a goodwill, as Augustine says in 
the following book: „when I asked myself what wickedness was, I saw that it was not a 
substance but perversion of the will when it turns aside from you, O God, who are the 
supreme substance, and turns towards things of the lower order, [...] becoming inflated 
with desire for things outside itself‟ (p.150).  Willpower is the condition of continence, 
which in turn is the condition of goodwill; and man‟s willpower comes not from man 
himself, but from God Himself. 
Not only that, but we can find God Himself by looking inside ourselves.  For 
Augustine, mankind‟s problem is that all too often solutions to our problems are sought 
outside of oneself: e.g., when we blame others in order to avoid blaming ourselves.  
This we learn in the selfishness of our youth, where Augustine depicts us as guilty of 
the travesty of declaring our own innocence and another‟s guilt, even when the reverse 
is the case.  Bad habits like this – denial of guilt when we are in fact to blame and 
falsely accusing someone else who is innocent – are formed in our actions and reactions 
which continue into our adulthood.  And when we turn into ourselves to find out, what 
in the tenth book Augustine calls our „true self‟ (Augustine, 1961, p.208), we might not 
like what we discover.  This inward turn becomes the basis of the very distinction 
between the soul and the body as the division between the inside and outside of us: 
„Then I turned to myself and asked, “Who are you?”  “A man,” I replied.  But it is clear 
that I have both body and soul, the one the outer, the other the inner part of me‟ (p.212).  
This inward turn becomes the basis of the famous Augustinian cogito.  Speaking of the 
plethora of facts which the human memory must assimilate, he says: 
 
In other words, once they have been dispersed, I have to collect them again, and this is the derivation of 
the word cogitare, which means to think or to collect one‟s thoughts.  For in Latin the word cogo, 
meaning I assemble or I collect, is related to cogito, which means I think, in the same way as ago is 
related to agito or facio or factito.  But the word cogito is restricted to the function of the mind.  It is 
correctly used only of what is assembled in the mind, not what is assembled elsewhere (pp.218-219). 
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Thought becomes the basis of mental content, „of what is assembled in the mind‟; and 
as such, Augustine repeats his inheritance from the Platonic tradition in which the soul 
is said to exist in itself, radically separated from the embodied world and in contact with 
a more spiritual world. 
In the tenth book of Confessions Augustine equates the mind with memory, 
arguing that if one cannot remember anything then one has no ability to retain mental 
content: „the mind and memory are one and the same‟ (Augustine, 1961, p.220).  He 
continues: „We might say that the memory is a sort of stomach for the mind, and that 
joy or sadness are like sweet or bitter food‟ (p.220).  He thereby has a close connection 
between thought and feeling; but thought, as memory, takes a certain logical priority: 
 
My memory also contains my feelings, not in the same way as they are present to the mind when it 
experiences them, but in a quite different way that is in keeping with the special powers of the memory.  
For even when I am unhappy I can remember times when I was cheerful, and when I am cheerful I can 
remember past unhappiness.  I can recall past fears and yet not feel afraid, and when I remember that I 
once wanted something, I can do so without wishing to have it now.  Sometimes memory induces the 
opposite feeling, for I can be glad to remember sorrow that is over and done with and sorry to remember 
happiness that has come to an end (p.220). 
 
Thought, as memory, „contains my feelings‟.  And it is perhaps relevant to note the way 
in which the cogito statement connects neatly with the first-person nature of 
autobiographical narrative (the deictic reference of the „I‟), as it asks each and every one 
of us to make the same self-reflexive movement inwards in order to get in contact with 
the rational part of our minds.  But although memory requires a certain mental presence 
of feelings, „present to the mind‟, it also has the paradoxical feature of „inducing the 
opposite feeling‟ to what one is presently feeling.  For the memory is a memory of the 
past, not the present.  It is a consequence of this paradoxical feature of memory‟s 
experience of time that Augustine develops in the eleventh book of the Confessions on 
the nature of time. 
 In the eleventh book Augustine distinguishes between time and eternity: 
„eternity, which is forever still‟ and „time, which is never still‟ (p.261), as the present 
constantly moves into the past and future.  He continues: 
 
But in eternity nothing moves into the past: all is present.  Time, on the other hand, is never all present at 
once.  The past is always driven on by the future, the future always follows on the heels of the past, and 
both the past and the future have their beginning and their end in the eternal present (pp.261-262). 
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In order to distinguish time from eternity, Augustine says: „time is never present all at 
once‟.  Having distinguished them absolutely, he must then presuppose the existence of 
„the eternal present‟ – which is a necessity in a worldview in which God Himself, and 
the immortal soul, is thought to exist.  Indeed, this was the sole purpose of his earlier 
Soliloquies: „I desire to know God and the soul‟ (Augustine, 1910, p.10).  In Soliloquies 
Augustine writes himself in dialogue with Reason itself (ergo, his own reason), in 
which Reason takes him on a journey towards this knowledge of God and the soul.  But, 
Reason says, if you truly want to know God and the soul, you have to get to that point 
„when all desire of mortal things is purged and far away‟ (p.21).  Similarly, then, with 
this distinction between the temporal and the eternal: it enables Augustine‟s general 
worldview to be the following: on the one hand, the love of mortal and temporal things 
is the origin of sin; and on the other hand, the love of immortal and eternal things is the 
origin of saviour from sin.  For, „a soul marred and diseased by lust‟ (p.21), cannot but 
love temporal things more than eternal things. 
But for Augustine, it is also the case that the existence of eternal presence 
impinges upon time‟s own not being present all at once; and this, in turn, impinges upon 
how he conceptualizes memory.  In the eleventh book of Confessions he says: 
 
From what we have said it is abundantly clear that neither the future nor the past exist, and therefore it is 
not strictly correct to say that there are three times, past, present, and future.  It might be correct to say 
that there are three times, a present of past things, a present of present things, and a present of future 
things.  Some such different times do exist in the mind, but nowhere else that I can see.  The present of 
past things is the memory; the present of present things is direct perception; and the present of future 
things is expectation (Augustine, 1961, p.269). 
 
Eternal presence thereby infuses all times with presence; not only the present time, but 
the past and the future also.  This impinges on memory by expanding our mental 
faculties in the following way: just as memory relates us to our past, so perception 
relates us to our present, and so expectation relates us to our future.  The existence of 
spiritual substances saturate the world we live in with eternal presence; this eternal 
presence in turn saturates the temporality of the world with presence more generally, 
even in times not present; and this in turn saturates the human experience of this 
temporal world via our memory, where such self-presence becomes the basis of self-
knowledge, which in turn is the route to knowing our „true self‟.  And the point of 
knowing our „true self‟ is thus to cure our diseased soul: „Have pity on me, O Lord, in 
my misery!  I do not hide my wounds from you.  I am sick, and you are the physician‟ 
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(p.232).  For Augustine, sickness of the soul is ultimately a moral sickness; the sickness 
of a debauched soul.  But in his attempt to heal this sickness, Augustine gives us the 
classical metaphysical assumptions of the theological foundation of reality and the 
psychological foundation of ethics; assumptions that Derrida‟s thought radically puts 
into question.  So let us now begin to put Augustine in dialogue with Derrida, by 
turning our attention more directly to „Circumfession‟. 
 In Of Grammatology Derrida identifies logocentrism as the metaphysics of 
presence.  Here, his critical objection is to the philosophical tradition in its three 
dominant modes of presence: self-presence, temporal presence, and eternal presence.  
In books ten and eleven of the Confessions Augustine gives a very concise account of 
all of these three forms of presence, as we have just seen from the extract in the 
previous paragraph.  We might wonder, then, why in „Circumfession‟ Derrida does not 
address, in a more direct manner, these three forms of presence.  The answer is that 
„Circumfession‟ is a rhetorical exercise in indirectness; in periphrasis or circumlocution.  
It is a question of what happens to the very concept of confession when periphrastic 
manoeuvres are inscribed a priori within it.  Therefore, it is an exploration of the limit 
or boundary between language and selfhood; and yet, because it is an exercise in 
periphrasis, it is this exploration without directly saying that this is what it is; it is the 
performance of this exploration rather than the statement of this exploration.  In a way, 
Derrida very much leaves it up to his readers to take or leave from his text what they 
will, in order to present their version of what it is he might be trying to say or confess; 
or indeed, trying not to say or not to confess.  This has left some of his commentators 
disputing about the nature of his thought more generally, with „Circumfession‟ as one of 
the main texts that the divided opinions hinge on.  Most notably, this dispute regards 
whether or not Derrida‟s thought is religious or atheistic. 
 Here we will pick out two examples: John D. Caputo‟s The Prayers and Tears of 
Jacques Derrida: Religion Without Religion, and Martin Hägglund‟s Radical Atheism: 
Derrida and the Time of Life.  Caputo interprets the whole of Derrida‟s thought via the 
tradition of negative theology, the via negativa, in which a negative definition of God is 
attempted.  The reasoning behind negative or „apophatic‟ theology is that divine 
perfection is unnameable in human language, and so we must therefore use negative 
descriptions in order to manoeuvre around the imperfections of our positive 
characterizations of God (e.g., where we describe God as something, indeed as 
something undoubtedly positive or „cataphatic‟: as „love‟, as „truth‟, as „perfection‟, as 
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„goodness‟, etc).  But although Caputo interprets the whole of Derrida‟s thought from 
the perspective of negative theology, „Circumfession‟ is specifically targeted as his 
main inspirational text: „All along I will have been clutching Circonfession close to my 
breast‟ (Caputo, 1997, p.xxviii).  Indeed, there is textual warrant in „Circumfession‟ for 
Caputo‟s interpretation: having had his upbringing in a Sephardic Jewish family, it 
should not be surprising for the reader of „Derrida‟s autobiography‟ (if this is what 
„Circumfession‟ is supposed to be), that he alludes to his ambiguous personal relation 
not only to his Jewish identity but also to God.  For example, in „Circumfession‟ 
Derrida confesses that he still prays: 
 
I am addressing myself here to God, the only one I take as a witness, without yet knowing what these 
sublime words mean, and this grammar, and to, and witness, and God, and take, take God, and not only 
do I pray, as I have never stopped doing all my life, and pray to him (Derrida, 1993, p.56). 
 
What he calls, „so-called negative theology, the play with the names of God‟ (p.44), 
does therefore appear to be pertinent to understanding „Circumfession‟.  But for 
Derrida, it seems less about proving or disproving God‟s existence, and more about the 
rhetorical analysis of the language which surrounds God, including the multiplicity of 
God‟s names. 
In „Circumfession‟ Derrida inserts documents from notebooks he had kept in 
which he had desired to write a book on the topic of circumcision.  Always delayed in 
writing this book, he instead utilizes the opportunity of writing his „autobiography‟ to 
insert some passages from these notebooks.  „Circumfession‟ is the book on 
circumcision that he never managed to write; and he introduces his notebooks on 
circumcision in an extremely allusive and fragmented manner: 
 
[A]nd for years I have been going round in circles, trying to take as a witness not to see myself being seen 
but to re-member myself around a single event, I have been accumulating in the attic, my “sublime,” 
documents, inconography, notes, learned ones and naive ones, dream narratives or philosophical 
dissertations, applied transcription of encyclopedic, sociological, historical, psychoanalytic treatises that 
I‟ll never do anything with, about circumcisions in the world, the Jewish and the Arab and the others, and 
excision, with a view to my circumcision alone, the circumcision of me, the unique one, that I know 
perfectly well took place, one time, they told me and I see it but I always suspect myself of having 
cultivated, because I am circumcised, ergo cultivated, a fantastical affabulation (pp.59-60). 
 
I am still weaving the cloths of an affabulation that I have to date first from Spurs, 1972, the thing is 
named in it, from Glas especially, ‟74, and the first notebook opens December 27, 1976, from The 
Postcard especially, from the second last words of Envois, “turn around,” so that, this is my theory at 
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least, I am beginning to weave the simulacrum of that cloth on the warp of four moments at least (pp.69-
70). 
 
In wanting to write a book about circumcision, and to do so „with a view to my own 
circumcision‟, Derrida highlights his anxiety with regards to such a task when he says, 
„for years I have been going round in circles‟.  The theme of circumcision is apparent in 
some of his earlier works, the earliest he himself dates as „Spurs, 1972‟. 
 „Circumfession‟ is divided into fifty-nine sections, highlighting Derrida‟s age at 
the time of writing, which the subtitle calls „fifty-nine periods and periphrases‟.  In the 
seventeenth period of „Circumfession‟, a picture of the first of these notebooks is 
presented.  Underneath the picture is the following description: „Cover of the first of the 
notebooks preparatory to a book on circumcision, “The Book of Elijah,” projected from 
1976.  End of the Envois section of The Postcard (1979): “I shall wonder what, from 
my birth or thereabouts, to turn around has meant”‟ (Derrida, 1993, p.89).  There are a 
couple of things to note here.  First, the reference to the Biblical figure of Elijah, who 
was the prophet appointed by God as the guardian of the covenant of circumcision (bris 
milah), overseeing each one.  Elijah also had an eschatological significance concerning 
the „last‟ state of humankind.  Since The Bible tells the story of the creation of 
humankind from first things to last, this last, or eschaton, in which humans live without 
sin or evil, must be helped to be brought about by God‟s chosen prophets.  Elijah was 
one of them.  In „Circumfession‟, both of these elements of Elijah are drawn upon – 
e.g., as well as the emphasis on circumcision, Derrida paradoxically says, „I am the last 
of the eschatologists‟ (p.75) and „the last of the Jews that I still am‟ (p.190) – and they 
are strangely tied in uniquely to Derrida‟s own Jewish identity in a convoluted manner.  
In particular, he alludes in his notebooks to the fact that while his family have Hebrew 
names inscribed on their birth certificates, he does not (and that Elijah is his Hebrew 
name): „the fact that this forename was not inscribed [on my birth certificate, as were 
the Hebrew names of my family] (as though they wanted to hide it, still more than the 
other Hebrew names), was as though effaced, held back, signified several things mixed 
together‟ (pp.88-90).  In „Circumfession‟, Derrida therefore utilizes his own Hebrew 
name, and the Hebrew names of some of his family members, particularly his mother 
(replacing her forename „Georgette‟ with her Hebrew name „Esther‟), to act as proxies 
for their standard proper names, thereby, simultaneously disguising their identity while 
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nonetheless disclosing their secret in doing so: as he says, „my secret name, Elie 
[French for Elijah], around which the first notebooks from 1976 encircled‟ (p.87). 
The second thing to note about the description underneath the picture of the 
notebook is that it would seem that there is something about the meaning of 
„circumcision‟ that, for Derrida, implies something about the meaning of „to turn 
around‟.  Perhaps the most obvious of which would be „transformation‟ or „change‟.  
The etymology of „circumcision‟ is literally „to cut around‟.  In order „to cut around‟ 
one must turn some corners; one must turn around in order to cut around; one must 
change direction – and perhaps the upshot here is that, for Derrida, every change is a 
change of direction (which is perhaps why it becomes impossibly difficult to stay on 
„the straight and narrow path‟).  And, to further Caputo‟s interpretation of Derrida even 
more, Derrida refers to this change in the very fabric of his writing itself as hinging on 
the issue of religion: 
 
That‟s what my readers won‟t have known about me, the comma of my breathing henceforward, without 
continuity but without a break, the changed time of my writing, graphic writing, through having lost its 
interrupted verticality, almost with every letter, to be bound better and better but be read less and less well 
over almost twenty years, like my religion about which nobody understands anything (Derrida, 1993, 
p.154). 
 
Caputo says: „it is important to see that Derrida‟s religion is more prophetic than 
apophatic, more in touch with Jewish prophets than with Christian Neoplatonists, more 
messianic and more eschatological than mystical‟ (Caputo, 1997, p.xxiv).  The 
reference to „Jewish prophets‟ is to Elijah; and the reference to „Christian Neoplatonists‟ 
is to Augustine.  Caputo seems to be saying that Derrida utilizes the enigmatic figure of 
Elijah to aid in the deconstruction of Augustine.  Perhaps, but we wonder whether 
Caputo has taken to heart Derrida‟s concept of making truth, which at its initial 
inception in „Circumfession‟ he prefaces with the following irresolvable juxtaposition 
between religion and literature: „and make truth in this case that I‟m not sure comes 
under any religion, for reason of literature, nor under any literature, for reason of 
religion‟ (Derrida, 1993, p.48).  In other words, Derrida loves religious mythologies, 
and loves the moral of the story which tends to be the upshot of such mythology; but 
this does not mean that Derrida has religion with quite the same ease that Caputo would 
like to refer to „Derrida‟s religion‟.  Derrida indeed says „my religion‟: but to extract 
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this from the sentence it is in is perhaps misquotation as it leaves out the „like‟, the „as 
if‟, which prefaces it. 
But it is perhaps because most followers of Derrida‟s thought tended to assume a 
sort of generic atheism that Caputo‟s interpretation becomes surprising: the task of the 
deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence – the contamination of presence with 
absence, of purity with impurity, of proper with improper, etc – as a sort of implicit 
demonstration of the logical impossibility of God‟s omnipresence.  Although much of 
Caputo‟s religious rhetoric will be disconcerting for this garden-variety secular reader 
of Derrida, it perhaps should not be dismissed with quite the force of Hägglund‟s 
Radical Atheism.  Hägglund says: „The Prayers and Tears has established Caputo as the 
most powerful proponent for the religious turn in Derrida scholarship‟ (Hägglund, 2008, 
p.116).  Hägglund picks up on the different tones of the narrative between Augustine‟s 
Confessions and Derrida‟s „Circumfession‟ in order to show that, where the former 
writes in order to overcome mortal life in order to revel in the paradise of immortal life, 
the latter writes precisely in order to affirm mortal survival.  This difference, he argues, 
is shown with regards to the opposing way in which they relate to the deaths of their 
respective mothers.  For Hägglund, „[Derrida‟s] relation to his mother also reinforces 
the passion for mortal survival that Augustine seeks to suppress and leave behind‟ 
(p.148).  This desire for mortal survival is therefore what, more generally, in his 
„Introduction‟, Hägglund identifies as radical atheism: „by developing the logic of 
radical atheism, I argue that the so-called desire for immortality dissimulates a desire for 
survival that precedes it and contradicts it from within‟ (p.1).  Where Caputo interprets 
the general trajectory of Derrida‟s thought, and „Circumfession‟ in particular, as a form 
of negative theology, Hägglund instead interprets them as a form of radical atheism. 
The death of Augustine‟s mother, Saint Monica (who was pivotal to his own 
conversion to Christianity), is narrated in the ninth book of Confessions.  And here, he 
articulates his attempt to restrain his tears at his mother‟s death: 
 
I closed her eyes, and a great wave of sorrow surged into my heart.  It would have overflowed in tears if I 
had not made a strong effort of will and stemmed the flow, so that the tears dried in my eyes.  What a 
terrible struggle it was to hold them back!  As she breathed her last, the boy Adeodatus began to wail 
aloud and only ceased his cries when we all checked him.  I, too, felt that I wanted to cry like a child, but 
a more mature voice within me, the voice of my heart, bade me keep my sobs in check, and I remained 
silent.  For we did not think it right to mark my mother‟s death with weeping and moaning, because such 
lamentations are the usual accompaniment of death when it is thought as a state of misery or as total 
extinction.  But she had not died in misery nor had she wholly died.  Of this we were certain, both 
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because we knew what a holy life she had led and also because our faith was real and we had sure reasons 
not to doubt it (Augustine, 1961, p.200). 
 
Crying becomes a sign of immature childishness, like the way in which Augustine‟s 
own child Adeodatus cries at the death of his grandmother.  And extracts like this work 
to confirm Hägglund‟s point: for Augustine, to cry at his mother‟s death would be a 
sign of the love for her mortal life, which would be a sign of loving mortal life more 
generally.  This is why Augustine „holds back‟ his tears: „What a terrible struggle it was 
to hold them back!‟  Because of his real faith, „our faith was real‟, Augustine believed 
that his mother was not even entirely dead, „nor had she wholly died‟.  Indeed, in 
„Circumfession‟ Derrida refers to Saint Augustine‟s held back tears: „SA‟s immense and 
finite sponge pregnant like a memory with all the abandoned or held back tears of the 
Confessions, on the death of the friend, his friend, Paul or Koitchi, on the death of the 
mother, his mother‟ (Derrida, 1993, p.106).  And it is true that, while in Confessions 
Augustine adheres to the value of holding back his tears, in contrast in „Circumfession‟ 
Derrida allows his tears to flow, even to overflow, soaking them up with the help of a 
sponge. 
 In contrast to Augustine‟s narrative, in „Circumfession‟ Derrida speaks of his 
mother‟s dying state rather than her dead state.  As such, the arrival of her death can 
come along at any time to interrupt his writing.  He begins the fourth period by 
highlighting his mother‟s failing memory: 
 
Consign them here, but why I wonder, confide to the bottom of this book what were my mother‟s last 
more or less intelligible sentences, still alive at the moment I am writing this, but already incapable of 
memory, in any case of the memory of my name, a name become for her at the very least 
unpronounceable, and I am writing here at the moment when my mother no longer recognizes me, and at 
which, still capable of speaking or articulating, a little, she no longer calls me and for her and therefore 
for the rest of her life I no longer have a name (Derrida, 1993, p.22). 
 
[F]or the reader will have understood that I am writing for my mother, perhaps even for a dead woman 
and so many ancient or recent analogies will come to the reader‟s mind even if, no, they don‟t hold, those 
analogies, none of them, for if I were here writing for my mother, it would be for a living mother who 
does not recognize her son, and I‟m periphrasing here for whomever no longer recognizes me (p.25). 
 
Derrida is writing for his dying mother; but as Linda Anderson notes, so, in a way, is 
Augustine writing for his already-dead mother: „Derrida draws attention to the fact that 
Augustine writes his confessions after the death of his mother, and like Derrida himself, 
could be writing for his mother‟ (Anderson, 2001, p.25).  Suffering from Alzheimer‟s 
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disease, bedridden in hospital in Nice, Derrida‟s mother „does not recognize her son‟.  
But what is also curious about this is the way in which, at the end of the last extract 
Derrida says, „and I‟m periphrasing here for whomever no longer recognizes me‟.  In 
other words, Derrida uses  his mother‟s inability to recognize him as an analogy or 
proxy for the way in which certain readers of his work seem to have an inability to 
recognize what his thought is about –„to be bound better and better but be read less and 
less well‟.  In „Circumfession‟ Derrida attempts to interweave so many apparently 
unrelated strands of thought that are going on in the text, from his mother‟s inability to 
recognize him to his reader‟s inability to recognize him.  But what readers?  Derrida 
does not say, and so a Rousseau-inspired paranoia infects „Circumfession‟. 
 In meditating on his mother‟s pending death Derrida‟s fear of his own death 
becomes reignited.  And yet the idea of his mother‟s death also highlights for him the 
way in which his fear of his own death is very much singularly experienced through his 
mother‟s fear of his death: „my fear of death will only have reflected her own, I mean 
my death for her whose anxiety I perceived each time I was ill‟ (Derrida, 1993, p.211).  
His mother feared his death not only as a mother might more generally, but also because 
Derrida had two brothers who died young, Paul and Norbert, who get occasional 
mentions in „Circumfession‟.  Paul was born and died before Derrida himself was born, 
and Norbert was born when Derrida was seven and died a couple of years later.  In 
fearing his death each time Derrida got ill, because these other deaths heightened the 
fear, his mother „carried‟ his own fear of death: „and if my mother thus carried my fear 
of death, I fear dying from no longer being scared of death after her death‟ (p.212).  For 
Derrida, this is an example of how emotions are not only things that exist in oneself, but 
are felt in the way in which others around us and close to us feel them.  In 
„Circumfession‟, Derrida presents his dying mother to his readers, but he presents little 
else of her other than that she used to play poker: „a poker game, the passion of her life‟ 
(p.42); „she who was playing poker and swimming three years ago‟ (p.138).  In contrast 
to the memory of his mother‟s past passions, Derrida presents his mother in her present 
bedridden state, in which he has to listen to the euphemisms of the nurses: „she does not 
move much on her bed, only her fingers, she looks without seeing, can scarcely hear 
and as “the analyses are good,” as she “is eating and sleeping well,” what future remains 
to her‟ (p.80).  A moment later Derrida says: „and this is therefore real life‟ (p.80) – the 
„real life‟ of the scars of disability. 
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 The concept of scar is an important one in „Circumfession‟.  Derrida plays on 
the fact that the French word for bedsore is escarre, which is etymologically linked to 
an entire multilingual genealogy of the word „scar‟.  This in turn is etymologically 
linked to the eschaton which Elijah represents, for instance, in the scar of circumcision: 
„I have made the eschaton into a coat of arms of my genealogy‟ (Derrida, 1993, p.75).  
A whole series of allusions are made by Derrida in which the scars of life turn the 
experience of living into one of dying.  This can be said in general, but also, in 
„Circumfession‟, they take on the singular or autobiographical reference on Derrida‟s 
part: of the escarres on his dying mother on the one hand; and the scar of his own 
circumcision on the other hand.  After referring to „real life‟, he continues: 
 
[H]er life therefore reassures and worries the others, her nearest and dearest, at the only sign of evolution 
that still has the colour of desire, history or event, in other words blood, called by a name I am learning to 
learn, from head to toe, the escarre [bedsore], an archipelago of red and blackish volcanoes, enflamed 
wounds, crusts and craters, signifiers like wells several centimeters deep, opening here, closing there, on 
her heels, her hips and sacrum, the very flesh exhibited in its inside, no more secret, no more skin, but she 
seems not to be suffering, she does not see them as I do when the nurse says “they‟re looking good” to 
mark the fact that their rawness, the not yet necrosed character of the tissue allows one to hope that they 
will scar over (pp.80-82). 
 
As Derrida describes in almost candid detail (ironically for a periphrastic mode of 
writing) the composition of his mother‟s bedsores, a certain strange paradox within the 
very concept of scar develops: on the one hand, the scar is a melancholic sign of a 
painful past; but on the other hand, it is not as presently painful as an open wound that 
still has to „scar over‟.  The scar is both the wound itself and its healing; and it therefore 
relates to both the pain of the past which marks our memory and the impossible hope 
for a future without such pain.  The scar thus represents the uncertain position of the 
present in which we do not know whether or not the wound will scar over. 
 While a melancholic tone certainly dominates „Circumfession‟, particularly as 
his dying mother haunts the entire text, Derrida nonetheless has his moments of 
deadpan humour – his friend Hélène Cixous calls him „the dry-witted prince of the 
Jews‟ (Cixous, 2004, p.1) – and moments where he says how much he has enjoyed life.  
In the fiftieth period he says: 
 
I have not met anyone, I have had in the history of humanity no idea of anyone, wait, wait, anyone who 
has been happier than I, and luckier, euphoric, this is a priori true, isn‟t it?, drunk with uninterrupted 
enjoyment, [...] but that if, beyond any comparison, I have remained, me the counterexample of myself, as 
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constantly sad, deprived, destitute, disappointed, impatient, jealous, desperate, negative and neurotic, and 
that if in the end the two certainties do not exclude one another for I am sure they are as true as each 
other, simultaneously and from every angle, then I do not know how still to risk the slightest sentence 
without letting it fall to the ground in silence (Derrida, 1993, pp.268-270). 
 
Both happy and sad impossibly at the same time, both enjoying life‟s pleasures and 
feeling its pains impossibly at the same time – perhaps because the memory can forget 
the temporality of our past experiences; because the line between pleasure and pain can 
be imperceptible; and because our expectation cannot foresee in advance whether our 
future life will turn out as we planned it to.  Until life itself happens to us, we do not 
know.  Unlike biography, which can be written after someone is dead, autobiography is 
written by its author when they are still alive, in which their lifetime is not yet over and 
they still have a future to come.  Derrida is well aware that the unknowable future to 
come haunts us just as much as the past: „not that I love nonknowledge for itself, on the 
contrary, I am even ready to think like certain Muslims that “the ink of the learned is 
more sacred than the blood of martyrs,” but sacred, precisely, through something other 
than knowledge, sacred truth of this nonknowledge‟ (pp.141-142).  What we do not 
know has a certain power over us, and so the „nonknowledge‟ of which Derrida here 
speaks demands a certain respect. 
 As Hägglund notes in Radical Atheism, against Augustine, one of the pleasures 
of which Derrida speaks in „Circumfession‟ is around the issue of sex.  But this is an 
issue that is intermingled with his discourse on circumcision (for, as Maimonides says, 
the reason why there is circumcision is to suppress the feeling of sex in man since he is 
too naturally weak to do so himself).  In Confessions the Christian apologist Augustine, 
who gives all manner of apologia for Christianity, apologizes to God for the 
promiscuity of his past.  But in „Circumfession‟ Derrida gives an apologia of 
promiscuity itself, strangely weaved into what he articulates as his broken alliance with 
his Judaism and his Jewish identity, as he tries in his notebooks „to describe my sex 
throughout thousands of years of Judaism‟: 
 
“...the mixture on this incredible supper of the wine and blood, let people see it how I see it on my sex 
each time blood is mixed with sperm or the saliva of fellatio, describe my sex throughout thousands of 
years of Judaism, describe it (microscopy, photography, stereophototypy) until the paper breaks, make all 
the readers drool, wet lips, high and low, stretched out in their turn on the cushions, right on the knees of 
„godfather‟ Elie – high mourning – leave nothing, if possible, in the dark of what related me to Judaism, 
alliance broken in every aspect (Karet), with perhaps a gluttonous interiorization, and in heterogeneous 
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modes: last of the Jews, what am I [...] the circumcised is the proper” (12-30-76) (Derrida, 1993, p.153-
154). 
 
Indeed, Derrida‟s critique of the practice of ritual circumcision is confirmed when he 
refers to „my noncircumcised sons‟ (p.62) – almost every time he mentions his sons is 
merely to refer to the fact that he did not circumcise them.  At the same time, the 
violence of circumcision, as the violence of a certain form of incision (or excision, in 
French, „female circumcision‟), via a strange manoeuvre of synecdoche, becomes 
representative of the act of cutting in general; perhaps more particularly as 
representative of the primordial division of oneself; of one‟s name and identity: „the 
circumcised is the proper‟, and deconstruction is the displacement of the metaphysics of 
the proper. 
 Caputo opens The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida by referring to 
Derrida‟s broken alliance with Judaism, highlighting how the etymology of the concept 
of „alliance‟ is related to „covenant‟, and so to the „covenant of circumcision‟.  He goes 
onto say, both polemically and metaphorically, that deconstruction is circumcision: „I 
will say that for Derrida deconstruction is circumcision, where circumcision cuts open 
the same to the event of the other, thus constituting the breach that opens the way to the 
tout autre‟ (Caputo, 1997, p.xxv).  The scission of circumcision is the a priori division 
of selfsameness from itself, opening its way to the relation to the other, and so to the 
other‟s otherness.  But it is precisely in this relation between oneself and another that, 
not only ethics, but also emotion, becomes important.  And in „Circumfession‟ Derrida 
makes the following curious statement about God and emotion: 
 
I‟m mingling the name of God here with the origin of tears, the always puerile, weepy, and pusillanimous 
son that I was, the adolescent who basically only liked reading writers quick to tears, Rousseau, 
Nietzsche, Ponge, SA, and a few others, that child whom the grown-ups amused themselves by making 
cry for nothing, who was always to weep over himself with the tears of his mother: “I‟m sorry for 
myself,” “I make myself unhappy,” “I‟m crying for myself,” “I‟m crying over myself” – but like another, 
another wept over by another weeper, I weep from my mother over the child whose substitute I am, 
whence the other, nongrammatical syntax that remains to be invented to speak of the name of God which 
is here neither that of the father nor that of the mother, nor of the son nor of the brother nor of the sister 
(Derrida, 1993, pp.118-119). 
 
If God‟s name is the origin of tears, which of course can be tears of joy as well as of 
pain, then this perhaps invokes a reversal of Augustine regarding the relation between 
thought and feeling – since of course, as we saw earlier, the Augustinian cogito 
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demands the primacy of thought.  Derrida „only liked reading writers quick to tears‟: 
this personal taste for tears on Derrida‟s part offers the illusion of a secure 
psychological basis for his argument; the illusion of psychologism which his general 
deconstructive thought stringently demystifies.  But I would argue that „psychology‟ is 
no longer a blasphemous word in deconstructive theory, so long as it is without 
„psychologism‟, for here it does not refer to actual psychical substance since it is instead 
a thematic concern that circumscribes certain issues and arguments around a particular 
topic.  Which kind of begs the question, precisely what is the argument of 
„Circumfession‟? 
As we have tried to show, the actual argument of „Circumfession‟ is unclear, and 
has divided Derrida‟s followers.  Caputo interprets this statement by Derrida, of 
mingling God‟s name with the origin of tears, in a religious manner, as seems proper: 
„we could say that “God” for him is given not in theological analysis but in religious 
experience‟ (Caputo, 1997, p.288).  In contrast, Hägglund tries to pull off the more 
remarkable feat of arguing that this statement is evidence of Derrida‟s „radical atheism‟: 
„The origin of tears is thus the experience of mortal survival‟ (Hägglund, 2008, p.162).  
Hägglund can say this because of his earlier premise in which, for Derrida: „The 
purported love for the immortal (the passion for “my God” as the one I love above all) 
is reinscribed as a love for the mortal‟ (p.147).  For Hägglund, Derrida closes off all 
possible love for immortality and immortal beings; and circumcision is not even given a 
mention.  Hägglund accuses Caputo of giving Derrida a partial reading, but the retort of 
tu quo que can be addressed to Hägglund.  In „Confessions and “Circumfession”: A 
Roundtable Discussion with Jacques Derrida‟, Derrida says the following: 
 
If you are a radical atheist, and you just mention the word God, that means you are supposed to 
understand what that word means, that you inherit the word in a culture that you are raised in, a culture in 
which the word God means something.  For me, even if I say God doesn‟t exist, I would immediately say 
the opposite.  God exists to the extent that people believe in God.  There has been a history, and there are 
religions.  For me, religions are the proof that God exists, even if God doesn‟t exist.  That‟s the question.  
Even if I were able to demonstrate, against all the canonical proofs of the existence of God, that God 
doesn‟t exist, it wouldn‟t demonstrate that God doesn‟t exist, because religions exist, because people 
believe in God.  They behave and organize their lives according to this belief.  There have been not only 
some events attesting to the fact that people believe in God, but everything in humanity is organized 
according to this belief.  So that‟s enough.  That‟s God‟s existence to me. [...] God is the name of this 
pathogenic power that produces neurosis, psychosis, paranoia, wars, peace, love, and so on and so forth.  
Isn‟t that enough?  God exists even if, and especially if, he doesn‟t exist, because how powerful this 
nonexistence should be to produce such extraordinary phenomena in what is called man (Derrida, in: 
Kearney, 2005, p.39). 
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Coming between Caputo and Hägglund, I understand this extract to be evidence of 
Derrida‟s radical agnosticism.  An agnosticism in which the „sacred truth of 
nonknowledge‟ rests: an agnosticism in which rests the paradoxical formulation from 
„Circumfession‟: „the constancy of God in my life is called by other names, so that I 
quite rightly pass for an atheist‟ (Derrida, 1993, p.155).  In all of these texts – by 
Derrida, by Caputo, by Hägglund, etc – the word „agnosticism‟ (literally, „without 
knowledge‟) has not been mentioned.  But does it not seem to nicely fit in with the 
„unknowable‟ of which Derrida speaks? 
Perhaps we could even call it an autobiographical agnosticism: for it leaves 
open the relation to the other‟s otherness as it accounts for the space that relates us to 
everyone‟s singular upbringing and characteristics.  And not only whether religious or 
atheist, but also whether happy or unhappy, prosperous or penniless, generous or 
miserly, kind or unkind, honest or deceptive, peaceful or aggressive, persuader or 
persuaded, bully or bullied, polite or rude, faithful or unfaithful, diligent or lazy, 
masculine or feminine, beautiful or ugly, healthy or unhealthy, able or disabled, 
fantasist or realist, unblemished or disfigured, erotic or nonerotic, heartbreaker or 
heartbroken, loved or hated, strong or weak, continent or incontinent, etc.  Such 
qualities can of course combine in some contradictory or quasi-contradictory way in 
each individual person – which can of course depend not only on „who you are‟ but also 
on who you are around (as we must account for both the unhelpful sabotage or neglect 
and the helpful support or teaching that occurs in everyday life, particularly everyday 
family life).  Derrida‟s „autobiographical agnosticism‟ leaves open the space for the 
relation to all character traits, all living conditions, and all forms of relationship, each 
with their singular causes and effects, whether positive or negative: „Everybody‟s 
Autobiography‟ (Derrida, 1993, p.311), he says, quoting Gertrude Stein (1993), with 
respect to the potentially conflicting historical realities of each individual‟s own 
personal experience.  And yet, despite accounting for this space in theory, in practice 
one can still take it away from another, or have it taken away from oneself by another, 
even with the most minimal of gestures.  In life, the other‟s otherness can easily be 
compromised; and so for Derrida, practically speaking, there nonetheless remains, for 
everyone, the infinite responsibility to make the truth happen.  That is, in relation to 
both ourselves and others around us, we all have the responsibility to become more 
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aware of the negative causes and effects of our manner in order to turn them around into 
positive ones. 
 
Conclusion 
Against Hägglund, I would argue that in what Derrida receives from Augustine there is 
not necessarily a reversal between what we should and should not love (mortality or 
immortality), but rather is a complication of the boundary between what we give an 
apology for (defending another; loving another; preserving another) and what we give 
an apologia for (self-defence; self-love; self-preservation).  For Derrida, autobiography 
is tied into the complex boundary between apology and apologia, and this in turn is 
worked into the concept of making truth by giving it an ethical foundation.  Hägglund‟s 
book, devoid of all religious import into Derrida‟s thought, is devoid of all ethical 
import – he refers to „an ethical or religious “turn”‟ (Hägglund, 2008, p.1) – and so he 
fundamentally misunderstands the concept of making truth.  He says: „Making the truth 
is for Derrida not a matter of devotion to God but of a singular testimony that is always 
open to the possibility of perjury and lying.  Even in testifying to his singular life 
Derrida is liable to violate the truth of his life‟ (p.154).  Perhaps, but Hägglund has also 
left out the fact that, for Derrida, making the truth requires an asked-for pardon.  Like 
the concept of circumcision, the concept of pardon gets no mention in Radical Atheism.  
To put it bluntly, it would seem that, for Derrida, moral truth, perhaps contained in the 
moral of the story, comes before truth itself; and therefore comes before any sort of 
religious truth (which is why The Prayers and Tears of Caputo perhaps gets off on the 
wrong foot just as Hägglund does). 
 The problem with the idea of moral truth, as with the idea of the moral of the 
story, is that it is not God-given but rather is something that we have to make happen in 
our actions.  We must perform moral truth in our actions; there is a performance of truth 
in our actions that can rightly be described as moral.  And this concept of 
performativity, which has become so pervasive in our thinking particularly after 
Austin‟s How to Do Things with Words (Austin, 1962), is what Derrida has in mind 
with regards to the „making‟ part of making truth.  As he puts it in his essay 
„Composing “Circumfession”‟: 
 
It is this limit of the performativity that in fact draws the line we are now analyzing.  The interest we are 
taking in speech act theory in the academy perhaps has to do with the illusion that, by using performative 
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utterances, we produce events, that we are mastering history.  The event is absolutely unpredictable, that 
is, beyond any performativity.  That‟s where a signature occurs.  If I so much insist on circumcision in 
this text, it is because circumcision is precisely something which happens to a powerless child before he 
can speak, before he can sign, before he has a name.  It is by this mark that he is inscribed in a 
community, whether he wants it or not.  This happened to him and leaves a mark, a scar, a signature, on 
his body.  This happened before him, so to speak.  It‟s a heritage that he cannot deny, whatever he does or 
he doesn‟t do (Derrida, 2005, p.21). 
 
The „limit of the performativity‟ is thus the boundary between what we are capable of 
making happen and what happens to us regardless of our capabilities, and happens in 
such a way that instead emphasizes our inabilities and disabilities.  That which we make 
happen is when we are „mastering history‟, whereas that which happens to us 
(„circumcision is precisely something which happens to a powerless child‟) is when 
historical events master us, taking us by surprise in their unpredictability: „It only 
happens to me‟ (Derrida, 1987, p.135; Derrida, 1993, p.305).  In his essay „Signature 
Event Context‟ Derrida invents the counter-concept of iterability in order to put into 
question Austin‟s concept of the performative – in which the heteronomy of historical 
context circumscribes the capabilities of any rhetorical performance.  In 
„Circumfession‟, it is circumcision that performs this task: the „covenant‟ of 
circumcision acts as the „heteronomic alliance‟ (Derrida, 1993, p.136) – a heteronomy 
that overpowers the capable autonomy that can, with ease, make something happen.  
Circumfession is a hesitant confession precisely because it is an uneasy confession. 
 Derrida‟s essay „Composing “Circumfession”‟ was delivered as a paper at a 
conference in Villanova in 2001, not long after the September 11
th
 attack on the World 
Trade Centre.  In his summary of what he means by making truth, he alludes to the 
attack: 
 
When I ask, when I confess, I‟m not reporting a fact.  I can kill someone.  I can hijack a plane and then 
report; it‟s not a confession.  It becomes a confession only when I ask for forgiveness and, according to 
the tradition, when I promise to repent, that is, to improve, to love, to transform my hatred into love, to 
transform myself, and to do so out of love.  It‟s not a matter of knowledge.  It‟s not a matter of making 
the other know what happened, but a matter of changing oneself, of transforming oneself.  That‟s what 
perhaps Augustine calls “to make the truth.”  Not to tell the truth, not to inform – God knows everything 
– but to make the truth, to produce the truth (Derrida, 2005, p.23). 
 
One can detect the moral psychological tone that the concept of making truth carries: it 
is „a matter of changing oneself, of transforming oneself‟.  Earlier we saw that Derrida 
wonders what „to turn around‟ means: viz., to change or transform.  And in the context 
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of the concept of making truth it becomes a matter of turning around into oneself; an 
impossibly inward turn.  An „autobiographical‟ turn, for in „Circumfession‟ Derrida 
says: „I owe it to autobiography to say that I have spent my life teaching so as to return 
in the end to what mixes prayer and tears with blood‟ (Derrida, 1993, p.20).  This debt 
to autobiography that Derrida confesses early on in „Circumfession‟ itself later on 
becomes transformed into the more monstrous sounding counter-concept: 
„autobiothanatoheterographical‟ (p.213).  The life of the self implies within it, radically 
within it in this counter-concept, the death of the other; for example the death of the 
mother.  Life changes us because its very lifetime changes itself without our control.  
As such, Derrida counters Augustine‟s notion of original sin by claiming, instead, „the 
original sin against me‟ (Derrida, 1993, p.74).  The problem of morality is therefore not 
merely a matter of moral action, but is also a matter of moral judgement with regards to 
those circumstances when something has heteronomously happened to someone that 
was not of their own autonomous doing, not of their own „free will‟.  The 
autobiothanatoheterographical acts as the quasi-transcendental condition of possibility 
and impossibility of the very boundary between apology and apologia.  To make the 
truth happen is to give it back to those from whom we might have taken it: to give it 
back with an apology or to take it back with an apologia, for justice precedes truth – so 
long as the pleas do not fall on deaf ears, in which case perhaps the time has come to go 
separate ways, to break the alliance or to sever completely the already-broken alliance. 
 Derrida‟s concept of making truth is therefore distinguished from the theological 
concept of absolute truth, or absolute knowledge – in French, savoir absolu (which is 
what Derrida alludes to in abbreviating Saint Augustine‟s name as „SA‟).  Making truth 
is not absolute truth because it does not rest in some eternal divine presence; but neither 
is it making knowledge for it is not about the mere reportage of an event.  Instead, it is 
about the trial of making right a wrong, and so it is about making a future event happen; 
which is impossible because this has to happen against the grain of the run of events 
that happen to us, and which form the life circumstances of our actions.  And in such 
circumstances, if God‟s name becomes synonymous with the origin of tears, then 
feeling precedes thinking.  Derrida‟s neologism of the autobiothanatoheterographical is 
not only the condition of the apology/apologia opposition, but also, for example, of the 
opposition between the tragic and the comic.  But what are the direct implications of 
this reversal of Augustine for the metaphysics behind his moral psychology?  This 
question is too big for the space we have here to give a point by point analysis, for 
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Derrida‟s exercise in indirectness has postponed a direct answer.  But in the chapter that 
follows, we will see that although Derrida‟s autobiographical thought begins by 
apparently reversing the logical order of priority between thought and feeling, at the 
same time he also puts into question the very self-presence of feeling itself. 
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Confessing Desire: Rousseau & Derrida 
 
Introduction 
Feeling precedes thinking.  Rousseau himself says so in the second chapter of his „Essay 
on the origin of languages‟: „One does not begin by reasoning, but by feeling‟ 
(Rousseau, 1966, p.11).  Rousseau‟s „Essay‟ is the text that Derrida famously chose to 
give an extended deconstructive reading of in the second part of Of Grammatology, 
„Nature, Culture, Writing‟.  Before Derrida turns to his reading of Rousseau‟s „Essay‟, 
he offers two preparatory chapters, the first entitled, „The Violence of the Letter: From 
Lévi-Strauss to Rousseau‟; and the second entitled, „That Dangerous Supplement‟.  But 
it in his short opening „Introduction to the “Age of Rousseau”‟ – and it is perhaps 
notable that Derrida borrows this phrase „age of Rousseau‟ from Nietzsche (1997, p.17) 
– that he proffers his choice of Rousseau over and above any other philosopher: for 
Derrida, Rousseau „starts from a new model of presence: the subject‟s self-presence 
within consciousness or feeling‟ (Derrida, 1976, p.98).  Having in the first part of Of 
Grammatology, „Writing Before the Letter‟, outlined how deconstruction targets, and 
works to undermine without destroying completely, the phono-logocentric prejudices of 
the metaphysical tradition, it becomes necessary for Derrida to justify the usage of 
Rousseau as his main point of inspiration, amongst other thinkers.  For Derrida, 
Rousseau is a transitory figure in the history of metaphysics, on the boundary between 
metaphysics and its deconstruction.  Indeed, it is precisely because of Rousseau‟s 
reversal of the relation between feeling and thinking, and the consequences of this 
reversal, that places him on this boundary. 
In this chapter, the aim is not to document the twists and turns of Derrida‟s 
lengthy reading of Rousseau‟s „Essay‟.  Rather, drawing on Derrida‟s reading of 
Rousseau‟s Confessions and Émile in „That Dangerous Supplement‟, the aim of this 
chapter is to show the way in which Derrida‟s conception of the supplement applies 
itself to the understanding of life and self.  But it should also be noted that Derrida‟s 
choice of Rousseau‟s „Essay‟ is important also because the „Essay‟s‟ title, regarding the 
„origin of languages‟, names Derrida‟s own central concern – not only in Of 
Grammatology but in what he calls „deconstruction‟ more generally.  That is, the 
concepts that form the vocabulary of Derrida‟s own philosophical thought find their 
initial point of application in the question that Rousseau poses regarding the origin of 
languages (or perhaps rather language itself; and perhaps not only origin but also 
56 
 
teleology).  This is why Derrida‟s philosophical thought is quasi-transcendental: 
because his argument is that the condition of possibility of the origin of language 
requires the condition of impossibility of finding this origin.  The origin of language is 
lost before the attempt to find it has even begun.  This is an obvious consequence of the 
fact that any attempt to find these origins requires a sort of philosophical-cum-literary 
speculation-cum-mythology such as Rousseau himself has recourse to in his own 
thought – beginning with the „social contract‟ concept of the state of nature which is 
supposed to identify humankind‟s more general historical origins.  For Derrida, as for 
Rousseau, the problem of humankind‟s origins is linked to the problem of the origin of 
human languages.  But unlike Rousseau, Derrida does not engage in philosophical 
speculation or literary mythologizing in order to provide explanations.  Instead, as the 
concept of supplement implies (amongst others), his thought alludes to the ultimate 
unknowability of our explanations of the origins of life itself. 
However, there is a difference between arguing that the origins of life „itself‟ are 
unknowable, and that the origins of „this or that‟ life are unknowable.  The former is 
generic and the latter is specific.  The former enquires about the origin of history itself; 
the latter enquires about the origin of a particular individual who is inscribed within a 
pre-existing history.  In Of Grammatology, Derrida is more concerned with the generic 
than the specific.  For example, his concept of arche-writing outlined in „Writing Before 
the Letter‟ mediates between the binary opposition of speech and writing, thereby 
infusing all language and communication with the properties of writing more generally.  
In „That Dangerous Supplement‟, in the famous „Question of Method‟ section regarding 
the nature of critical or deconstructive reading, he conceptualizes the idea of the text to 
which reading finds its primary point of application: „There is nothing outside of the 
text‟ (Derrida, 1976, p.158).  But the text, he argues, is not just the literary text, the 
specific text that is read and written in the narrow sense of the term; instead it is the 
general text according to the idea of arche-writing in which all forms of communication 
are affected.  For Derrida, the text is world-historical reality insofar as language is 
radically implicated in this reality: 
 
What we have tried to show by following the guiding line of the „dangerous supplement‟, is that in what 
one calls the real life of these existences „of flesh and bone‟, beyond and behind what one believes can be 
circumscribed as Rousseau‟s text, there has never been anything but writing; there have never been 
anything but supplements, substitutive significations which could only come forth in a chain of 
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differential references, the „real‟ supervening, and being added only while taking on meaning from a trace 
and from an invocation of the supplement, etc (pp.158-159). 
 
In juxtaposing „real life‟ with the text, Derrida can allow the latter to do the work of the 
former, thereby continuing the work of metaphysics while simultaneously displacing it.  
The prejudices of metaphysics (of presence, purity, properness, etc) become displaced; 
but metaphysics in the neutral sense of the term (as a worldview on the nature of the 
world) continues.  Derrida offers such a worldview when he refers to „supplements, 
substitutive significations which could only come forth in a chain of differential 
references‟. 
Real life is an infinite chain of supplements within which one is inscribed.  But 
what does this mean, exactly?  In this chapter, I will consider the answer to this question 
with regards to Derrida‟s reading of Rousseau in „That Dangerous Supplement‟.  In 
doing so this chapter will pick up on a couple of interpretations of Derrida‟s reading of 
Rousseau, by Burke and de Man, in which the problem of literary criticism in Derrida 
will be addressed.  But first it is important to consider the nature of Rousseau‟s thought 
as it is relevant to Derrida in Of Grammatology. 
 
Confessing Desire 
Rousseau began writing his „Essay on the Origin of Languages‟ at a similar time to 
writing his famous „Discourse on the Origin of Inequality‟ (the second of three 
„Discourses‟), but the former was unfinished during his lifetime and published 
posthumously.  In his essay „Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Founder of the Sciences of Man‟ 
(in: Levi-Strauss, 1976), the structural anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss hailed 
Rousseau‟s „Discourse on the Origin of Inequality‟ as the foundation of the modern 
discipline of anthropology.  It is in the context of the thought of Levi-Strauss that, in the 
first chapter of „Nature, Culture, Writing‟, Derrida thus moves backwards in time „from 
Lévi-Strauss to Rousseau‟.  But here, before we turn to Émile and The Confessions, let 
us consider the „Essay‟ and Rousseau‟s second „Discourse‟. 
 In Rousseau, Nicholas Dent says: „whether or not Rousseau saw himself as 
working in quite this way, it does in fact make quite a lot of sense to see his thought as 
moving progressively from the diagnosis of human and social ills to an attempt to find 
their remedy‟ (Dent, 2005, p.80).  „Discourse on the Origin of Inequality‟ is thus an 
attempt to diagnose the ills of humanity.  Taken by itself it is a thus a relatively 
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pessimistic text, as the ills are offered with little sense of what to do about them.  Near 
the beginning Rousseau positions himself in the context of the social contract thinkers 
who have utilized the concept of the state of nature: „The philosophers who have 
examined the foundations of society have all felt the necessity of returning to the state 
of nature, but none of them has reached it‟ (in: Rousseau, 1987, p.38).  What is 
distinctive about Rousseau, in comparison with Hobbes and Locke before him, is the 
new version of the state of nature that he offers, and the consequences for thinking 
about society that is implicated in this version.  In Leviathan Hobbes portrayed the state 
of nature as a state of war; a chaotic war of all against all.  Mankind enters into a social 
contract because the state of nature is the harsh reality of war: „the life of man, solitary, 
poore, nasty, brutish, and short‟ (Hobbes, 1985, p.186).  For Hobbes, natural law is 
about seeking peace, and because the state of nature is a state of war it makes no sense 
for man to remain in the state of nature, where he is animal-like in attempting to satisfy 
his own passions. 
In contrast to Hobbes, Locke, in his Two Treatises of Government, argues that 
the state of nature is not a state of war but is rather a state of liberty.  He continues: „But 
though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence‟ (Locke, 1924, p.119).  
That is, in the state of nature mankind might be free, but natural law does not protect 
our private property from theft.  This protection, offered by the positive laws created by 
mankind in society, is ultimately the reason why we enter into a social contract.  With 
such contrasting versions of the state of nature, it is important to note the different 
forms of political rule in society that result.  For Hobbes, in order to curb mankind‟s 
natural violence, the autocratic figure of the Sovereign is given absolute power (which 
is synonymous with the statement of „the divine right of kings‟).  For Locke, in order to 
institute and enforce the necessary complex positive laws concerning the protection of 
an individual‟s property, the separation of state powers is necessary (culminating in a 
more democratic constitution).  But unlike both Hobbes and Locke, in „Discourse on the 
Origin of Inequality‟ Rousseau is not writing with a political agenda as such.  Rather, 
his agenda places morality before politics.  As Lévi-Strauss notes, there is indeed a 
moral tendency in how Rousseau goes about his anthropological business which 
positions the self radically in relation to others before itself: the second „Discourse‟, 
„lies in a conception of man which places the other before the self, and in a conception 
of mankind which places life before men‟ (Lévi-Strauss, 1976, p.37). 
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Levi-Strauss gets his conception of Rousseau as the founder of anthropology 
from the fact that, in the second „Discourse‟, he gives real world examples of 
indigenous tribes, such as the South African Hottentots, in order to consider in a 
practical way what he means when he refers to the idea of the state of nature.  Because 
Hobbes and Locke refer to the state of nature without practical examples, they 
misconceive mankind in the state of nature: „They spoke about savage man, and it was 
civil man they depicted‟ (in: Rousseau, 1987, p.38).  This argument guides Rousseau‟s 
own depiction of savage man as naturally good, and mankind‟s experience of the state 
of nature as a happy one.  On the one hand, Rousseau‟s concern is moral (regarding the 
causes of good and evil in humanity); and on the other hand, his concern is 
psychological (regarding the causes of happiness and unhappiness in humanity).  
Morality and psychology are two sides of the same coin of human feeling for Rousseau.  
And as a work of moral psychology, the second „Discourse‟ argues the cause of their 
negative aspects (i.e., evil and unhappiness) to come from civil society itself: „someone 
could easily write the history of human maladies by following the history of civil 
societies‟ (p.42).  For Rousseau, civil society becomes the origin of inequality in 
mankind, as social organization implies the relation of ruler and ruled or rich and poor; 
and the state of nature, in contrast, is the prehistory in which human relations were once 
equal in their solitariness.  But, he argues, there can be no return to this prehistorical and 
prephilosophical state of nature as the formation of society implies there can be no 
going back: „We will never see those happy days reborn when the people did not dabble 
in philosophizing‟ (p.99).  For Rousseau, history begins through the philosophical 
impetus, as the techniques of thinking turned humans away from their natural state of 
feeling. 
Rousseau‟s blend of morality and psychology in human feeling is expressed 
most directly in his sentimentalist conception of pity.  For Rousseau, this conception 
requires an adjustment to the so-called „golden rule‟ of morality (which perhaps 
transposes the Hippocratic Oath from a medical to a moral context): 
 
Instead of the sublime maxim of reasoned justice, Do unto others as you would have them do unto you, 
pity inspires all men with another maxim of natural goodness, much less perfect but perhaps more useful 
than the preceding one: Do what is good for you with as little harm as possible to others.  In a word, it is 
in this natural sentiment, rather than in subtle arguments, that one must search for the cause of the 
repugnance at doing evil that every man would experience, even independently of the maxims of 
education.  Although it might be appropriate for Socrates and minds of his stature to acquire virtue 
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through reason, the human race would long ago have ceased to exist, if its preservation had depended 
solely on the reasonings of its members (in: Rousseau, 1987, p.55). 
 
For Rousseau, the sentiment of pity involves the impetus for self-preservation and self-
love, which in turn require the intuitive recognition of the same sentiments at work in 
other people.  Just as one oneself does not want to feel the effects of an unnecessary 
pain caused by the words and deeds of others, so one should therefore limit one‟s 
relations with others so as to not cause unnecessary harm to them.  This is different 
from the golden rule because the latter generically implies that the other likes and 
dislikes what oneself likes and dislikes.  But this may not be the case, and so 
Rousseau‟s conception of pity involves a relation to the other in which we do not want 
to see them in pain, thereby taking into account the specifics of whatever it is that 
causes pain in particular people.  Through pity, we identify with another‟s pain to the 
degree that we become sensitive to whatever it is that causes pain in that person; and in 
recognizing the causes, we are better placed to take preventative action.  For Rousseau, 
the „natural sentiment‟ of pity takes priority over the „subtle arguments‟ of virtue 
acquired through reason; and this is justified with recourse to the natural existence of 
human tears: „Nature, in giving men tears, bears witness that she gave the human race 
the softest hearts‟ (p.54).  But those hearts have been corrupted by civil society founded 
upon the „perfectibility‟ (p.45) of the mind. 
The second „Discourse‟ also briefly takes up the task more explicitly reserved 
for the „Essay on the Origin of Languages‟.  Assigning language as the basis of culture, 
cultivation, civilization, or education; of nurture rather than nature; Rousseau says: „let 
us think of the inconceivable difficulties and the infinite amount of time that the first 
invention of languages must have cost‟ (in: Rousseau, 1987, p.48).  For Rousseau, the 
formation of languages did not occur in the necessities of domestic encounters, „in the 
domestic intercourse among fathers, mothers, and children‟ (p.48).  Rather, the 
formation of language „is the cry of nature‟ (p.49).  That is, when the natural world 
itself provided painful circumstances beyond the control of savages in the state of 
nature, it is their cries of help that formed language.  Indeed, just as babies cry for help, 
in this respect the formation of languages is less about adult teaching of languages to 
children, and more about children struggling to vocalize their wants and needs: „It 
should be noted that, since the child had all his needs to explain and consequently more 
things to say to the mother than the mother to the child, it is the child who must make 
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the greatest effort toward inventing a language‟ (p.48).  Consequently, the teaching of 
language by parents to the child, „is a good way of showing how already formed 
languages are taught, but it does not tell us how languages are formed‟ (p.49).  The 
formation of languages is thus childlike.  In a move that makes Émile famous, Rousseau 
is known for identifying with the perspective of the child qua child, rather than 
interpreting the child as if it were merely a small adult – as was the prevalent thinking in 
his day that he was critical of. 
If we return briefly to Dent‟s suggestion to see Rousseau‟s thought as 
developing from the diagnosis of humanity‟s ills to their remedy, then both Émile and 
„The Social Contract‟ can be understood as remedial of the diagnosis given in the earlier 
three „Discourses‟, particularly the second on inequality (at any rate, the structure of 
Dent‟s book implies this).  With its central argument that the birth of civil society is the 
origin of mankind‟s inequality, the second „Discourse‟s‟ diagnoses for modernity 
appear bleak, if taken by themselves.  Both Émile and „The Social Contract‟ were 
written and published by Rousseau at a similar time, and they deal with the opposite 
spheres of life in terms of private life and public life respectively.  While Rousseau‟s 
novel Julie, or the New Heloise was the most famous novel in eighteenth-century 
France (Rousseau, 1997), and so his most widely-read work in his own lifetime, it is 
undoubtedly „The Social Contract‟ for which he is most remembered (in: Rousseau, 
1987).  But here, it is Émile that interests us most; in particular as a precursor to The 
Confessions.  Émile is a treatise on education; but it is written in a part-novelistic 
manner via the invention of the character Émile.  The task that Rousseau sets himself is 
to demonstrate how the education or upbringing of a human individual in civil society 
must be performed in order to be such that it is in accordance with the teaching of 
Nature itself.  For Rousseau, since Nature is inherently good, human nurture should be 
in accordance with Nature. 
If Rousseau appears to speak out against education, as in the above extract from 
the second „Discourse‟ which gave his adjustment to the golden rule, it is because the 
techniques of education that have developed in civil society have the opposite effect to 
their intended one.  That is, they not only make children unhappy and unruly, but then, 
later in life, they have the effect of making adults unhappy with themselves and nasty to 
each other.  For Rousseau, the primary reason for this goes back to how we treat and 
teach children, in not allowing children to be children: „The wisest writers devote 
themselves to what a man ought to know without asking what a child is capable of 
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learning.  They are always looking for the man in the child, without considering what he 
is before he becomes a man‟ (Rousseau, 1993, p.2).  The character of Émile is thus 
Rousseau‟s hypothetical case study in which we treat a child qua child, as taught 
according to Nature and thus according to mankind‟s natural goodness.  He makes clear 
from the outset that his interest is not in public education: „If you wish to know what is 
meant by public education, read Plato‟s Republic.  Those who merely judge books by 
their titles take this for a treatise on politics, but it is the finest treatise on education ever 
written‟ (p.8).  Rather, Rousseau‟s interest is in the education of private life; that is, in 
the context of domestic upbringing.  For Rousseau, civil education by itself would only 
teach people to be at war with themselves, endlessly divided between duty and desire: 
„He who would preserve the supremacy of natural feelings in social life knows not what 
he asks.  Ever at war with himself, hesitating between his wishes and his duties, he will 
be neither a man nor a citizen‟ (p.8).  But what is his solution? 
His solution is to teach children how to be men, not how to be citizens.  This, in 
turn, involves teaching them how to live: „Before his parents choose a calling for him 
nature called him to be a man.  Life is the trade I would teach him.  When he leaves me, 
I grant you, he will be neither a magistrate, a soldier, nor a priest; he will be a man‟ 
(Rousseau, 1993, p.10).  For Rousseau, the sort of education that teaches children to be 
civilians, altruistically in the service of others, and leaves them to figure out their own 
happiness for themselves, is not only doomed to failure, but is also doomed to 
hypocrisy: „It is only fit to turn out hypocrites, always professing to live for others, 
while thinking of themselves alone‟ (p.9).  From the moment we are born, we learn; life 
is lifelong learning about life: „We begin to learn when we begin to live‟ (p.10).  
Because life involves so many injuries, both physical and emotional, ultimately 
culminating in death and mourning, Rousseau acknowledges that to learn to live is to 
learn to live with life‟s pains.  But to teach children in such a way that removes the 
element of natural feeling from living life is not to teach them how to cope with life‟s 
pains: „This is not teaching him to bear pain; it is training him to feel it‟ (p.11).  For 
Rousseau, we need to let children be children; that is, we need to facilitate their 
imagination rather than stifle it by educating them in adult realities: „Mankind has its 
place in the sequence of things; childhood has its place in the sequence of human life; 
the man must be treated as a man and the child as a child‟ (p.51).  This, however, is not 
to pander to the child‟s wants: „to yield to his tears is to teach him to cry‟ (p.59).  
Rather, it is to bring up the child such that they know that they are not the powerful ones 
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in the relationship, which liberates them from a premature sense of entitlement; thus 
allowing them to play more imaginatively.  In child‟s play, problems are encountered 
that the children themselves are encouraged to overcome, thereby facilitating their 
physical and psychical development through nature‟s own education, rather than 
through the unnatural institutions of the adult world. 
Émile is structured in five books, each book dealing with a different stage of life: 
i.e., the first book deals with infancy, the second with childhood, the third with 
adolescence, etc.  At each stage Rousseau documents how the child should be brought 
up, counteracting along the way the various traps that parents fall into in their child‟s 
upbringing: viz., the trap of the traditional idea of the tutor as the knowledgeable 
authority figure from whom the child learns disinterestedly in classroom teaching.  
Instead, he suggests that the parents and tutors should learn to manipulate the 
environment in such a way that facilitates the child‟s play, within which the child will 
encounter problems that they themselves will take an active interest in overcoming.  As 
well as the prevalent way of thinking about education in Rousseau‟s own time, his 
arguments are also directed against a view of childhood which could be said to originate 
in Augustine‟s Confessions, in which, as a result of original sin documented by the Fall, 
children are born sinners.  In contrast, in Émile Rousseau argues that a natural dose of 
self-love or selfishness is healthy for the human heart: 
 
Let us lay down as an incontrovertible rule that the first impulses of nature are always right; there is no 
original sin in the human heart, the how and the why of the entrance of every vice can be traced.  The 
only natural passion is self-love or selfishness taken in a wider sense.  This selfishness is good in itself 
and in relation to ourselves; and as the child has no necessary relations to other people he is naturally 
indifferent to them; his self-love only becomes good or bad by the use made of it and the relations 
established by its means (Rousseau, 1993, pp.66-67). 
 
For Rousseau, children are not old enough to reason properly, and so any wrong-doing 
that they perform is judged so by the adults around them, but is not understood by the 
children themselves.  As he puts it: „wrong-doing depends on the harmful intention‟ 
(p.67), and as the child is not old enough to reason properly, he therefore does not 
possess quite the capacity for the ill-will which acts as the basis of the wrong-doing for 
adults. 
The notion of self-love that Rousseau generally promotes – amour-propre as 
distinct from amour de soi – is one in which the former develops out of the latter.  That 
is, the task of education, for Rousseau, is to transform the self-love we naturally 
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experience in childhood (amour de soi) into a mode of adult self-love which includes 
pity within its general scheme (amour-propre).  As Dent puts it, it follows from this that 
adult self-love becomes a sort of self-worth and self-respect such that we expect to 
receive respect from others, out of which there is also respect given to others, as we 
must also acknowledge self-respect at work within others themselves: 
 
It is that the central demand of amour-propre, to receive our due recognition and respect from other 
people, is capable of being met provided we are clear about what is our due from others – not servility 
and fawning adulation but a position among men of common regard and common respect, recognizing 
our equality as humans (Dent, 2005, p.105). 
 
As Émile becomes a young adult, he requires an education in religion in order to 
provide amour-propre with a solid foundation in inner conscience: „conscience persists 
in following the order of nature in spite of all the laws of man‟ (Rousseau, 1993, p.274).  
In the fourth book of Émile Rousseau inserts a section entitled, „The Creed of a 
Savoyard Priest‟, his most famous text on the philosophy of religion.  Here, Rousseau 
argues for natural religion: „the light of reason alone, in a state of nature, can lead us no 
further than to natural religion‟ (p.333).  That is, religion in which we bypass the 
orthodoxy of the church in favour of the sentiments of the human heart: „True worship 
is of the heart‟ (p.326).  Rousseau, brought up a Protestant, was nonetheless a staunch 
critic of religious dogmatism – „The Creed of a Savoyard Priest‟ led to the burning of 
Émile – and promoter of religious toleration.  Before placing Rousseau in dialogue with 
Derrida, let us turn our attention finally to The Confessions. 
 Although the title of Rousseau‟s Confessions is undoubtedly taken from 
Augustine, he makes no explicit attempt to distinguish its underlying theme from that of 
Augustine‟s.  Already we can see both similarities and differences.  Augustine was 
writing both as a prayer to God and to promote the virtue of conversion to his readers.  
While Augustine addresses God Himself, Rousseau instead addresses his human 
readers.  Indeed, this difference is apparent right from the opening page: 
 
I have unveiled my inmost self even as Thou has seen it, O Eternal Being.  Gather round me the countless 
hosts of my fellow-men; let them hear my confessions, lament for my unworthiness, and blush for my 
imperfections.  Then let each of them in turn reveal, with the same frankness, the secrets of his heart at 
the foot of the Throne, and say, if he dare, „I was better than that man!‟ (Rousseau, 1996, p.3). 
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Augustine writes for God; Rousseau writes for his „fellow-men‟: even though he does 
indeed believe in God, his confession is not for him in quite the same way.  
Commenting on this extract, Peter France in Rousseau: Confessions notes that what 
Rousseau says is compatible with the Protestant tradition of the time: „This is 
compatible of course with a Protestant tradition of public confession, and the final lines 
of the preamble imagine a scene of reciprocal confession – he will tell his sins, then 
everybody else will tell theirs‟ (France, 1987, p.25).  As such, Rousseau‟s Confessions 
cannot be considered simply as a sort of „secular autobiography‟ in contradistinction to 
Augustine‟s „spiritual autobiography‟, even though its address is to his fellow-men 
rather than to God.  Regarding the point of Rousseau‟s confession, France continues: 
„But to what end?  To gain forgiveness, would be a normal Christian answer, and this 
may be in Rousseau‟s mind too, but he tends to speak rather of gaining relief‟ (p.25).  
That is, it would appear that Rousseau thinks that confession is not merely a moral 
vehicle for having sins pardoned, but is also a psychological vehicle for not having to 
bear the mental weight of the sin any longer. 
 Another characteristic difference between Augustine and Rousseau is that 
Augustine wrote his Confessions with the theme of original sin in mind, thereby 
showing how childhood is as corrupt as adolescence and adulthood.  By contrast, 
Rousseau spends considerable time in the first part of his Confessions documenting 
various events of his childhood in order to demonstrate his natural goodness of heart.  
He articulates how this goodness has been forced to struggle against the grain of 
multifarious misfortunes, for which he himself has had to bear the consequences.  
Beginning with his very birth, to which he lost his mother: „Ten months later I was 
born, a weak and ailing child; I cost my mother her life, and my birth was the first of my 
misfortunes‟ (Rousseau, 1996, p.5).  Brought up by his father, he was educated from a 
young age in literature which sensitized him to the plights of the world: „I felt before I 
thought: this is the common lot of humanity.  I experienced it more than others‟ (p.6).  
Able to understand the literature well for his age, but unable to truly understand it, he 
therefore grew up with confused and powerful emotions, feelings which have never left 
him: 
 
In a short time I acquired, by this dangerous method, not only extreme facility in reading and 
understanding what I read, but a knowledge of the passions that was unique in a child of my age.  I had no 
idea of things in themselves, although all the feelings of actual life were already known to me.  I had 
conceived nothing, but felt everything.  These confused emotions, which I felt one after the other, 
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certainly did not warp the reasoning powers which I did not as yet possess; but they shaped them in me of 
a peculiar stamp, and gave me odd and romantic notions of human life, of which experience and 
reflection have never been able wholly to cure me (p.6). 
 
Consistent with Émile is the idea that being taught to read and educated in lots of 
literature at such a young age is harmful to a child, which is why he here calls it a 
„dangerous method‟.  A method which on the one hand might be said to facilitate 
imagination, but facilitates it with imagination unfit for the mind of a child. 
Indeed, the juxtaposition of imagination and memory is much stronger in 
Rousseau than it is Augustine, who assigns memory a privileged place for human 
thought.  In her essay „Augustine and Rousseau: Narrative and Self-knowledge in the 
Two Confessions‟ Ann Hartle says: „there is a sense in which remembering is, for 
Rousseau, a function of the imagination‟ (Hartle, 1999, p.270).  There is also a sense in 
which, to say this, Rousseau is placed directly alongside his onetime friend David 
Hume, who, in A Treatise on Human Nature, says: „Thus it appears, that the belief or 
assent, which always attends the memory and senses, is nothing but the vivacity of 
those perceptions they present; and that this alone distinguishes them from imagination‟ 
(Hume, 1978, p.86).  That is, there are no absolutely stable grounds with which to 
distinguish memory from imagination.  As such, when writing one‟s autobiography, 
which requires writing from one‟s memory, there will undoubtedly be embellishments 
from one‟s imagination.  This can be seen in both parts of The Confessions (each part is 
of course comprised of six books).  In the first part, Rousseau‟s self-portrayal is of a 
relatively happy upbringing and existence.  In the second part, his self-portrayal is of a 
much more suspicious nature due to the characters of those he believes surround him.  
As he puts it at the beginning of the second part: „Destiny, which for thirty years 
favoured my inclinations, during a second thirty thwarted them‟ (Rousseau, 1996, 
p.265).  The Confessions is a lengthy book full of detailed descriptions of a multitude of 
events of Rousseau‟s life; but to reduce all of the detailed events of his lifetime to this 
pithy viewpoint is equally the work of imagination as of memory.  But it is this 
imagination that thus directs the tone of his writing throughout as much as anything 
else.  Perhaps one should not forget Rousseau when he refers, „to what an extent I am 
capable of being inflamed by beings of the imagination‟ (p.536).  But let us turn our 
attention now to Derrida‟s reading of Rousseau in „That Dangerous Supplement‟ – and 
we will set up a little bit of groundwork before drawing on the scholarship of de Man 
and Burke. 
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 „That Dangerous Supplement‟ is undoubtedly the most well-known chapter in 
Of Grammatology.  The statement of there being nothing outside the text has become a 
sort of empty watchword for both protagonists and antagonists of deconstruction.  But 
as we have already made the case for what this means, let us consider the other concerns 
that are at work in this chapter, notably Derrida‟s reading of Rousseau.  As Arthur 
Bradley argues in Derrida‟s Of Grammatology, the dynamic between how Derrida 
reads Rousseau and how he also uses this reading as an opportunity to say what he 
wants to about his own thought forms a difficult and strange balancing act: 
 
If „That Dangerous Supplement‟ is now one of the most famous chapters in Of Grammatology, it is also – 
and particularly for readers new to Derrida – one of the most idiosyncratic: Derrida‟s reading constantly 
tacks back and forth between Rousseau‟s life and work and seems to treat everything from the 
philosopher‟s most personal confessions to his largest theoretical claims as grist to his own mill (Bradley, 
2008, p.99). 
 
Here it is this juxtaposition of life and work in Derrida‟s reading of Rousseau that 
concerns us the most.  Derrida‟s argument is not merely that Rousseau denounces 
writing as the loss of presence, but that he also renovates it as a vehicle to recover that 
lost presence, of which it itself was the cause: „Rousseau condemns writing as 
destruction of presence and as disease of speech.  He rehabilitates it to the extent that it 
promises the reappropriation of that of which speech allowed itself to be dispossessed‟ 
(Derrida, 1976, p.142). 
Derrida‟s reading of Rousseau is organized around this paradox, and it is 
precisely within this paradox that the juxtaposition between life and work occurs.  
Derrida continues:  
 
The first movement of this desire is formulated as a theory of language.  The other governs the experience 
of the writer.  In the Confessions, when Jean-Jacques tries to explain how he became a writer, he 
describes the passage to writing as the restoration, by a certain absence and by a sort of calculated 
effacement, of presence disappointed of itself in speech (Derrida, 1976, p.142). 
 
As „a theory of language‟, writing becomes excluded in the work of Rousseau; as „the 
experience of the writer‟, writing becomes rehabilitated in the life of Rousseau.  The 
way in which this exclusion of writing operates in Rousseau‟s actual treatise on 
language, „Essay on the Origin of Languages‟, is not Derrida‟s concern in „That 
Dangerous Supplement‟.  However, he does manage to pick out a citation from a little-
known text by Rousseau called „Pronunciation‟ in which he explicitly describes writing 
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as a supplement to speech (something which does not happen in the „Essay‟): 
„Languages are made to be spoken, writing serves only as a supplement to speech. ... 
Speech represents thought by conventional signs, and writing represents the same with 
regard to speech.  Thus the art of writing is nothing but a mediated representation of 
thought‟ (Rousseau, in: Derrida, 1976, p.144).  Thus Derrida has evidence for his claim, 
which is also a preparatory one for his subsequent reading of the „Essay‟, that 
Rousseau‟s theory of language works to exclude writing – and does so by way of the 
notion of the supplement. 
What is curious about „That Dangerous Supplement‟ is the way in which 
Derrida conceptualizes the supplement (ultimately, as an adequate substitution for a 
deficiency or privation that can be both necessary and contingent).  Having just cited 
from Rousseau‟s second „Discourse‟, suggesting that, „the moment of mine-blindness, 
that is, of metallurgy, is the origin of society‟ (Derrida, 1976, p.149), Derrida continues 
by invoking a relation between blindness and the supplement: 
 
Blindness thus produces that which is born at the same time as society: the languages, the regulated 
substitution of signs for things, the order of the supplement.  One goes from blindness to the supplement.  
But the blind person cannot see, in its origin, the very thing he produces to supplement his sight.  
Blindness to the supplement is the law.  And especially blindness to its concept.  Moreover, it does not 
suffice to locate its functioning in order to see its meaning.  The supplement has no sense and is given no 
intuition.  We do not therefore make it emerge out of its strange penumbra.  We speak its reserve (p.149). 
 
Paradoxically, Derrida conceptualizes the supplement at the same time in which he 
states a general wariness towards the idea of the very possibility of it functioning as a 
concept.  But of course, the guiding idea underlying Of Grammatology as a whole 
regards a general wariness towards the problem of turning words (signifiers) into 
concepts (signifieds) in which the latter appear purely self-present or transcendent.  
Deconstruction undermines the metaphysical force of what Derrida calls the 
transcendental signified: the concept whose authority over the word is absolute. 
This undermining occurs via the concept of play.  In „Writing Before the Letter‟ 
Derrida says: „One could call play the absence of the transcendental signified as 
limitlessness of play, that is to say as the destruction of onto-theology and the 
metaphysics of presence‟ (Derrida, 1976, p.50).  For precisely the reason that Rousseau 
gave in „Pronunciations‟, where writing is a representation of speech which is itself a 
representation of thought, Derrida thus opens Of Grammatology by naming the 
movement of language, that is of language-as-writing in general or as arche-writing, as 
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essentially the signifier of the signifier: „In all senses of the word, writing thus 
comprehends language.  Not that the word “writing” has ceased to designate the 
signifier of the signifier, but it appears, strange as it may seem, that “signifier of the 
signifier” no longer defines accidental doubling and fallen secondarity‟ (p.7).  The 
problem in metaphysical philosophy regarding the nature of reality is that the human 
experience of reality involves representation.  In the history of metaphysics, this 
representation occurs by the substance of the human mind itself.  But in metaphysics, 
the existence of language poses a problem, since language mediates human experience; 
and so there is a tendency to evade the problem of language by assuming transparency 
of its signifiers to its signified concepts.  For Derrida, this problem hinges on the 
concept of writing because of the double representational structure given to it by the 
metaphysical tradition itself.  Through the counter-concept of arche-writing (which 
counteracts the narrow metaphysical conception of writing), Derrida locates the 
foundations for radically rethinking how reality itself is formed: from a metaphysical 
position which seeks shortcuts around the problem of representation toward some idea 
of pure reality, to a deconstructive position which considers reality itself as always 
already contaminated by an elaborate and potentially infinite chain of representations. 
But why does the concept of play become useful?  If the boundary between 
reality and representation becomes complicated, and does so through the problem posed 
by language, then metaphor also contaminates the literal work of meaning – and Derrida  
invents the term „metaphoricity‟ (Derrida, 1976, p.15) in order to argue that effects of 
literal meaning must occur in the context of the underlying metaphorical schematic of 
language itself.  But with this in mind, there are two analogies for „real life‟ itself which 
Derrida alludes to in Of Grammatology: real life as a game and real life as theatre.  
Derrida uses the analogy of the game when discussing Saussure in the second chapter of 
„Writing Before the Letter‟, called „Linguistics and Grammatology‟, where Saussure 
notably gives the analogy the game of chess for linguistic structure.  And not just 
Saussure, as Derrida says: „expelling the problem of meaning outside of their 
researches, certain American linguists constantly refer to the model of a game.  Here 
one must think of writing as a game within language‟ (Derrida, 1976, p.50).  Rather 
than the problem of meaning, the model of the game instead invokes the idea of rule-
following.  A moment later he continues: „It is therefore the game of the world that must 
first be thought; before attempting to understand all the forms of play in the world‟ 
(p.50).  The game of the world is that general context within which meaning itself is 
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part and parcel of the human experience of reality: i.e., the problem of both meaning in 
language and meaning in life.  Derrida‟s „there is nothing outside of the text‟ refers to 
this general world-historical context.  That is, Derrida would have said „there is nothing 
outside of historical reality‟ if the metaphysical tradition did not exclude the problem of 
its linguistic representation. 
The analogy of real life as theatre returns us to Derrida‟s reading of Rousseau.  
Here Derrida connects up the themes of imagination and pity in Rousseau‟s theory of 
theatre, thus alluding to the latter‟s Letter to M. d‟Alembert on the Theatre (Rousseau, 
1968).  In the chapter following „That Dangerous Supplement‟, called „Genesis and 
Structure of the Essay on the Origin of Languages‟, Derrida says: „Let us note in 
passing that Rousseau‟s entire theory of the theatre also establishes a connection, within 
representation, between the power of identification – pity – and the faculty of 
imagination‟ (Derrida, 1976, p.184).  Particularly so, then, in the „tragic scene‟ (p.185), 
where the plights of those represented on stage provide a vehicle for the audience‟s 
imagination to identify with the actors as one puts oneself in their position.  In the 
context of theatrical representation in the tragic scene, imagination provides the impetus 
for perfectibility: „it surmounts animality and arouses human passion only by opening 
the scene and the space of theatrical representation.  It inaugurates the perversion whose 
possibility is itself inscribed in the notion of perfectibility‟ (p.185).  Imagination 
becomes the condition of theatrical representation, for Rousseau, because the tragic play 
is presented to the audience as the representation of how horrific life can become; 
invoking the identification (pity) for the suffering of the characters; in turn invoking the 
impetus to avoid such suffering in the notion of perfectibility.  More generally, it is 
interesting to note the way in which Derrida‟s own thought mimics Rousseau‟s 
sentiment without explaining it in quite the same metaphysical vocabulary of self-
presence implied in concepts like „imagination‟.  For example, the concept of 
imagination can be substituted for that of invention: „Deconstruction is inventive or it is 
nothing at all‟ (Derrida, 2007, p.23), says Derrida in his essay „Psyche: Invention of the 
Other‟.  And undoubtedly, theatrical representation is linked to the more pervasive 
question in deconstructive theory of literary representation and invention. 
The theme of tragedy in theatrical representation can be connected here to 
Derrida‟s conceptualization of the supplement as the adequate substitution for privation: 
e.g., at the end of his essay „The Theatre of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation‟, 
in Writing and Difference, he says: „To think the closure of representation is to think the 
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tragic‟ (Derrida, 1978, p.250).  That is, because representation has been so geared 
towards the transparency of the living present, of the life-force of the soul, of the inside 
of the psyche, of the outside of the world, etc, what Derrida calls „the closure of 
representation‟ thus moves towards death.  It makes death the condition on which life is 
possible.  Theatre is a cruel theatre.  The game is a „cruel game‟ (Derrida, 1976, p.259).  
It involves the play of infinite representation, of infinite substitution, in which there can 
be no return to the idea of a pure or original reality in which the heart‟s desire is fully 
satisfied.  Not only is death the condition of life, but privation becomes the condition of 
satisfaction, hence the cruelty.  The closure of representation does not therefore mean 
the end of representation; in Of Grammatology Derrida is careful to distinguish closure 
from end.  The latter is merely destructive, in which something (e.g., an idea, or 
concept, or tradition – representation or metaphysics) is left in the past and forgotten 
about.  The former is instead deconstructive, in which the thing in question is 
complicated, contaminated, and sent off into the future: „in its closure, representation 
continues‟ (Derrida, 1978, p.250).  In its closure, metaphysics continues in the form of 
deconstruction.  Derrida‟s metaphysics without metaphysics posits the beginning as 
always already a representation or repetition.  And as for the end, even death keeps 
something in reserve so as to preserve life against itself, even if it is not one‟s own life: 
e.g., in principle one‟s own death implies the inheritance for the still-living other. 
To return again to Derrida‟s reading of Rousseau, this relation between life and 
death is something that Derrida picks up on in Rousseau‟s Confessions.  Derrida quotes 
Rousseau saying: „I can certainly say that I never began to live, until I looked upon 
myself as a dead man‟ (Rousseau, 1996, p.221).  In the chapter prior to „That Dangerous 
Supplement‟ where Derrida provides a reading of Levi-Strauss, he alludes to a section 
in Tristes Tropiques that Levi-Strauss calls „A Writing Lesson‟, which documents an 
incident in which, as an experiment, the anthropologist provides members of the 
Nambikwara tribe with some writing utensils (Levi-Strauss, 1992).  It becomes a 
notable section for Derrida as here Levi-Strauss aligns writing with the moral 
debasements of the so-called „civil society‟ of the Western world, as compared with the 
good-hearted innocence of tribal life.  But in „That Dangerous Supplement‟ Derrida 
alludes back to his reading of Levi-Strauss when he ironically refers to Rousseau‟s own 
„writing lesson‟ in this relation between life and death: 
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Such would be the writing lesson in Jean-Jacques‟s existence.  The act of writing would be essentially – 
and here in an exemplary fashion – the greatest sacrifice aiming at the greatest symbolic reappropriation 
of presence.  From this point of view, Rousseau knew that death is not the simple outside of life.  Death 
by writing also inaugurates life (Derrida, 1976, pp.142-143). 
 
This extract directly precedes the above citation from Confessions.  For Derrida, writing 
specifically is symbolic first and foremost with death (via the author‟s death); and 
language more generally is symbolic first and foremost with the relation to the other 
(via the act of communication).  So although it is not quite put in such terms explicitly 
in Of Grammatology, Derrida‟s reading of Rousseau‟s Confessions in „That Dangerous 
Supplement‟ implies it: viz., arche-writing symbolizes heterothanatography.  The 
relation to both death and the other, indeed to the death of the other, is already named 
by arche-writing. 
Not only this, but that heterothanatography as the condition of possibility of 
autobiography is a feature that is implied within Rousseau‟s „reappropriation of 
presence‟ given to writing: i.e., The Confessions restores writing so as to come to the 
aid of life-writing, to autobiographical confession as the cure of the soul, but only 
insofar as life and the self pass through death and the other; a tragic rite of passage that 
writing itself symbolizes.  It will have been writing that acted as the poison, but it also 
acts as the cure – as Derrida notes with his concept of pharmakon from the chapter 
„Plato‟s Pharmacy‟ in Dissemination (Derrida, 1981).  The supplement is the 
pharmakon of privation: at once the cause of privation and the means to its substitution.  
Or as Derrida puts it: „the supplement supplements‟ (Derrida, 1976, p.145).  A literary 
critical interpretation of this might focus on the role of the author‟s intentions 
(Rousseau‟s or Plato‟s) – indeed, this is what Seán Burke‟s interpretation of Derrida 
does in his chapter „Misread Intentions‟ in The Death and Return of the Author.  Burke 
says: „Supplementary play in Rousseau discovers a Platonic equivalent in the 
pharmakon, a similarly exorbitant figure which derives from and yet defies authorial 
intention‟ (Burke, 2008, p.145).  We will come to this literary critical interpretation of 
Derrida in more detail in a moment by considering de Man‟s essay on Derrida in 
Blindness and Insight, „The Rhetoric of Blindness: Jacques Derrida‟s Reading of 
Rousseau‟.  As a preliminary to this, against Burke, I would argue that to consider the 
supplement and the pharmakon merely with respect to the issue of the author‟s 
intentions in the critic‟s role of reading is to significantly reduce the broader 
philosophical and conceptual force that they carry for understanding „real life‟. 
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For example, consider when Derrida gets around to discussing the moment at 
which Rousseau in Confessions refers to masturbation (auto-eroticism) as a „dangerous 
supplement‟ to the act of sex (hetero-eroticism): „Dangerous supplement.  These are the 
words that Rousseau uses in the Confessions‟ (Derrida, 1976, p.149).  Indeed, Derrida 
prefaces this discussion with one on Émile .  In amongst some long quotations from 
Émile , Derrida says: „Without childhood, no supplement would ever appear in Nature.  
The supplement is here both humanity‟s good fortune and the origin of its perversion.  
The health of the human race‟ (p.147).  The supplement finds its practical point of 
application in helping us understand „the health of the human race‟.  Surely this is a 
more poignant and pertinent topic than the role of the author‟s intentions; and it is also 
Derrida‟s real intention in „That Dangerous Supplement‟ to propound such themes.  
There is no supplement without childhood because childhood represents originary 
weakness: even if the broader socioeconomic context of a family is privileged, it is 
nonetheless the case that all human life is born in the heteronomy of dependence.  And 
here, kindness is more important than money: „Men, be kind to your fellow-men; this is 
your first duty, kind to every age and station, kind to all that is not foreign to humanity.  
What wisdom can you find that is greater than kindness?‟ (Rousseau, 1993, p.50).  Of 
course, kindness is only one of the conditions of a happy life, the moral condition; the 
other condition is pleasure, the psychological condition.  And just as death is the arch-
symbol of life‟s pain, sex is the arch-symbol of life‟s pleasure.  Hence, Derrida‟s 
reading of Rousseau is not overly concerned with his intentions regarding the word 
„supplement‟; rather, it is concerned with the more important themes of life‟s pain, life‟s 
pleasure, and the health of the human psyche. 
Derrida is more concerned with reconceptualising the nature of reality: we could 
say that his intention is „metaphysical‟ if the tradition of metaphysics were not saturated 
by the prejudice of presence (self-presence, temporal presence, and eternal presence).  
Most scholars of Derrida here lose sight and consider instead his displacement of the 
metaphysical tradition itself.  Here we are going in the other direction to consider what 
his own „metaphysics‟ is; what his own approach to the nature of reality is.  And if the 
double representation regarding the boundary between language and reality is the form 
of what we saw Derrida call „the game of the world‟ then the content is what he calls, 
„the play of substitutions‟ (Derrida, 1976, p.156).  Regarding then the subjective human 
experience of reality, and not merely the objectivity of reality itself, this play of 
substitutions, which occurs in „an infinite chain‟ (p.157), impinges on each individual‟s 
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life in a way that is unique to them.  In this way the supplement concerns the 
individual‟s experience, or lack thereof, of pleasure.  As Derrida notes having just cited 
the part of the Confessions that refers to the „dangerous supplement‟: 
 
The experience of auto-eroticism is lived in anguish.  Masturbation reassures („soon reassured‟ [Derrida is 
reciting Rousseau here]) only through that culpability traditionally attached to the practice, obliging 
children to assume the fault and to interiorize the threat of castration that always accompanies it.  Pleasure 
is thus lived as the irremediable loss of the vital substance, as exposure to madness and death (pp.150-
151). 
 
That is, as the supplement is both the symbol of the ultimate lack of pleasure and 
convoluted means with which pleasure thus becomes partially satisfied in the context of 
this lack, it therefore impinges upon each person‟s life by emphasizing the various ways 
in which desire becomes satisfied and unsatisfied in each individual case.  But this 
relation of pleasure to its dissatisfaction, given to it by the very same supplement that 
thus attempts to satisfy it, therefore acts „as exposure to madness and death‟.  Indeed, in 
a generic way this also explains the act of suicide: it is the psyche tortured by 
displeasure to the degree where death seems more appealing than life.  A moment ago 
we referred to Derrida‟s designation of Rousseau‟s „writing lesson‟ in its relation to life 
and death: in this discussion he also refers to Rousseau‟s „literary suicide‟ (p.143) 
insofar as he places death radically inside life; and does so in the writing of his own life. 
 Before we conclude, let us consider de Man‟s influential „rhetorical reading‟ of 
Derrida in Blindness and Insight.  It is perhaps useful here to recall Derrida‟s 
proposition that „blindness to the supplement is the law‟.  For in his account of „Jacques 
Derrida‟s reading of Rousseau‟, de Man himself avoids Derrida‟s discussion of the 
supplement in „That Dangerous Supplement‟.  Indeed, de Man generally appears to 
evade the work of concepts; but it is precisely this that, in this particular reading of 
Derrida, radically misrepresents the latter‟s thinking.  This is an important point because 
de Man‟s literary critical form of deconstruction has, to date, more often than not 
offered the underlying impetus for most interpretations of Derrida.  But as Rodolphe 
Gasché notes in his essay „Deconstruction as Criticism‟, de Man actually subjects 
Derrida‟s thought to a literary critical criticism: „Yet to become fruitful for literary 
criticism, Derrida‟s work has first to be submitted to a critique by literary criticism 
itself.  That is why “The Rhetoric of Blindness” reproaches Derrida‟s reading of 
Rousseau‟ (in: Gasche, 1994, p.54).  This is of course not to say that all the literary 
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critical work on Derrida is wrong or faulty; but just that it can ignore the underlying 
philosophical impetus of his work to understand the nature of „real life‟ and its „human 
experience‟.  Instead, in deconstructive literary criticism, the first and last point of 
reference is to the „literary text‟; and here Derrida‟s „there is nothing outside of the text‟ 
is understood to be not a statement about the nature of reality.  Rather, as Geoffrey 
Hartman puts it in his essay „Looking Back on Paul de Man‟, it is a literary critical 
statement „about the difficulty of turning texts inside out‟ (Hartman, 1989, p.5).  I 
would argue that Derrida is saying both; and to claim it is one rather than the other is to 
water down his thought. 
In „The Rhetoric of Blindness‟ de Man argues: „Critics‟ moments of greatest 
blindness with regard to their own critical assumptions are also the moment at which 
they achieve their greatest insight‟ (De Man, 1983, p.109).  And also that: „Derrida‟s 
work is one of the places where the future possibility of literary criticism is being 
decided, although he is not a literary critic in the professional sense of the term‟ (p.111).  
De Man‟s argument is thus centred upon the way in which Derrida‟s reading of 
Rousseau – that is, his reading of the „Essay on the Origin of Languages‟ – and indeed 
his method of reading more generally, concentrates on picking out marginal „blind 
spots‟ within a text so as to use them against the dominant part of a text.  As Derrida 
puts it towards the end of „That Dangerous Supplement‟: „The concept of the 
supplement is a sort of blind spot in Rousseau‟s text, the not-seen that opens and limits 
visibility‟ (Derrida, 1976, p.163).  That is, the supplement not only designates the 
structure of the play of substitutions in the game of the world, but also is tied to 
Rousseau‟s text, and also to Derrida‟s text as it is the latter who gives it the conceptual 
force.  So the metaphor of blindness is already at work in Of Grammatology, but in a 
double-bind manner: on the one hand it occurs in relation to the difficult 
conceptualization of the supplement; on the other hand it occurs as part of the 
deconstructive method of critical reading.  In „The Rhetoric of Blindness‟, de Man 
implicitly disregards the first moment, and more explicitly adjusts the second so as to 
argue that Derrida‟s critical insight regarding blindness also contains an uncritical 
blindness regarding the very juxtaposition of blindness and insight, a blindness which 
applies itself to his reading of Rousseau. 
In order to point to this juxtaposition, de Man does not read Rousseau through 
Derrida‟s reading of Rousseau, but rather offers his own reading of Rousseau in order to 
contrast it with Derrida‟s.  As he puts it: „we have to reverse the interpretative process 
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and start reading Derrida in terms of Rousseau rather than vice versa‟ (De Man, 1983, 
p.123).  To do this involves not so much comparing and contrasting their respective 
philosophies, but instead, reading them as literature.  Indeed, one of Derrida‟s main 
flaws in his reading of Rousseau, for de Man, is having read Rousseau‟s text qua 
philosophy rather than qua literature: Derrida, „remains unwilling or unable to read 
Rousseau as literature‟ (p.138).  To read Rousseau as literature rather than philosophy, 
and mutatis mutandis to read Derrida as literature rather than philosophy, involves being 
attentive to their different „rhetorical modes‟: „Our concern is not so much with the 
degree of blindness in Rousseau or in Derrida as with the rhetorical mode of their 
respective discourses‟ (p.122).  This in turn involves locating cognition not in the 
subject but rather in literary language: „it follows from the rhetorical nature of literary 
language that the cognitive function resides in the language and not in the subject‟ 
(p.137).  Which has two consequences: the first is the symbolic „death of the subject‟ 
(p.113).  The second requires a perspective in which the two figures at hand, Rousseau 
and Derrida, are not making philosophical or epistemological statements about the 
nature of reality, but are instead telling different stories or different versions of the same 
story: „unlike epistemological statements, stories do not cancel each other out, and we 
should not let Derrida‟s version replace Rousseau‟s own story of his involvement with 
language‟ (p.119).   
Within this schematic of rhetorical reading, in which the main theme is 
attentiveness to the respective rhetorical modes of Rousseau and Derrida, there occurs 
in de Man a watered down version of what the supplement actually is.  De Man says: 
„Derrida‟s main theme, the recurrent repression, in Western thought, of all written forms 
of language, their degradation to a mere adjunct or supplement to the live presence of 
the spoken word, finds a classical example in the works of Levi-Strauss‟ (De Man, 
1983, p.115).  Here the supplement is merely a metaphor for the way in which writing 
in the narrow sense of the term has substituted „the live presence of the spoken word‟.  
That is, there is no sense of the supplement as occurring on a similar conceptual level as 
that of arche-writing, thereby doing its own conceptual work.  For de Man, the 
supplement merely does rhetorical work; and as such, it finds its point of application 
only in literary texts, not in real life.  But for Derrida, the chain of supplements is the 
reason why the world we inhabit, and our experience of it, is such a complicated place; 
and why the attempt to satisfy our own individual desires within this world can become 
so convoluted and hyperbolic.  It becomes not a matter of transposing the location of 
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cognition from the subject to language; but rather of saying that, on the boundary 
between language and reality, the infinite chain of supplements juxtaposes cognition 
with the unknowable.  For de Man, deconstruction merely becomes about attentiveness 
to rhetorical modes, and since Rousseau‟s text is highly attentive to its own rhetorical 
mode, it has no blind spots: „Rousseau‟s text has no blind spots: it accounts at all 
moments for its own rhetorical mode‟ (p.139).  Hence: „There is no need to deconstruct 
Rousseau‟ (p.139).  De Man says that Derrida failed to read Rousseau as literature; but 
de Man himself failed to read Derrida as philosophy.  De Man‟s blindness to the 
conceptual mode of the supplement (in particular with regards to the satisfaction of 
desire), and indeed of writing itself as arche-writing, is the ultimate blind spot in his 
own misreading of Derrida. 
 
Conclusion 
I would like to conclude here by bringing the discussion back to Rousseau‟s 
Confessions, and to some of the problems it throws up in the juxtaposition of self with 
other and life with death.  Rousseau was well aware that, in confessing his own inner 
feelings and thoughts, he is not merely confessing himself but is also confessing others 
as well: „showing myself in my true character‟ is „impossible without also showing 
others as they were‟ (Rousseau, 1996, p.505).  As France notes: „He himself said on 
several occasions that in confessing himself he was bound to confess others, to reveal 
their failings as well as his own‟ (France, 1987, p.28).  Indeed, the fact that confession, 
particularly public confession in a written autobiographical form, does by necessity 
involve this revealing of other‟s failures from one‟s own perspective; a placing in the 
public arena in an autobiographical work of the negative characteristics of others; this is 
exactly what envelopes the very written fabric of an autobiography within the confines 
of a potentially morally judgemental mode of communication.  It is for precisely this 
reason that Derrida hesitates to confess in „Circumfession‟: because, „one always 
confesses the other‟ (Derrida, 1993, p.147).  That is, on the one hand Rousseau 
confesses the other so easily; but on the other hand Derrida‟s argument is that one 
should not do this so easily because there is the moral responsibility not to cause harm 
to the other – the moral responsibility that Rousseau himself articulates in his own 
adjustment of the golden rule. 
It is in the context of such considerations that Derrida, in „Circumfession‟, posits 
the following undecidable principle of confession: „to leave suspended the question of 
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knowing if one is finally asking pardon in writing for some earlier crime, blasphemy, or 
perjury or if one is asking for pardon for the crime, blasphemy, or perjury in which 
consists presently the act of writing‟ (Derrida, 1993, p.46).  Of course, the immediate 
reference of Derrida‟s undecidable principle of confession concerns the actually written 
autobiography (and so, some might say, to the literary act).  But it is not a far stretch to 
hypothesize that the principle operates in everyday life and experience, and indeed that 
it is here that it takes its most poignant point of application: i.e., in autobiography as a 
concept with which we take as an aid to understanding the dynamics and 
psychodynamics of living everyday life with others.  Take the example of masturbation 
in the problem of desire.  On the one hand, autobiography as „the articulation of desire‟ 
(Derrida, 1976, p.163) represents the articulation of one‟s own inner feelings.  But on 
the other hand, to confess a desire for sex, for lust or love, is to confess a desire for the 
other, where one‟s own inner feelings can only be satisfied by the exterior other in 
which one requires the other‟s decisive consent; which of course one might not receive, 
so instead one gives it to oneself via masturbation.  The moral problems posed here can 
be extremely delicate: ranging from violence as direct as rape to violence as indirect as 
leading someone on – which thus requires pity for the respective victims (the raped and 
the duped). 
This is of course not to say that Derrida‟s concept of autobiography solves the 
moral psychological problems posed by the human need for love, and the subtle modes 
of articulation and communication they presuppose.  Rather, it is to inscribe these 
problems into the more general theory of subjectivity from which they have 
traditionally been absent.  Indeed, the problem posed by autobiography, as life‟s desires, 
for the theory of subjectivity hinges on the following double-bind: on the one hand, 
desires are felt in such a way that is radically interior to oneself; but on the other hand, 
their point of application is more often than not toward something or someone radically 
exterior to oneself, and is therefore at least partially outside of one‟s own autonomous 
control.  For example, this is the case even in the auto-erotic experience of 
masturbation, in which the radically interior fantasy which provides the underlying 
impetus to masturbate will most likely be not of one‟s own masturbating self, but rather 
of some radically exterior hetero-erotic sexual experience.  But not only is a 
deconstructive moral psychology inscribed within the theory of subjectivity regarding 
the potentially violent relation of self and other, there is also a deconstructive 
metapsychology concerning the ultimately temporal relation of life to death.  For 
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Derrida, life is not merely about deciding on a desired goal and methodically working 
towards it; it is also about the unpredictable spontaneity of chance events that 
supplement this process.  Through this supplement, autobiography thus inscribes the 
concept of lifetime within the theory of subjectivity. 
Within this latter concept is the formation and transformation of people‟s very 
personalities.  France says that the Confessions articulate, „the inner development of an 
individual, the formation of a personality‟ (France, 1987, p.109).  Dent echoes this: 
„The exaltation of the drama of the formation and unfolding of personality rather than a 
narrative of achievements was to be, and surely still is, hugely influential in the 
development of Romantic autobiography‟ (Dent, 2005, p.197).  The „formation of 
personality‟ is an economical way to put it; perhaps too economical for someone of 
Derrida‟s subtlety.  But when the „bio‟ of autobiography refers to biology as much as it 
does to biography, and Derrida is very much a thinker of the body as of the mind, there 
becomes the need to account for the different stages of development of human life: not 
merely qua each particular narrative but also qua universal physical and psychical needs 
at each particular stage.  Although Derrida‟s thought does not do this directly, for 
instance as directly as Rousseau‟s Émile, it does conceptualize autobiography to the 
degree where these concerns become unavoidable in the more general deconstructive 
theory of subjectivity.  So much of Derrida‟s thought involves a philosophy of time, in 
which, as David Wood notes in The Deconstruction of Time, the idea of time in acts, „as 
a semiautonomous principle of the real‟ (Wood, 2001, p.x).  He continues: „With this 
principle, our thinking about time can span human institutions, psychic development, 
and natural processes‟ (p.x; my emphasis).  Insofar as Derrida‟s autobiographical 
thought is heterothanatographical, it not only presupposes his philosophy of time, but it 
also inscribes it into the idea of the psychic development of human experience (and of 
course nonhuman experience).  The temporality of experience becomes radically 
connected to the idea of the lifetime of existence, which is the underlying condition of 
any sort of „formation of personality‟. 
In conclusion, in many respects Rousseau‟s Confessions offer a sort of practical 
example of Émile‟s principle.  They adhere to the same structure of the „formation of 
personality‟; the same principle of individual development within a family structure; a 
structure which is itself broadly influenced by the political culture in which the family is 
inscribed.  For Rousseau, Émile‟s principle of „learning to live‟ involved a radical 
retreat from politics while acknowledging that this retreat itself occurred in broader 
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political circumstances that, on the one hand the individual themselves is not 
responsible for, but on the other hand is nonetheless is in a relation of dependence.  As 
The Confessions articulates: „my view had become greatly enlarged by the historical 
study of morals.  I had come to see that everything was radically connected with 
politics, and that, however one proceeded, no people would be other than the nature of 
its government made it‟ (Rousseau, 1996, p.393).  In both Émile and Confessions this 
retreat was symbolized by the virtue of country-life as distinct from the vices of town-
life – for in the latter we are more prone to civil society‟s uncivil manners.  That is, an 
interest in psychological health paradoxically involves both proximity to and distance 
from political concerns – such is the simultaneous implication and incommensurability 
of public life and private life, of work and life.  Although it has different effects in 
Derrida‟s work compared with Rousseau‟s, this paradox remains an important feature of 
his autobiographical thought; and the next chapter will touch upon it further. 
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Learning to Live: Marx & Derrida 
 
Introduction 
Derrida‟s philosophical thought moves in two directions.  First of all it involves a 
critique of the philosophical tradition, by which it utilizes the discipline of literature as 
representative of those features characteristically excluded by philosophy (style, fiction, 
rhetoric, narrative, humour, etc).  And second, in his readings of other philosophers, 
Derrida sets the groundwork from which future research in deconstructive philosophy 
can be done in such a way that is more careful and sensitive regarding the problems of 
metaphysical prejudice. 
In The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection, Rodolphe 
Gasché articulated Derrida‟s arguments with respect to the philosophical tradition, 
maintaining a critical distance from the appropriation of Derrida in literary criticism.  In 
Inventions of Difference: On Jacques Derrida, what Gasché calls „a companion volume 
of sorts to that earlier book‟ (Gasché, 1994, p.2), he articulates Derrida‟s philosophy of 
difference (otherness, singularity, etc) more specifically.  The opening essay in 
Inventions of Difference, „Deconstruction as Criticism‟, also addresses the problem of 
deconstructive literary criticism.  In one argument Gasché makes he says: „most of what 
appears as deconstructive criticism contributes more to the prolonging the impasses of 
traditional academic criticism than to opening up new areas of research‟ (p.23).  In the 
point noted above regarding the two directions of Derrida‟s philosophical thought, The 
Tain of the Mirror applies most directly to the first direction, and Inventions of 
Difference sets the foundations for the second direction, of „opening up new areas of 
research‟.  Although there is of course a third direction, of that provided in the field of 
deconstructive literary criticism, Gasché‟s point here regards the opening up of new 
areas of philosophical research that is inspired by Derrida‟s thought, not literary 
research; and a further point he makes is that the latter has eclipsed the former.  As he 
puts it in his essay in Inventions of Difference called „The Eclipse of Difference‟: the 
appropriation of deconstruction to literature „contributes to a further stiffening of the 
classical concept of difference‟ (p.84) as it is merely concerned with a self-reflexive 
„praxis of difference‟ (p.85) as a way of evading metaphysics.  For Gasché, the point, in 
philosophy at any rate, is rather to consider both the genealogy of the concept of 
difference and the theoretical implications for the way in which Derrida reworks it. 
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The present study is thus indebted to Gasché‟s proposal for the foundation of a 
deconstructive philosophy.  But in this chapter I would like to go a step further than 
Gasché and make the following argument: that insofar as Derrida‟s thought requires 
research into new areas of deconstructive philosophy it thus entails a particular 
approach to philosophical criticism.  While, in practice, as philosophical criticism 
deconstruction could take many forms, in principle, because its first point of 
displacement is of the metaphysics of presence and self-presence, its first form would 
therefore be the critique of the metaphysics of objectivity and subjectivity that is at 
work in any particular theoretical doctrine.  That is, deconstruction puts into question 
both the worldview underlying the nature of the world, and the psychology underlying 
the nature of the psyche, that is at work in any one particular philosophical position.  
Indeed, particularly regarding the latter of these two modes of questioning (as this 
concerns us more here), Derrida‟s autobiographical thought shows a theory of 
subjectivity at work as part of the underlying basis of, for example, political and 
economic doctrines.  As such, he puts such doctrines into question not necessarily by 
taking them on their own politico-economic terms, but rather by questioning them at 
their problematic foundations regarding their metaphysics of subjectivity.  This is what 
is meant by deconstructive philosophical criticism: to put into question the underlying 
foundations of a specific mode of thought, in particular by addressing the assumptions 
of its implicit theory of subjectivity (and/or objectivity).  In this chapter, I will consider 
Derrida‟s Spectres of Marx as an exemplary case in point. 
Initially, Spectres of Marx might seem like an unusual or counterintuitive book 
for the consideration of Derrida‟s autobiographical thought.  This is particularly so since 
Marx is a politico-economic thinker, and the tradition of orthodox Marxist interpretation 
reads him as such.  But consider the subtitle of Spectres of Marx: The State of the Debt, 
the Work of Mourning, and the New International.  Two politico-economic designations 
sandwich a psychological term (work of mourning), thereby making this psychological 
term their intermediary; the proxy they must pass through.  Indeed, for a book on Marx, 
Derrida‟s „Exordium‟ sets the opening stage in a strange and surprising manner: 
 
Someone, you or me, comes forward and says: I would like to learn to live finally. 
 Finally but why? 
 To learn to live: a strange watchword.  Who would learn?  From whom?  To teach to live, but to 
whom?  Will we ever know?  Will we ever know how to live and first of all what „to learn to live‟ means?  
And why „finally‟? (Derrida, 2006, p.xvi). 
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This opening is surprising particularly for more orthodox intellectual Marxists, as is 
evident from most of the responses to Spectres of Marx in the edited collection entitled 
Ghostly Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques Derrida‟s Spectres of Marx (Sprinker, 
1999) – for they seem to have overlooked this concept of learning to live that Derrida 
proffers to Marxist readership.  Of course, it comes from Rousseau‟s Émile, as we saw 
in the previous chapter; and Derrida here refers to it as a „watchword‟ for Spectres of 
Marx in general.  Blindness to the watchword is the law.  Through the concept, or rather 
watchword, of learning to live, Spectres of Marx is organized according to Derrida‟s 
autobiographical thought.  And with it, he puts to Marx the problem of political-
economy as also a problem of the philosophy of life – something he was already 
propounding anyway, as Freud notes in „The Question of a Weltanschauung‟ (in: Freud, 
1964).  As Douglas Adams puts it in Mostly Harmless: „You live and learn.  At any rate, 
you live‟ (Adams, 2009, p.150).  If we do not necessarily live and learn, then we must at 
least learn to live before it is too late (hence the „finally‟ in Derrida‟s watchword). 
The concept, or perhaps watchword, of work of mourning is one that has already 
been considered in the introduction to the present study with respect to Derrida‟s 
Memoires for Paul de Man.  As we saw, this latter book also articulated Derrida‟s 
concept of plus d‟un, a concept that also opens the first chapter of Spectres of Marx: 
 
The spectres of Marx.  Why this plural?  Would there be more than one of them?  Plus d‟un [More than 
one / No more one]: this can mean a crowd, if not masses, the horde, or society, or else some population 
of ghosts with or without a people, some community with or without a leader – but also the less than one 
of pure and simple dispersion.  Without any possible gathering together (Derrida, 2006, p.1-2). 
 
For Derrida, plus d‟un paradoxically means both more than one and less than one: more 
than one in the sense of „a crowd, if not masses, the horde, or society‟; less than one in 
the sense of „pure and simple dispersion‟.  That is, a lack of oneness and unification 
within the very same crowd that refers to the more than one: „without any possible 
gathering together‟.  A unified crowd would know how to live, and learning would be a 
relatively rational affair prescribed by the particular mode of unification.  But a 
dispersed crowd involves much more complicated dynamics, and learning to live en 
masse in infinite sites of such isolated dissemination requires a more subtle 
understanding of what it is to learn to live at all. 
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It is this problem that Derrida takes to his reading of Marx which will be 
considered here.  At stake is the underlying psychology behind Marx‟s very 
identification of the proletariat as the universal class.  In teasing out the problems of this 
underlying psychology it will be demonstrated that Derrida‟s thought is a form of 
philosophical criticism, in particular one that addresses the problems of an underlying 
theory of human subjectivity.  At the same time, via the autobiographical watchword of 
learning to live, he also sets the foundations with which the theory of subjectivity can be 
rethought.  But first, let us consider Marx‟s thought as it is relevant to Spectres of Marx. 
 
Learning to Live 
As is well-known, Marx‟s thought occurs as a critical response primarily to three 
intellectual contexts of the Enlightenment: British liberal capitalist thought (Smith, 
Ricardo, Mill); French utopian socialist thought (Proudhon, Saint-Simon, Fourier); and 
German speculative philosophy, in the form of Hegel and the Young Hegelians 
(Feuerbach, Bauer, Stirner).  For the liberal capitalists, Marx‟s main criticism is that 
they have misrepresented the economic structure of the historical present, based on 
profit, as the natural and eternal way of things; and so they exclude from the idea of the 
wealth of nations the class of workers, and so the majority of the population, who 
actually produce this wealth.  For the utopian socialists, his main criticism is that their 
ideas are not grounded in historical reality: i.e., they remain influenced by what is 
judged to be a naive Rousseauian mythological narrative of the relation between the 
state of nature and civil society, rather than ground their ideas in the historical realities 
of civil society itself.  And for the speculative philosophers, his main criticism is that 
their underlying religious worldview covertly deifies the historically present mode of 
political structure as the end of history, making them politically conservative much like 
the liberal capitalists.  And yet, despite the theologics, there was also a unique blend of 
dialectical and teleological method to Hegelian philosophy which gave it its power, and 
which was a great influence on Marx‟s early intellectual development.  Since what 
concerns us here in our account of Marx is more the philosophical side of his thought, 
we will draw on his two early works, written but unpublished before The Communist 
Manifesto, which address Hegelian philosophy: Critique of Hegel‟s „Philosophy of 
Right‟ and the first volume of The German Ideology. 
 Marx‟s Critique of Hegel‟s „Philosophy of Right‟ provides a materialist critique 
of Hegel‟s dialectical idealism.  Although the choice of Hegel‟s Philosophy of Right is 
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such that Marx seeks to address Hegel‟s political philosophy, in the course of his 
critique he argues that Hegel‟s real interest is not actually political philosophy but rather 
is logic: „Hegel‟s true interest is not the philosophy of right but logic.  The 
philosophical task is not the embodiment of thought in determinate political realities, 
but the evaporation of these realities in abstract thought‟ (Marx, 1972, p.18).  From the 
outset, Marx‟s critique of Hegelian philosophy is thus guided by the opposition between 
the abstract and the real.  In the course of his analysis Marx shows how Hegel‟s political 
trinity in Philosophy of Right between family, civil society, and state, is guided by an 
underlying theological logic which reduces the real conditions of life to speculative 
abstractions.  Consider this in relation to the view of human history given in Hegel‟s 
prior Phenomenology of Spirit.  Here Hegel speculated that the nature of human history 
is saturated with the philosophical dialectic (as a logical strategy of negation and 
ascension: i.e., to negate a proposition with a counterproposition, then to ascend the 
juxtaposition with a new proposition and counterproposition, in principle until the lofty 
heights of truth are reached).  As one self-conscious human comes into contact with 
other self-conscious humans, they perceive the other as a threat to their individual 
autonomy, and thus as a threat to their very existence; which thus ensues in, „a life-and-
death struggle‟ (Hegel, 1977, p.114).  In this struggle, famously mythologized as 
Hegel‟s „master-slave dialectic‟, there is a conscious recognition on the part of the 
weaker person that the other is stronger; and, not wanting to die, the weaker accepts a 
state of servitude in order to survive. 
So for Hegel, the real historical past is but the history of varying power relations 
of master and slave.  But he also argues that real history is in effect reducible to the 
history of philosophy, in particular to philosophy‟s idea of the human soul or spirit, 
which gives real history its purpose.  The purpose or teleological structure of history – 
that is of future-history – becomes the realization of the human spirit, which brings an 
end to the master-slave dialectic, and thus an end to history itself.  History ends with the 
realization of absolute knowledge, or the absolute idea, in which the historical power 
relations that have developed between humans become equalized and ascended.  The 
dialectical logic underlying Hegel‟s account here is dependent on the construction of 
middle terms that mediate between two opposites which negate each other.  For 
instance, in the opposition between master and slave Hegel points towards, „the 
negative significance of fear‟ (Hegel, 1977, p.118), which is at work mediating the 
relationship.  Hence, in Philosophy of Right, the state becomes the mediator between the 
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family and civil society (i.e., other families) (Hegel, 2008).  But for Marx, underlying 
Hegel‟s account is the more pervasive phenomenology of spirit in which the actual 
empirical realities of family, civil society, and state, are themselves reduced to the 
mind‟s idea: „The Idea is given the status of a subject, and the actual relationship of 
family and civil society to the state is conceived to be its inner imaginary activity‟ 
(Marx, 1972, p.8).  He continues: „if the idea is made subject, then the real subjects – 
civil society, family, circumstances, caprice, etc. – become unreal‟ (p.8).  Because in 
Hegel‟s thought empirical reality is so saturated with spiritual substance, from Marx‟s 
materialist perspective it is the spiritual substance which is falsely understood to be real, 
and not the empirical reality itself. 
The main body of Marx‟s Critique of Hegel‟s „Philosophy of Right‟ offers a very 
dense reading of a very abstract thinker.  In contrast, the more famous introduction to 
the book, „A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel‟s “Philosophy of Right”‟, is much 
more readable.  In the main body, Marx says, „it is not religion that creates man but man 
who creates religion‟ (Marx, 1972, p.30), in an attempt to critically demonstrate the 
underlying religious nature of Hegel‟s speculative philosophy, and so of speculative 
philosophy itself.  In his introduction, the purpose is to counteract religion more 
generally.  The first sentence says: „the critique of religion is the prerequisite of every 
critique‟ (p.131).  Marx then echoes the statement from the main body: „The foundation 
of irreligious criticism is this: man makes religion, religion does not make man‟ (p.131).  
For Marx, those who think that religion, or God, has made man, are deluded about their 
condition of existence as if they were on drugs, „opium‟ to be more precise: 
 
The wretchedness of religion is at once an expression of and a protest against real wretchedness.  Religion 
is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions.  It 
is the opium of the people. 
The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is a demand for their true happiness.  The 
call to abandon illusions about their condition is the call to abandon a condition which requires illusions.  
Thus, the critique of religion is the critique in embryo of the vale of tears of which religion is the halo 
(p.131). 
 
The statement here that religion „is the opium of the people‟ is of course the most 
famous citation from this extract.  But in the extract as a whole there is a moral 
sentiment underlying what Marx is saying: viz., that we need to look at the real living 
conditions of people in order to see how they actually are unhappy (so that we can do 
something practical about it), and that consequently we must not cover over these real 
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conditions with the speculative illusions of the actual existence of spiritual substances 
(thereby hiding a priori any sort of practical solution to real problems). 
 In this atheistic scheme of things, it becomes the „task of history‟ to undermine 
theology‟s sacredness.  Here, philosophy is allied to history but subservient to it.  And 
once history has done its task, the „task of philosophy‟ becomes to highlight how we 
alienate ourselves in the secular world in which we inhabit, in order to critique the 
problem of „human self-alienation‟ and proffer practical solutions to it: 
 
It is the task of history, therefore, once the other-world of truth has vanished, to establish the truth of this 
world.  It is above all the task of philosophy, which is in the service of history, to unmask human self-
alienation in its secular forms, once its sacred form has been unmasked.  Thus, the critique of heaven is 
transformed into the critique of the earth, the critique of religion into the critique of law, the critique of 
theology into the critique of politics (Marx, 1972, p.132). 
 
Of course, Marx himself proffers his own practical solution to the problem of human 
self-alienation in his own „critique of politics‟.  The introduction alludes to it in the 
designation of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie as the politico-economic structure of 
modern capitalism, in which the proletariat become the universal class of human 
emancipation: „Just as philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat, so the 
proletariat finds its spiritual weapons in philosophy‟ (p.142).  For Marx, philosophy is 
ultimately to be negated as it signifies passive contemplation rather than proactive 
action; thinking life rather than actually living life.  Philosophy signifies individual 
thought rather than social action, and as he says in the main body: „the nature of the 
particular person is not his beard, his blood, his abstract Physis, but rather his social 
quality‟ (p.22).  But for Marx, philosophy cannot be negated until it is actualized, and 
since the proletariat find their spiritual weapons in philosophy, they hold the key to the 
actualization of philosophy.  But just as they hold the key to philosophy‟s actualization, 
the latter in turn finds its purpose in „the abolition of the proletariat‟: „Philosophy 
cannot be actualized without the abolition [Aufhebung] of the proletariat; the proletariat 
cannot be abolished without the actualization of philosophy‟ (p.142).  Hence, 
philosophy finds its true purpose in the historic task of the proletariat. 
 In The German Ideology, which Marx co-authors with Engels, this historic task 
becomes much clearer in the context of their outline of historical materialism, in the 
first part of the first volume.  The first volume of The German Ideology, the main bulk 
of the book as a whole, contains a critical analysis of the group of their contemporary 
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German philosophers they call the „Young Hegelians‟ (Marx and Engels, 1998, p.35).  
Taking especial interest here is Feuerbach (in the first part); Bauer (in a short second 
part); and Stirner (in an extended third part, which offers a lengthy analysis of The Ego 
and His Own (Stirner, 2005)).  For Marx and Engels, the problem with the Young 
Hegelians is much like the problem with Hegel‟s Philosophy of Right: i.e., an 
abstraction from historical reality.  They say: „It has not occurred to any one of these 
philosophers to enquire into the connection of German philosophy with German reality, 
the connection of their criticism with their own material surroundings‟ (Marx and 
Engels, 1998, p.36).  In order to acquire a sense of what they mean when they refer to 
„material surroundings‟, they write what might be called a history of the present: i.e., a 
history that is directed towards the present time; written in such a way so as to designate 
the real-world problems of the present time; so as to make an effective intervention in 
present social action; thereby transforming the present conditions of existence into 
improved conditions in the short-term future, and in principle lasting into the long-term 
future.  In order to write this they distinguish between, on the one hand the material 
conditions of life that are „already existing‟ (p.37) for individuals, and on the other hand 
material conditions of life that are „produced by their activity‟ (p.37).  Economic 
production thus offers the base of historical materialism. 
 Having made this designation, Marx and Engels then interpret European history 
as having gone through three stages of economic production (tribal, ancient, and 
feudal), in order to allude to the historical conditions of the two modern ones 
(capitalism and communism).  Modern German ideology, in the hands of the Young 
Hegelians, presents ideas of human consciousness abstracted from the real living 
conditions in order to present that consciousness as the very source of those living 
conditions.  But for Marx and Engels, in an apparently existential reversal of this false 
ideology, it is life itself that becomes the source of consciousness: 
 
In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here it is a matter of 
ascending from earth to heaven.  That is to say, not of setting out from what men say, imagine, conceive, 
nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh; but 
setting out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process demonstrating the 
development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process.  The phantoms formed in the 
brains of men are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically 
verifiable and bound to material premises.  Morality, religion, metaphysics, and all the rest of ideology as 
well as the forms of consciousness corresponding to these, thus no longer retain the semblance of 
independence.  They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and 
their material intercourse, alter, along with this their actual world, also their thinking and the products of 
89 
 
their thinking.  It is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness (Marx 
and Engels, 1998, p.42). 
 
Of course, the famous part of this extract is the final sentence, which by itself would 
designate an existentialist philosophy.  But in the context of the extract, we can see that 
it in fact refers to the materialist relationship between the economic base and the 
intellectual superstructure of a society.  The German Ideology is concerned with 
exorcising ghosts, in particular in the reading of Stirner, who in the second part is 
quoted as saying: „truth is a ghost‟ (Stirner, in: Marx and Engels, 1998, p.110).  And 
here, we see that, for Marx and Engels, ideology has a spectral nature: „The phantoms 
formed in the brains of men‟.  The problem they pose is that these phantoms are but 
products of a mode of thinking indicative of the privileged few of any one particular 
form of society.  As such, they are false products, as they speak to the privileged few 
(bourgeois) and not to the underprivileged many (proletariat) of modern capitalist 
society. 
 So for the proletariat, these ghosts do not exist.  The division between the 
economic base and the intellectual superstructure thus involves a view of the division of 
labour as, in the first instance, a division between material and mental labour: „Division 
of labour only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material and 
mental labour appears‟ (Marx and Engels, 1998, p.50).  For Marx and Engels, history, 
as the history of particular modes of division of labour, becomes understood as the 
history of opposing economic classes.  Just as it was the historic destiny of the 
bourgeois to overthrow the feudal lords (in the transformation from feudalism to 
capitalism), Marx and Engels identify it to be the historic destiny of the proletariat to 
overthrow the bourgeoisie (in the transformation from capitalism to communism) – and 
where history finds its purpose and end.  The problem with modern capitalism is its 
ideology concerning the nature of the way in which private property is acquired.  Marx 
and Engels argue that capitalism is endowed with the modern German ideology of the 
speculative philosophers in which human self-consciousness is understood to pre-exist 
the circumstances of actual existence.  For capitalism fosters, „the illusion that private 
property is based solely on the private will‟ (p.100).  But as Marx and Engels had 
already argued, „circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances‟ 
(p.62).  As such, they emphasize how capitalism is already in a process of transition 
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towards communism; and just as the bourgeoisie revolutionized society from feudalism, 
so must the proletariat revolutionize society from capitalism. 
 In a knowing irony, The German Ideology also stresses the much more complex 
nature of modern capitalist economics, as it is no longer constrained to one nation.  At 
the same time that Marx and Engels stress „the connection of German philosophy with 
German reality‟, they also consider the way in which capitalist consumerism is based on 
the satisfaction of material needs.  But this process becomes hyperbolic, as it invents 
new needs for which new means of satisfaction, new techniques and technologies, must 
also be invented: „the satisfaction of the first need, the action of satisfying and the 
instrument of satisfaction which has been acquired, leads to new needs; and this 
creation of new needs is the first historical act‟ (Marx and Engels, 1998, p.48).  This 
satisfaction of material needs, the creation of new material needs to satisfy, thus 
involves the creation of a world market; as foreign products are imported and exported 
from and to foreign countries.  The proletariat‟s labour-power is born in the context of 
the historical formation of this world market, meaning that history itself is no longer 
merely of individual nations like Germany or continents like Europe, but is truly 
becoming world history: 
 
Moreover, the mass of workers who are nothing but workers – labour-power on a mass scale cut off from 
capital or from even a limited satisfaction [of their needs] and, hence, as a result of competition their 
utterly precarious position, the no longer merely temporary loss of work as a secure source of life – 
presupposes the world market.  The proletariat can thus only exist world-historically, just as communism, 
its activity can only have a „world-historical‟ existence.  World-historical existence of individuals, i.e., 
existence of individuals which is directly linked up with world history (p.57). 
 
German speculative philosophy, which is based on the Hegelian concept of the „world 
spirit‟ (p.59), is compared with the modern capitalist invention of the „world market‟ 
(p.59).  Indeed, the analogy can be carried further, as the world market is based on the 
invention of the stock market; and so to „speculative buying‟ (p.79); to „speculation in 
stocks and shares‟ (p.80); and so to the so-called „public‟ nature of the private sector, 
when a business becomes a corporation by allowing a share of it to be bought and sold 
in the stock market (Dasgupta, 2007, p.114).  Of course, in such a scenario, 
multinational corporations become more powerful than national democratic 
governments – and in ways that are only just beginning to be analysed by members of 
the more recent global justice movement; where right-wing governments are themselves 
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shown to consent to, rather than challenge, the violent effects of the economic 
colonialism of the multinationals (e.g., Monbiot, 2001; Klein, 2007). 
 But what of the historic destiny of the proletariat?  The German Ideology alludes 
to this, without necessarily concentrating on it – after the first part Marx and Engels 
become more interested in demystifying Stirner‟s spectre.  In the first part itself, they 
allude to what they consider to be an historical fact: viz., not only that the relation 
between bourgeoisie and proletariat is the relation between the capitalist class and the 
working class; but that it is also the relation between the „ruling class‟ and the 
„revolutionary class‟ (Marx and Engels, 1998, p.68).  This transposition from the 
proletariat qua working class to the proletariat qua revolutionary class becomes the 
basis of the argument of The Communist Manifesto: i.e., in the designation of the 
proletariat as a politically active entity.  And therefore, not merely an entity with a 
working-class identity (i.e., propertyless), but with the means to transform or 
revolutionize their identity from non-owner to owner – although not in the capitalist 
sense of an individual owner.  In The German Ideology Marx and Engels remind us that, 
in modern capitalism, each individual worker has the potential to transform their own 
individual identity from that of worker to capitalist: „it now enables these individuals to 
raise themselves into the ruling class‟ (p.69).  But as Marx says in Critique of Hegel‟s 
„Philosophy of Right‟, this only makes the individual partisan to capitalism‟s underlying 
individualism: „Present civil society is the accomplished principle of individualism: 
individual existence is the final end, while activity, labour, content, means, etc., are 
merely means‟ (Marx, 1972, p.81).  In contrast to capitalism‟s individualism Marx and 
Engels emphasize the virtue of communism‟s socialism: the individual human as 
primarily a social animal, in which socialist economic structures of common ownership 
are our ultimate politico-economic destiny in our societal communities. 
The pithy demonstration of capitalism‟s internal contradictions in The 
Communist Manifesto explains the reason why this has become historically necessary.  
Although its own structure of the world market economy has become hyperbolic and 
complex in its speculative nature, modern capitalism has ironically, „simplified the class 
antagonisms‟ (Marx and Engels, 2002, p.220).  This simplification, into bourgeoisie and 
proletariat, has led to the exploitation of the latter by the former: „naked, shameless, 
direct, brutal exploitation‟ (p.222).  The modern democratic state has become the 
administrator of modern capitalism: „The executive of the modern State is but a 
committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie‟ (p.221).  The 
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bourgeoisie itself exists only by producing a state of constant unrest by continually 
reinventing the technologies underlying its economy, the „instruments of production‟: 
„The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of 
production, and with them the whole relations of society‟ (p.222).  This leads to 
overproduction: to „the epidemic of overproduction‟ (p.226).  The proletariat are thus 
„enslaved by the machine‟ (p.227); enslaved by, for example, the newly invented 
factory machines.  For Marx and Engels, this means that, ironically, „there is too much 
civilization, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce‟ 
(p.226).  For the ownership of the means of subsistence is in the hands of the few rather 
than in the hands of the many: the bourgeoisie „has concentrated property in a few 
hands‟ (p.224).  The proletariat are almost powerless in such circumstances, competing 
with each other for wage labour: „the condition for capital is wage labour.  Wage labour 
rests exclusively on competition between the labourers‟ (p.233). 
In such circumstances, what are the proletariat to do?  In Lenin‟s question: 
„What Is to Be Done?‟ (in: Lenin, 1987). The solution: „Working men of all countries, 
unite!‟ (Marx and Engels, 2002, p.258).  The proletariat must form into communist 
parties, „working-class parties‟ (p.234), so as to both unify their identity and become 
one political voice for change.  The change in question: „Abolition of private property‟ 
(p.235).  But of course, this does not refer to, „personally acquiring property as the fruit 
of a man‟s own labour‟ (p.235); i.e., private property understood in the sense of the 
objects each individual utilizes in everyday life.  Instead, it refers first of all to an 
abolition of the capitalist system in which the owners of the buildings and tools that 
form the means of production (e.g., factories and factory machines) are not the ones 
who use these means for their own labour: 
 
We by no means intend to abolish this personal appropriation of the products of labour, an appropriation 
that is made for the maintenance and reproduction of human life, and that leaves no surplus wherewith to 
command the labour of others.  All that we want to do away with is the miserable character of this 
appropriation, under which the labourer lives merely to increase capital, and is allowed to live only in so 
far as the interest of the rule class requires it (p.236). 
 
And secondly, it refers to replacing the capitalist system with a communist system of 
common ownership of the means of production, in which the workers who actually use 
these means to produce goods are simultaneously the owners of these means: „You are 
horrified at our intending to do away with private property.  But in your existing 
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society, private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the population; its 
existence for the few is solely due to its non-existence in the hands of those nine-tenths‟ 
(p.237).  For Marx and Engels, common ownership is therefore fairer, and so is a more 
just way of organizing the economic base of society.  The ghost of communism haunts 
capitalism: „A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of Communism‟ (p.218). 
Let us now consider Marx in relation to Derrida‟s Spectres of Marx.  The 
interpretation of Derrida given here is distinct from the prevalent ones in the field.  The 
interpretation given here emphasizes the autobiographical element in Spectres of Marx, 
arguing that through this element this book operates a philosophical criticism of Marx, 
in particular with respect to his underlying theory of subjectivity.  This philosophical 
criticism takes effect in the very identification of the proletariat in the prescription of 
their historic task.  But before I turn to my own interpretation of Derrida in more detail I 
will briefly consider some of the others in the field.  Four in total, coming from different 
perspectives: „post-Marxism‟ (Simon Critchley), „literary theory‟ (Peggy Kamuf), 
„negative theology‟ (John D. Caputo), and „radical atheism‟ (Martin Hägglund).  The 
labels here given to each interpretation are partly in order to distinguish them from one 
another, partly for brevity‟s sake, partly in order to capture something distinctive within 
each one, and therefore, hopefully, partly accurate.  It is hoped that, in highlighting this 
diversity of scholarship, it will show how Spectres of Marx is one of those books by 
Derrida, like many others, which defies a singular interpretation as a result of its 
polytechnic concerns.  For example, this can range from Marx‟s critique of religion, to 
the problem of Marxist tradition (both intellectual and historical) and what we inherit 
from it, to the critique of the state of the contemporary capitalist world, to literary 
criticism, to the problems of class identity and the theory of identity it presupposes. 
 In his essay, „The Hypothesis, the Context, the Messianic, the Political, the 
Economic, the Technological: On Derrida‟s Spectres of Marx‟, in Ethics-Politics-
Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas, & Contemporary French Thought, Simon 
Critchley considers Derrida‟s strategy of double reading regarding the notion of spectre: 
„Derrida focuses this double gesture in the ambivalent usage of a specific word by the 
author he is considering, in this case Spectre, Gespenst‟ (Critchley, 1999b, p.145).  The 
six words that form long title of Critchley‟s essay comprise the title of the six separate 
sections of the essay itself.  He also picks up on Derrida‟s neologism of „hauntology‟, 
where he usefully says: „One of the crucial distinctions in SdM turns, characteristically 
for Derrida, on a homonym, namely the difference between ontologie and hauntologie, 
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a difference that can only be marked grammatologically in writing‟ (p.146).  With the 
consequence that: „hauntologie is the condition of possibility of ontologie‟ (p.147).  
Indeed, via Critchley‟s explanation, the similarity of hauntology to Derrida‟s founding 
neologism of différance is uncanny.  All of this useful classification occurs in the first 
section, „Hypothesis‟.  More generally, however, Critchley‟s essay, particularly in the 
latter two-thirds, is more concerned with the political implications that arise from 
Specters of Marx; implications which are broadly positioned in the context of post-
Marxist thought – that is, in the context of Laclau‟s and Mouffe‟s Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001).  
For example, Critchley alludes to the way in which the word „hegemony‟ is used by 
Derrida in Spectres of Marx: „In SdM, Derrida indeed speaks of hegemony, using the 
word – which is, to my knowledge, relatively new to his vocabulary – on at least eight 
occasions‟ (p.164).  While this is of course a legitimate road to go down, it is not my 
concern here to get into the political dimensions of „SdM‟. 
 In her two essays, „The Ghosts of Critique and Deconstruction‟ and „The Haunts 
of Scholarship‟, in Book of Addresses, Peggy Kamuf begins by alluding to the 
difficulties of Derrida‟s plus d‟un: „Depending on whether or not one pronounces the 
“s”: plu(s)/plus, the expression shifts registers from that of counting by ones to that of 
counting without number one, or of taking account of the other than one‟ (Kamuf, 2005, 
p.219).  On the following page, invoking the distinction between „critique‟ and 
„criticism‟, she continues by giving what seems like a sort of quarter-apology and three-
quarter-apologia for deconstruction as literary criticism instead of philosophical critique 
(the latter invoking, „critique in the Kantian sense‟ (p.220)): 
 
So, although the topic of critique and deconstruction sets up some strict, philosophical questions, I‟m 
going to invoke the altogether looser discourse of criticism.  This discourse, however, has at least the 
advantage of being somewhat more familiar, since it is not confined to the publications or classrooms of 
formal philosophy but spills over into mass-circulated newspapers, for example in the form of 
supplemental Sunday “Book Review” sections.  Moreover, that deconstruction has been frequently 
assimilated to the discourse of criticism is something anyone in these broadly defined intellectual circles 
may easily observe (p.220). 
 
Kamuf seems to think here that deconstruction as literary criticism has advantages over 
deconstruction as philosophy; but the former is not without its problems.  For instance, 
using the example of „mass-circulated newspapers‟ as some sort of justificatory 
„advantage‟ for deconstruction-as-literary-criticism is unfair, because it says just as 
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much about the underlying economy of these newspapers (i.e., regarding the populism 
behind what its owners and editors think will make the newspaper sell more) as it does 
about the „discourse of criticism‟ itself.  Or when she says the advantage of the 
discourse of criticism is that it is „familiar‟; familiar to whom?  And is all philosophy 
„formal philosophy‟? 
More generally, the purpose of Kamuf‟s „The Ghosts of Critique and 
Deconstruction‟ is to examine the way in which Stephen Greenblatt‟s „new historicist‟ 
essay „What Is the History of Literature?‟ (in: Greenblatt, 2005), in its reading of 
Shakespeare‟s „Hamlet‟, does not address Derrida‟s reading of „Hamlet‟ in Spectres of 
Marx – where Derrida draws in particular on Hamlet‟s haunted phrase, „The time is out 
of joint‟ (in: Shakespeare, 2001, p.384).  The moment of criticism comes by drawing on 
Derrida‟s distinction in Spectres of Marx between the visor effect and the helmet effect, 
and applying it to Greenblatt by arguing he sees the latter but not the former: „Historical 
criticism, and perhaps especially New Historicism, would appear to see clearly enough 
the helmet, that is, the chief prosthesis of power, but does not notice the visor‟ (Kamuf, 
2005, p.234).  That is, the helmet, „like the visor‟, is a symbol of „the chief‟s authority‟ 
(Derrida, 2006, p.7).  But unlike the helmet, the visor has, „the supreme insignia of 
power: to see without being seen‟ (p.8).  In „The Haunts of Scholarship‟ Kamuf draws 
on Rousseau‟s Émile and, towards the end of the essay, alludes briefly to Derrida‟s 
„watchword‟ of learning to live – although she leaves the connection between them 
implicit.  To this degree it could be seen as partial groundwork for this chapter.  She 
uses the argument of Rousseau‟s Émile, that reading should be left out of the child‟s 
education until such point, „that children will learn naturally to read as soon as they see 
reading‟s usefulness‟ (Kamuf, 2005, p.247).  In such circumstances, reading will thus 
become pleasurable to the child.  She continues: „The pleasure principle only works, 
however (if it ever really works at all) on the condition of spectrality‟ (p.248).  It is this 
spectrality that warrants the brief allusion, towards the end of the essay, to Derrida‟s 
„learning to live‟ watchword – where Kamuf becomes concerned merely with the 
grammar of Derrida‟s expression rather than its rich conceptual force.  As her title 
suggests, her point is not about life, but rather about literary scholarship.  Here I intend 
to reverse this thematic order of priority so as to discuss life rather than literature. 
Finally is the interpretation of Spectres of Marx as addressing the problem of 
religion.  This concerns the concept that Derrida develops here of the messianic without 
messianism, which he links to the idea of justice as the undeconstructible condition of 
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deconstruction, as developed in his essay „Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of 
Authority”‟.  In Caputo‟s The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida, this concept of the 
messianic without messianism is given as further evidence of „Derrida‟s religion‟: „this 
messianic structure goes to the heart of deconstruction, that is, to the heart of Derrida‟s 
religion‟ (Caputo, 1997, p.118).  In contrast, in Hägglund‟s Radical Atheism, this 
concept is given, against Caputo, as further evidence of Derrida‟s radical atheism: „The 
same radical atheism can be traced in Derrida‟s notion of the messianic without 
messianism‟ (Hägglund, 2008, p.132).  However, what this opposition between Caputo 
and Hägglund amounts to is that, where the former has emphasized the „messianic‟ part 
of Derrida‟s formulation (here he does not even refer to it as being „without 
messianism‟), the latter has instead emphasized the „without messianism‟: „Derrida 
emphasizes that what he calls the messianic is without messianism and without religion‟ 
(p.132).  As was said in the chapter on Augustine discussing these two thinkers, it 
would appear that a notion of radical agnosticism is needed in order to capture what is 
actually going on in Derrida‟s thought on religion – a notion that provokes not only a 
religious tolerance of other religions, but also a religious tolerance of atheism; as well 
as, in a fair exchange, an atheistic tolerance of religion itself (i.e., radical atheism as 
violently intolerant of religion just as organized religions are of heretics).  Indeed, once 
again, it is curious how the notion of agnosticism is not considered by other scholars 
working in the field: e.g., Critchley refers to Spectres of Marx as „quasi-atheistic‟ 
(Critchley, 1999, p.160).  The passions are too high in this area such that scholars lose 
perspective: a more disinterested notion of agnosticism is required in order to keep the 
peace. 
So from considering some of the dominant literature in the field, we can get a 
picture of some of the dominant concepts and themes in Spectres of Marx: sophisticated 
polylingual manoeuvres (around „ghost‟, and „plus d‟un‟), hauntology, hegemony, visor 
effect, helmet effect, messianic without messianism, etc.  Out of this literature, the 
„watchword‟ of learning to live makes a brief appearance in Kamuf‟s essay „The Haunts 
of Scholarship‟, but does so with a different emphasis than the one I would like to give 
here.  Towards the end of her essay she quotes the opening line from Spectres of Marx 
that we saw earlier: „Someone, you or me, comes forward and says: I would like to 
learn to live finally‟.  Kamuf‟s response is the following: 
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This incipit is a spectral event, neither fictional nor nonfictional, performative, one might say, if that did 
not imply somewhere a self-knowing self-present first person.  The phrase comes, as it were, from 
nowhere, from „someone‟ who says it; it opens up with a series of pronouns, beginning with the third 
person indefinite: quelqu‟un, someone, „Someone, you or me...‟  Notice that the order of the pronouns is 
third, second, first, which reverses the ordinally numbered series but preserves, perhaps, the division 
between the non-personal third and personal first/second pronouns (to recall Benveniste‟s distinction) 
(Kamuf, 2005, p.251). 
 
Kamuf‟s interest here is in the first part of the citation, not the second part; that is, the 
part she quotes as: „Someone, you or me...‟  This is why it becomes a „spectral event‟ 
for Kamuf: because the „someone‟ who „comes forward‟ (from where? to where?) is 
here anonymous, but still has a seemingly positive designation, „you or me‟.  It is a 
figure that comes forward, a spectral figure that is not easy to make out, that sees us 
with our being able to see them (note the play of the „visor effect‟); as if what was 
actually said – „I would like to learn to live finally‟ – was heard as an echo from an 
unknown origin.  This is clever analysis from Kamuf.  But it is analysis of the rhetorical 
force of the first part of the citation rather than an analysis of the conceptual force of the 
second part.  Before coming to the conclusion of this chapter, it is this latter analysis 
that I would like to undertake here.  This I will do by concentrating, for the most part, 
on Derrida‟s opening „Exordium‟ to Spectres of Marx.  In the conclusion I will then 
consider the implications of Derrida‟s learning to live watchword for his reading of 
Marx, thereby highlighting his particular mode of philosophical criticism as distinct 
from literary criticism. 
In the opening „Exordium‟ Derrida connects the watchword of learning to live to 
the problem of violence: „from the lips of a master this watchword would always say 
something about violence‟ (Derrida, 2006, p.xvi).  The master, here, is the teacher; the 
teacher who teaches the student how to learn to live.  In this respect, there is, Derrida 
notes, a moment of address in the watchword through which the information that is 
taught travels from one destination to another; from one person to another.  He suggests 
that there are three moments of this address: „Such an address hesitates, therefore: 
between address as experience (is not learning to live experience itself?), address as 
education, and address as taming or training [dressage]‟ (pp.xvi-xvii).  Address as 
experience because experience always relates to some worldly context with which one 
becomes familiar; such that one says that one has learned from experience (or not); such 
that one says that one is experienced (or inexperienced).  Address as education because, 
as one learns from experience in the first moment of address, the process of learning 
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becomes one of education; in both formal (institutional) contexts and informal (life) 
contexts.  And address as taming or training because, as the process of learning in 
education is meant to teach some activity or other, the discipline required in learning the 
activity requires a focus of attention through which one becomes tamed or trained.  
Indeed, there is an echo of Foucault‟s Discipline and Punish, here, as the latter‟s 
argument involved the suggestion that disciplinary power is a productive form of power 
of bodies and minds, rather than a destructive form of power.  The prison structure, as 
involving disciplinary power, is in principle guided by the ideal of the reforming or re-
education of the prisoners‟ negative attitudes which got them into prison in the first 
place (Foucault, 1991). 
One can also detect the radical empiricism contained in Derrida‟s watchword: 
learning to live as „experience itself‟.  But it is a radical empiricism which is connected, 
on the one hand, to his quasi-transcendental approach to justice, as he puts it in „Force 
of law‟, „as an experience of the impossible‟ (Derrida, 2002, p.243); and on the other 
hand, to death, to the other, and to the spectral structure that death and the other bring to 
the understanding of life and the self.  I will come to the topic of justice in a moment, 
but let us consider first the way in which Derrida prefaces this with the watchword of 
learning to live as „ethics itself‟.  He says: „To live, by definition, is not something one 
learns.  Not from oneself, it is not learned from life, taught by life.  Only from the other 
and by death‟ (Derrida, 2006, p.xvii).  A moment later he paradoxically continues: 
 
And yet nothing is more necessary than this wisdom.  It is ethics itself: to learn to live – alone, from 
oneself, by oneself.  Life does not know how to live otherwise.  And does one ever do anything else but 
learn to live, alone, from oneself, by oneself?  This is, therefore, a strange commitment, both impossible 
and necessary, for a living being supposed to be alive: „I would like to learn to live‟ (p.xvii). 
 
For Derrida, the formulation „to learn to live‟ is paradoxical in a quasi-transcendental 
manner: i.e., „both impossible and necessary‟.  It is impossible because, since one is 
already living life, what is it, then, to learn to live?  What is it to learn what one is 
already doing?  The impossibility arises in the premise that we have not learnt to do 
what we are already doing.  That is, we have not learnt to do properly what we are 
already doing; and so to learn to do properly what we are already doing becomes 
impossibly difficult.  To learn to live is to learn to live properly, and this is what 
saturates it with moral necessity.  To learn to live is necessary because it highlights 
moral necessity: the moral responsibility that it imposes on the individual toward the 
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other becomes infinite; a responsibility up to and beyond death; both one‟s own death 
and the other‟s death. 
On the one hand, this responsibility both comes from the other‟s address and 
moves toward the other‟s address; that is, as the responsibility to do no harm or violence 
to the other.  On the other hand, this responsibility is so radically felt within oneself (or 
it ought to be, in order for the ethical relation to occur) that it is also almost as if it were 
self-given.  Here we might allude to Derrida‟s essay „Passions: An Oblique Offering‟, in 
On the Name, in which he contrasts his moral thought with Kant‟s on the relation 
between duty and desire: 
 
A gesture „of friendship‟ or „of politeness‟ would be neither friendly nor polite if it were purely and 
simply to obey a ritual rule.  But this duty to eschew the rule of ritualized decorum also demands that one 
go beyond the very language of duty.  One must not be friendly or polite out of duty.  We venture such a 
proposition, without a doubt, against Kant (Derrida, 1995a, p.7). 
 
From this, we can see further, then, why, for Derrida, the moral necessity constitutes a 
simultaneous impossibility: for to be friendly and polite not out of duty, but instead out 
of passion or desire, presupposes that one actually likes the people to whom one applies 
one‟s friendship or politeness.  Of course, this might not be the case; and in such 
circumstances we come across what, in the chapter on Augustine, we saw as the 
problem of the broken alliance, and so of the already-broken alliance that might require 
complete severance.  Otherwise the friendship in question is in danger of being 
disingenuous and grounded in false pretences: a pseudo-friendship.  To make matters 
worse, or at any rate more complex, this relation to the other might also presuppose the 
problem of a third party, another friend or perhaps family member, who is loyal to the 
person that one oneself dislikes.  Within the moral psychological watchword of learning 
to live is therefore the origin of the problem of friendship and family breakdown: i.e., 
learning to live as learning to both prevent and cope with such emotional difficulties. 
Indeed, then there is of course the enigmatic „finally‟: „Finally what‟ (Derrida, 
2006, p.xvii), Derrida asks (without a question mark, perhaps implying that it would 
have been a rhetorical question anyway).  Within the „finally‟ is Derrida‟s spectral 
moment.  „Finally‟ would imply the question: Learning to live to what end; what 
purpose?  A question which invokes death: but, Derrida suggests, not then as an 
affirmation of either life or death pure and simple, but as what takes place between 
them: 
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If it – learning to live – remains to be done, it can happen only between life and death.  Neither in life nor 
in death alone.  What happens between the two, and between all the „two‟s‟ one likes, such as between 
life and death, can only maintain itself with some ghost, can only talk with or about some ghost (p.xvii). 
 
Inscribed a priori into life, death transposes the life-force (soul or spirit) that the 
metaphysical tradition has ascribed to the very concept of life with the spectre.  In the 
main body of Spectres of Marx Derrida says, near the beginning of the first chapter: „the 
spectre is a paradoxical incorporation, the becoming-body, a certain phenomenal and 
carnal form of the spirit.  It becomes, rather, some “thing” that remains difficult to 
name: neither soul nor body, and both one and the other‟ (p.5).  Later in the book he 
says, near the beginning of the final chapter: „For there is no ghost, there is never any 
becoming-spectre of the spirit without at least an appearance of the flesh, in a space of 
invisible visibility, like the dis-appearing of an apparition‟ (p.157).  The „finally‟ 
imposes the disjointed temporality of the spectre; the moment of „becoming‟; of the 
spectre as the becoming-body of the spirit and the becoming-spirit of the body.  The 
spectre is what takes place between life and death: life is haunted not just by death, but 
also by the emotional and practical difficulties of life itself. 
It might have been noticed that, above, when Derrida invokes learning to live as 
„ethics itself‟, this only constitutes one half of the double-bind he proposed.  Derrida‟s 
relation to the term „ethics‟ is much more ambiguous than his relation to the term 
„justice‟, which, in „Force of Law‟ he describes as the undeconstructible condition of 
deconstruction: „The undeconstructibility of justice also makes deconstruction possible, 
indeed is inseparable from it‟ (Derrida, 2002, p.243).  This ambiguity is to do with 
Derrida‟s relation to Levinas, who described the ethical relation as the face-to-face 
relation with the other.  Geoffrey Bennington succinctly summarizes the problem in his 
chapter „Deconstruction and Ethics‟ in Interrupting Derrida: „The possibility of the 
third party (another other, the other‟s other) haunting my face-to-face with the other 
gives the possibility of justice‟ (Bennington, 2000, p.39).  A moment later he continues: 
„Derrida wants to say that this originary presence of the third party haunting the face-to-
face with the other may appear to compromise or contaminate the purity of the properly 
ethical relation‟ (p.40).  So where the ethical relation involves a dual relation of two 
people face-to-face; in contrast, for Derrida, justice not only names or identifies the 
third party in this relation, but identifies it as the essence of the relation itself.  This 
means that the other to whom one relates might not be there in front of us, as he puts it 
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in his „Exordium‟ to Spectres of Marx: „this responsibility and this respect for justice 
concerning those who are not there‟ (Derrida, 2006, p.xviii).  And towards the end of 
the „Exordium‟ he says: „justice carries life beyond present life or its actual being-there, 
its empirical or ontological actuality: not toward death but toward a living-on [sur-vie]‟ 
(p.xx).   
Learning to live finally is therefore learning to survive, or live-on, against a life 
which throws up so many emotional and practical difficulties; and to do so by causing 
as minimal harm as possible to others; which is very difficult, perhaps impossible, 
because it might well have been those very same others who gave me my own 
difficulties.  Having quoted another moment in Spectres of Marx where Derrida uses the 
term „sur-vie‟, Critchley says: „Derrida is obviously seeking to deconstruct the limit 
between the living and the non-living and show that the seeming priority of life in fact 
presupposes a sur-vie that undermines this priority‟ (Critchley, 1999, p.152).  Indeed, 
towards the end of the first chapter in Spectres of Marx Derrida says: „the dead can 
often be more powerful than the living; and this is why to interpret a philosophy as 
philosophy or ontology of life is never a simple matter‟ (Derrida, 2006, p.60).  Perhaps 
this is Derrida‟s own „writing lesson‟, as it applies itself to the process of learning to 
live: that to learn to live is to learn to live finally, which presupposes that any 
philosophy of life must concern itself with death, and so with spectres, and so with a 
very idea of life as always already living-on or survival against life‟s own difficulties 
(emotional, practical, etc).  Here, before concluding, I would argue against an 
interpretation such as that given by Hägglund, where Derrida‟s notion of survival is 
reserved for a philosophy of radical atheism.  And to do this I would like to invoke not 
only the earlier concept of radical agnosticism, but also of autobiographical 
agnosticism. 
The notion of autobiographical agnosticism I argued for was one which left open 
the relation to the other‟s otherness by invoking their singular upbringing and 
characteristics.  People from all walks of life can suffer from life‟s difficulties.  To 
reserve Derrida‟s notion of survival for the ideological purposes of „radical atheism‟ is 
therefore, in a way, to disallow the difficult life experiences of the majority of the 
world‟s population (given that, so they say, ninety-odd percent of the world‟s 
population remain religious in some form; even in today‟s secular world).  To disallow 
this makes no moral sense, especially in the context of Derrida‟s notion of justice.  Of 
course, some people suffer more than others from life‟s difficulties.  But here, surely, 
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the issue is less about religion and atheism and more about prosperity and poverty, 
about the privileged and the underprivileged – amongst other issues, for emotional 
difficulties can have more than one cause (e.g., problematic family dynamics).  And this 
invokes „a certain spirit‟ of Marxism, as Derrida says throughout Spectres of Marx, the 
spirit that he wants to maintain against more orthodox Marxism: „the religious also 
informs [...] that “spirit” of emancipatory Marxism whose injunction we are reaffirming 
here, however secret and contradictory it appears‟ (Derrida, 2006, p.209).  On the one 
hand, Derrida‟s thought is, as Hägglund notes, critical of religion; but on the other hand 
he keeps something of religion in reserve as a tool to use against those who would 
violently denounce it (such as Marx himself). 
This implies that Derrida‟s thought is a form of what might be called, and was 
alluded to above, tolerant agnosticism: i.e., not an agnosticism that is so often accused 
of sitting on the fence, but rather an agnosticism articulated in the name of justice that 
seeks to keep the peace.  Indeed, the problem of an inclination for violence can inform 
this emancipatory spirit of Marxism, at times inscribing it within the very identity of the 
proletariat, and it is this that Derrida seeks to counteract in Marx‟s thought, as I will 
argue in the conclusion. 
 
Conclusion 
Spectres of Marx is a book about capitalist violence – note Derrida‟s critical reading of 
Fukayama‟s capitalist triumphalism in the second chapter, which leads, in the third 
chapter to his bleak outlook: „The world is going badly‟ (Derrida, 2006, p.96).  It is also 
a book about communist violence.  However, it is not, in that, a matter of documenting 
what is, now, perhaps the well-known history of the violence of communist institutions.  
Rather, it is a book about what constitutes violent behaviour in the first place, using 
communism as an exemplary example of blindness to its own mode of violence.  That 
is, of the way in which initial violent rhetoric can lead to actual physical violence in the 
transposition from intellectual to institutional Marxism: pointing to a war of words that 
underlies, and exists alongside, the world‟s wars.  Spectres of Marx was written in 
response to the end of the Cold War, and the Cold War was of course a war of 
propaganda – a war of propaganda nonetheless famous for proxy wars so that the 
dominant powers in question, the USA and the USSR, did not have to fight each other 
directly. 
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The ghost to which Derrida refers his readers is one that, on the one hand, 
applies itself to the structure of history as disjointed time: „haunting is historical, to be 
sure, but it is not dated, it is never docilely given a date in a chain of presents, day after 
day, according to the instituted order of a calendar‟ (Derrida, 2006, p.3).  In other 
words, past violence lives-on in the memory of its victims.  But it is at once constantly 
present with them and yet present only to them and nobody else: i.e., its presence to 
oneself is its absence to others.  And so arises the problem of the evidence of the actual 
historical reality of the past violence; the problem of whether others will believe me 
when I accuse someone else of causing me harm.  This is why, for Derrida, the „work of 
mourning‟ underlies his concept of the ghost: the haunted memory mourns for the loss 
of its happiness.  On the other hand, the ghost is not only the structure of history, but is 
also the structure of rhetoric: „the figure of the ghost is not just one figure among others.  
It is perhaps the hidden figure of all figures.  For this reason, it would perhaps no longer 
figure as one tropological weapon among others.  There would be no meta-rhetoric of 
the ghost‟ (p.150).  The ghost is thus the structure of history and rhetoric; it is historicity 
and rhetoricity as the dual problem of the relation between the event and its description 
(or perhaps rather depiction).  Within this relation is the problem of what Derrida calls: 
„the visor effect: we do not see who looks at us‟ (p.6).  That is, the problem of blindness 
to one‟s own mode of violence, particularly rhetorical: i.e., not only one does not see 
who looks at us, but one does not hear who listens to us. 
Indeed, it is this rhetorical violence of Marx, of the text of Marx itself, which 
Derrida attempts to address in Spectres of Marx, particularly in the final chapter, where 
Derrida offers a critical reading of Marx‟s reading (or exorcism) of Stirner‟s ghost in 
The German Ideology.  He says: 
 
Why such relentless pursuit [acharnement]?  Why this hunt for ghosts?  What is the reason for Marx‟s 
rage?  Why does he harass Stirner with such irresistible irony?  One has the impression, since the critique 
appears so insistent and redundant, both brilliant and ponderous, that Marx could go on forever launching 
his barbs and wounding to death.  He could never leave his victim.  He is bound to it in a troubling 
fashion.  His prey captivates him.  The acharnement of a hunter consists in setting out an animal lure, 
here the living lifeless body of a ghost, in order to trick the prey (Derrida, 2006, p.174). 
 
Derrida continues a little later: „This logic and this topology of the paradoxical hunt [...] 
should not be treated as a rhetorical ornament when one reads The Manifesto of the 
Communist Party: its first sentences, as we saw, immediately associate the figure of 
haunting with that of hunting‟ (pp.175-176).  In other words, there is an unapologetic, 
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violent rhetoric in the founding texts of communism that should not be considered as 
mere „rhetorical ornament‟.  For example, hear The Communist Manifesto: „where the 
violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat‟ 
(Marx and Engels, 2002, p.232).  But who are these „proletariat‟ that will perform this 
„violent overthrow‟? 
This question invokes a basic philosophical criticism of Marx‟s very 
identification of the proletariat; a criticism which underlies Derrida‟s explorations in 
Spectres of Marx, and is contained in the concept of plus d‟un that we saw earlier.  
Derrida said that plus d‟un involved the more than one of a crowd or mass, but 
paradoxically also, „the less than one of pure and simple dispersion‟.  Marx‟s critique of 
capitalism involves the designation of a „ruling class‟ (the bourgeoisie) and the „ruled 
class‟ (the proletariat).  But the problem is that the bourgeoisie do not rule society with 
the collective consciousness of itself as a class.  Indeed, the bourgeoisie might well rule 
capitalist society, but they do so in a dispersion of individual business owners.  
Logically, then, it follows that the proletariat are also dispersed, and so concerned more 
with their own private affairs than with those of their class.  On the one hand, class 
identity is perhaps part and parcel of each and every individual‟s identity; but on the 
other hand, this identity does not necessarily extend itself out to the level of the actual 
possession of a class consciousness.  For those who are (or who desire to be) politically 
active, and so involve themselves in a political community of likeminded individuals (or 
would at least like to), there may well be a certain class consciousness.  But for the vast 
majority in modern democratic societies who are not politically active (which is not to 
say they will not take a more passive interest in politics), there are only the struggles of 
private life to contend with.  Marx wants to speak to the majority of society in the 
proletariat; but he ends up only speaking to a minority within the proletariat itself: i.e., 
to those who are politically active.  And even then, they have to adhere to the value of 
the „violent overthrow‟, which is dangerously close to the paradoxical problem of 
creating injustices in the search for justice itself.  Like those who train hard in order to 
be fit and healthy but end up badly injuring themselves in the process, and so almost 
unable to train at all. 
Granted, Marx wants to make all the proletariat politically active; but trying to 
make this happen is not the same thing as stating historical facts, which Marx presents 
himself as doing with historical materialism in contradistinction to speculative 
philosophy.  Hence, Marx‟s vision for a universally politically active proletariat is his 
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own neo-Hegelian form of speculative philosophy.  Marx mimics the very thing he 
denounces in Hegel and Stirner: „two great hunters, Marx and Stirner, are in principle 
sworn to the same conjuration‟ (Derrida, 2006, p.176).  Historical materialism is 
therefore bound to the very same teleological structure of history as Hegelian 
philosophy, only it goes in the final direction of communism rather than capitalism.  
Perhaps a nice end in principle; but when the means to that end is in practice 
unapologetically violent, how can there be any guarantee that it will be achieved 
without creating the collateral damage of begrudged victims who will rebel against the 
injustices of communism in its turn?  Indeed, some might say that this is the benefit of 
hindsight, but would not a certain foresight, perhaps from another theoretical 
perspective, have been able to see in advance this very problem?  This is why Derrida, 
although like Marx alludes to life‟s practicalities as the point of application of a theory, 
does not denounce philosophical abstraction with quite the same force: „Pardon me for 
beginning with such an abstract formulation‟ (p.49).  Learning to live finally instead 
poses the question of finality to Marx as whether, all things considered, the proletarian 
revolution really is the best way forward.  Perhaps this requires the substitution of the 
term „poverty‟ for „proletariat‟ in the brilliant penultimate sentence from „A 
Contribution to the Critique of Hegel‟s “Philosophy of Right”‟ we saw earlier: 
„Philosophy cannot be actualized without the abolition of [poverty]; [poverty] cannot be 
abolished without the actualization of philosophy‟.  For me, this is the spirit of Marx 
that Derrida retains. 
Here, learning to live becomes the watchword for Derrida‟s relation to Marx by 
highlighting Marx‟s own naivety in denouncing so quickly his inheritance from 
Rousseau.  In such a case, perhaps Derrida also articulates this Rousseauian phrase with 
a Nietzschean inflection: for instance, in „Circumfession‟ he refers to both Rousseau 
and Nietzsche as his „two positive heroes‟ (Derrida, 1993, p.133).  Since what Marx 
tends to avoid is what, in Human, All Too Human Nietzsche calls „the case of the 
individual human being‟ (Nietzsche, 1996, p.107), it is precisely this case that Derrida‟s 
thought poses to Marxist thought.  And this not so as to return to a form of existential 
Marxism (e.g., Sartre), but perhaps rather to juxtapose existentialism with Marxism in 
an undecidable paradox, where „deconstruction‟ is perhaps the ambiguous middle term.  
This paradox regards the strange sense of both proximity to and distance from political 
concerns, and the simultaneous implication and incommensurability of public life and 
private life, of work and life.  Is the violent political activity of the proletarian 
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revolution really how one wants to live?  Is it really how one should be taught how to 
live?  What happens after the revolution?  As Derrida puts it in his „Exordium‟: „where, 
for example, is Marxism going? where are we going with it?‟ (Derrida, 2006, p.xix).  
Derrida‟s „learning to live‟ watchword positions Marx between Rousseau and 
Nietzsche.  It poses the complex question of individual life history and life goals as an 
important feature of what it is that thinking must attend to – something all too forgotten 
in more orthodox Marxism; one of its blind spots. 
Human subjectivity is not merely political, but is also psychological.  Derrida‟s 
autobiographical thought touches base with the psychological aspects of subjectivity, 
and in Spectres of Marx this occurs in his watchword of „learning to live‟.  In this 
context, „learning to live‟ alludes to the need to account for individual difference as well 
as class difference, and so the need to account for the historical circumstances not only 
of the class but of the individual.  It is by addressing this underlying problem with 
Marx‟s thought that this watchword performs a philosophical criticism of it: a criticism 
which addresses the very identification of the proletarian identity itself.  For, as it says 
in The Communist Manifesto: „The lower strata of the middle class – the small 
tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired tradesman generally, the handicraftsmen and 
peasants – all these sink gradually into the proletariat‟ (Marx and Engels, 2002, p.228).  
This is too reductive of the plus d‟un to be true, and so it constitutes an 
oversimplification at the point of identification (not only of the proletarian identity but 
also of the bourgeois identity; of the different levels between them; and of the different 
levels below the former and above the latter).  This oversimplification is not merely 
political and economic, but is also psychological as a result of the action that each 
individual member of the proletariat is supposed to take, and as a result of the driving 
passion which is supposed to underpin this action.  In Derrida‟s thought, since learning 
to live is to learn to live with others, and with oneself as other, it becomes connected to 
his approach to justice as the relation to the other‟s otherness.  The deconstructive 
conception of the third other might come along to disturb the twofold dialogical relation 
naively hypothesized by most philosophers; but that does not mean that, in the group 
context, all individual identity becomes altogether lost. 
For it is only in the relation to the other where one finds one‟s individual 
difference.  The identity of the individual only becomes possible when there is 
recognition of one‟s difference from others in one‟s daily life.  Learning to live is 
learning to live with other‟s differences.  In its own way, individual difference becomes 
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a higher priority than class difference, because the class unity which underlies class 
activity presupposes agreement among different individuals within the class in question.  
But since different people have different conceptions and sensibilities of how to live 
their own lives, of what they each want from life, and of what limitations the 
circumstances of their life impose with respect to the choices that are available or 
unavailable to them, this agreement is therefore a priori uncertain – particularly insofar 
as it is agreement for violent action.  Through this emphasis on individual difference, 
learning to live, as well as initially applying itself to Derrida‟s autobiographical thought, 
connects up with a deconstructive theory of subjectivity saturated with this sense of 
justice.  Indeed, this concern with individual difference will be considered in more 
detail in the next chapter. 
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Autobiographical Riddles: Nietzsche & Derrida 
 
Introduction 
The relation of Nietzsche to Derrida is perhaps more controversial in deconstructive 
scholarship than almost any other philosopher because of the status popularly given to 
Nietzsche as an arch-deconstructor, a status hinted at by Derrida himself (Schrift, 1996).  
The key question then becomes what Derrida inherits from Nietzsche and what in 
Nietzsche he is critical of.  For an example of what Derrida inherits, the first chapter of 
the first volume of Human, All Too Human, „Of First and Last Things‟, begins by 
highlighting the problem of the binary oppositions of metaphysical philosophy: 
 
Almost all the problems of philosophy once again pose the same form of question as they did two 
thousand years ago: how can something originate in its opposite, for example rationality in irrationality, 
the sentient in the dead, logic in unlogic, disinterested contemplation in covetous desire, living for others 
in egoism, truth in error?  Metaphysical philosophy has hitherto surmounted this difficulty by denying 
that the one originates in the other and assuming for the more highly valued thing a miraculous source in 
the very kernel and being of the „thing in itself‟ (Nietzsche, 1996, p.12). 
 
Metaphysical philosophy is then contrasted with what Nietzsche calls historical 
philosophy: 
 
Historical philosophy, on the other hand, which can no longer be separated from natural science, the 
youngest of all philosophical methods, has discovered in individual cases (and this will probably be the 
result in every case) that there are no opposites, except in the customary exaggeration of popular or 
metaphysical interpretations, and that a mistake in reasoning lies at the bottom of this antithesis: 
according to this explanation there exists, strictly speaking, neither an unegoistic action nor completely 
disinterested contemplation; both are only sublimations, in which the basic element seems almost to have 
dispersed and reveals itself only under the most painstaking observation (p.12). 
 
Historical philosophy becomes the basis of Nietzsche‟s existential-cum-deconstructive 
thought, a thought which is critical of the very foundations of metaphysical philosophy: 
„Lack of historical sense is the family failing of all philosophers‟ (p.13).  It is this 
„family failing‟ that is the interest of this chapter, although less directed against the 
philosophical tradition and more directed towards Nietzsche‟s existential-psychological 
insight, and to Derrida‟s implicit inheritance and adjustment of it in his autobiographical 
thought. 
 To make it clearer what Nietzsche says above regarding the difference between 
metaphysical and historical philosophy, and why it is here relevant, consider the 
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following aphorism from the second volume of Human, All Too Human in the essay, 
„The Wanderer and His Shadow‟: 
 
Habit of seeing opposites. – The general imprecise way of observing sees everywhere in nature opposites 
(as, e.g., „warm and cold‟) where there are, not opposites, but differences of degree.  This bad habit has 
led us into wanting to comprehend and analyse the inner world, too, the spiritual-moral world, in terms of 
such opposites.  An unspeakable amount of painfulness, arrogance, harshness, estrangement, frigidity has 
entered into human feelings because we think we see opposites instead of transitions (Nietzsche, 1996, 
p.326). 
 
This transposition from opposition to difference of degree is what Derrida himself calls 
différance, and does so in the context of Nietzsche‟s thought: „différance is the name we 
might give to the “active,” moving discord of different forces, that Nietzsche sets up 
against the entire system of metaphysical grammar, wherever this system governs 
culture, philosophy, and science‟ (Derrida, 1982, p.18).  This is, of course, not to say 
that Derrida agrees with everything Nietzsche says; for the potential moments where 
Nietzsche‟s text appears inconsistent is something that concerns him.  But this citation 
from „Différance‟ nonetheless highlights the Nietzschean context of Derrida‟s thought.  
Indeed, it has become necessary to make an addition to the citation from Derrida here: 
not only „wherever this system governs culture, philosophy, and science‟; but also 
where it governs, as Nietzsche puts it, „human feelings‟. 
However, unlike Rousseau, Nietzsche does not aim or proclaim to articulate the 
truth of human feelings.  For Nietzsche, faulty logical thought is at the heart of faulty 
ontological and psychological thought.  As such, although Rousseau emphasizes the 
importance of rhetoric for an education in articulation and eloquence, he is also, like the 
metaphysical tradition, distrustful of rhetoric for its manipulative and deceptive 
capabilities.  In contrast, rhetoric is embraced much more in Nietzsche than it is in 
Rousseau, as he puts it in „On Truth and Lying in a Non-moral Sense‟: 
 
What, then, is truth?  A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms, in short a sum of 
human relations which have been subjected to poetic and rhetorical intensification, translation, and 
decoration, and which, after they have been in use for a long time, strike people as firmly established, 
canonical, and binding; truths are illusions of which we have forgotten that they are illusions, metaphors 
which have become worn by frequent use and have lost all sensuous vigour, coins which, having lost their 
stamp, are now regarded as metal and no longer as coins (in: Nietzsche, 1999, p.146). 
 
Nietzsche does not articulate the truth of human feelings; rather, their error.  For 
Nietzsche, humans are burdened with false feelings because they think wrongly and 
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interpret actions wrongly.  And this is because of the faulty logic that underpins 
metaphysical worldviews; worldviews that, in the cultures of the Western world at any 
rate, have saturated the sentiment of popular culture through their transposition from 
intellectual to institutional Christianity.  But if faulty logic is the cause of this problem, 
then in part rhetoric becomes the means to its alleviation, through which there is much 
more emphasis on paradox, and the impasses that arise in the everyday communicative 
contexts of social intercourse with others.  For Nietzsche, feelings both derive from and 
infect our communications with others; communications that are both rhetorical and 
historical.  Feelings are not only an auto-affective experience that happens inside the 
individual, but are bound up with „human relations‟ with others in the world that 
surround each individual person; and who, like it or not, for better or for worse, 
happiness or sadness, are or have been important to each individual‟s life. 
 On this point, there are few who are as important as our family members; our 
parents.  It is well-known that Nietzsche‟s father died when he was still a child.  The 
first lines of the first essay in Ecce Homo, „Why I Am So Wise‟, allude to this death: 
„The fortunateness of my existence, its uniqueness perhaps, lies in its fatality: to express 
it in the form of a riddle, as my father I have already died, as my mother I still live and 
grow old‟ (Nietzsche, 1992, p.8).  In his essay „Otobiographies: The Teaching of 
Nietzsche and the Politics of the Proper Name‟, in The Ear of the Other, Derrida alludes 
to this riddle in the first section of the essay, „Logic of the Living Feminine‟ – the title 
of which alludes to the mother in the riddle who lives and grows old.  But what does 
this riddle mean?  This chapter will draw in particular on Norris and Smith to aid in the 
interpretation of Derrida‟s relation to Nietzsche.  But first let us turn to Nietzsche in 
more detail. 
 
Autobiographical Riddles 
Nietzsche‟s first major book, The Birth of Tragedy, Out of the Spirit of Music, combined 
an influence from two major figures in German Romanticism.  On the one hand, 
Schopenhauer‟s interpretation of the human will, in The World as Will and 
Representation (Schopenhauer, 1969), as structured by painful experience in the event 
of the will‟s dissatisfaction; and on the other hand, Wagner‟s music-dramas as they 
were fuelled by the problems of human life posed by classical tragic drama.  Himself 
trained in classical philology, Nietzsche sought to combine these two figures into his 
own dramatic theory by synthesizing another two figures from ancient Greek tragedy: 
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Apollo and Dionysus.  In these two figures, Nietzsche calls for the „rebirth of tragedy‟ 
(in: Nietzsche, 1999, p.76), in which tragic drama offers radical insights into the nature 
of the moral and psychological predicaments of humankind.  As Nietzsche puts it in his 
essay written at a similar time to The Birth of Tragedy but unpublished in his lifetime, 
„The Dionysiac World View‟, Apollo and Dionysus are „stylistic opposites‟ (p.119) in 
ancient Greek art.  Apollo, the god who was given the temple at Delphi, is 
representative of the Delphic inscriptions: „know thyself‟ and „nothing in excess‟.  
Dionysus, the god who had a cult following at hedonistic festivals (comprised of satyrs 
and maenads), is in contrast representative of the opposite: forgetting oneself in an 
excess of pleasure. 
On the one hand, Apollo, as a god of prophesy and the sun, represents the dream 
of truth.  That is, prophesy is „the perfection of these dream-states‟ (in: Nietzsche, 1999, 
p.120); and sun is the beautiful light of truth: „The god of lovely semblance must be the 
god of true knowledge as well‟ (p.120).  Within this image of truth given in the dream, 
there is therefore a certain experience of pleasure, but it is the so-called higher pleasure 
gained from self-knowledge and self-control in the principle of individuation: „Apollo 
as the deification of the principium individuationis‟ (p.26).  The wisdom of Apollo is 
grounded in the self-knowledge and self-control that each individual must exercise in 
order to turn their reality into their dream; it becomes the taming of humankind.  That 
this transformation is prophesied becomes the basis of „Apolline optimism‟ (p.130).  On 
the other hand, Dionysus, as the god of the so-called lower pleasure of intoxicated 
ecstasy, represents the wild animal instincts of humankind.  But within this wild state, 
humankind is in a community of likeminded people who all lose themselves in the 
intoxicated ecstasy of the community in song and dance: „as they sing and dance, 
human beings express their membership of a higher, more ideal community‟ (p.120).  
And of course, not just song and dance, but sex: „Almost everywhere an excess of 
sexual indiscipline, which flooded in waves over all family life and its venerable 
statutes, lay at the heart of such festivals‟ (p.20).  In such a state, humans do not care for 
artistic images because they themselves have become the artworks: „What does he now 
care for images and statues?  Man is no longer an artist, he has become a work of art‟ 
(p.121).  In the Apollonian experience the individual becomes an example of a more 
general rule.  But in the Dionysian experience the individual becomes the creator and 
destroyer of rules themselves.  One creates the new rule and destroys the old.  One does 
not look on at images of awesome things; one becomes the awesome thing itself. 
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 Nietzsche‟s taste for the Apollonian, and for Schopenhauer and Wagner, occurs 
only in his early thought.  In Ecce Homo the chapter on The Birth of Tragedy begins by 
saying: „In order to be just to “The Birth of Tragedy” (1872) one will have to forget a 
few things‟ (Nietzsche, 1992, p.48).  From Human, All Too Human onwards, the 
Dionysiac life experience organizes the spirit of Nietzsche‟s thought; but what is so 
radical about his thought is his distinctive interpretation of Dionysiac philosophy.  For 
Nietzsche, the Dionysiac life experience is not merely about the promotion of a 
hedonistic philosophy.  It is also about how one interprets the human experience of the 
world before and after the pleasurable experience; for pleasurable experience is in its 
nature temporary.  Pleasurable experience is a short-term experience in the long-term of 
one‟s life history, which from a broader cosmological perspective is a really short 
history anyway; but in the context of the experience of pleasure and pain it can feel like 
a really long history because the pleasurable moments of life tend not to outweigh the 
painful ones.  Hence, in contrast to Apollonian optimism, Nietzsche‟s thought is 
grounded in Dionysian pessimism; but it is a particular sort of pessimism that he 
distinguishes from the „romantic pessimism‟ (Nietzsche, 1996, p.212) of Schopenhauer 
and Wagner, as he puts it in the „Preface‟ to the second volume of Human, All Too 
Human.  Traditionally speaking, pessimism is life-negating – whether in its „romantic‟ 
form or in its more Christian „ascetic‟ form, as Nietzsche puts it On the Genealogy of 
Morality (Nietzsche, 1994).  Nonetheless, it is more philosophically poignant than 
optimism; for optimism not only lacks insight regarding the moral and psychological 
predicaments of humankind, but also the manner of this lack is naive to the point of 
delusional in the face of the adversities thrown at us by life – such as physical and 
emotional pain, death, injustice, hatred, neglect, etc.  In its delusion, optimism is 
characteristic of the theological faith that something good will happen when there are 
little real world grounds for this faith. 
The paradoxical task Nietzsche sets himself is therefore the development of a 
form of pessimism that is instead life-affirming; this is what the name of Dionysus 
represents in his thought.  As does also, as he puts it in his „An Attempt at Self-
criticism‟, the preface to the second edition of The Birth of Tragedy, or: Hellenism and 
Pessimism (note also the changed subtitle): „that Dionysiac monster who bears the name 
Zarathustra‟ (in: Nietzsche, 1999, p.12).  Nietzsche is of course alluding to the 
character of his now infamous philosophical novel, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in which 
the founder of the Zoroastrian religion (the pre-Islamic religion of ancient Persia) is 
113 
 
fictionalized and reworked to tell a different story to mankind.  Not a story of the One 
God (Zoroastrianism is one of the oldest monotheisms), and of the polar opposites of 
good and evil: „Zoroastrians are highly optimistic, certain that good will prevail, and are 
determined to partake of this good through the highest moral ideals, and in the fight 
against evil in all its forms during their life on earth‟ (Gill, 1997, p.186).  But rather, a 
story of how „God is dead‟ (Nietzsche, 2003, p.41), and that the Superman must take his 
place: „I teach you the Superman.  Man is something that should be overcome‟ (p.41).  
Zarathustra becomes a preacher not of theological optimism; but rather of what, in the 
„Preface‟ to the second volume of Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche refers to as 
„courageous pessimism‟ (Nietzsche, 1996, p.211).  Indeed, in the book preceding Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, The Gay Science, where Nietzsche first refers to the death of God, 
he also refers to this courageous form of pessimism as „Dionysian pessimism‟ 
(Nietzsche, 1974, p.331). 
It is important to note, here, that Nietzsche is not a pessimistic philosopher.  
Courageous or Dionysian pessimism is no garden-variety pessimism.  It is not a weak 
pessimism that glances at the past in disgust, and at the future in despair, before 
spending the present wallowing in self-pity.  Rather, as Nietzsche puts it in „An Attempt 
at Self-criticism‟, it is „a pessimism of strength‟ (Nietzsche, 1999, p.4).  But what is 
that?  Which is to ask: What is the Superman?  In the same year that he wrote „An 
Attempt at Self-criticism‟ (1886), Nietzsche also wrote a new „Preface‟ to Human, All 
Too Human, in which he says: 
 
And, to speak seriously: to become sick in the manner of these free spirits, to remain sick for a long time 
and then, slowly, slowly, to become healthy, by which I mean „healthier‟, is a fundamental cure for all 
pessimism (the cancerous sore and inveterate vice, as is well known, of old idealists and inveterate liars).  
There is wisdom, practical wisdom, in for a long time prescribing even health for oneself only in small 
doses (Nietzsche, 1996, p.9). 
 
The subtitle of Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits designates the „free 
spirit‟ to which Nietzsche here refers, and which was a concept that was to remain 
throughout his later thought.  The Superman is the ideal free spirit.  As such, the 
concept of free spirit is not necessarily what one will associate with it today: i.e., having 
a carefree nature.  For one can have a carefree nature by virtue of one‟s own natural 
disposition without necessarily being a Superman in Nietzsche‟s sense.  The free spirit 
is rather the basis of Nietzsche‟s psychological insight insofar as this insight is directed 
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against the naive thinking implicit within the moralism contained in both our 
philosophical and our everyday judgements.  For Nietzsche, this moralism, which is 
more often than not a mode of optimism, has done humankind more harm than good.  
However, he also believes that pessimism is an easy way out for the weak-minded: the 
free spirit is thus „a fundamental cure for all pessimism‟.  Weak pessimism is unhealthy; 
in contrast, Nietzsche‟s strong pessimism has mental health as its goal.  But 
paradoxically, this health is prescribed „only in small doses‟ because, he argues, there is 
psychological wisdom in the effort to become healthy from a period of ill-health.  While 
metaphysical philosophy attempts to invent a „moral psychology‟, Nietzsche‟s thought 
partially juxtaposes morality and psychology, arguing that psychological insight 
undermines the moral insights that have traditionally dominated human civilizations.  
The free spirit is thus the basis of Nietzsche‟s transvaluation of values (Nietzsche, 
1994). 
A free spirit is one who can look at life for what it ultimately is: a tragedy 
involving not merely death but various negative effects of human relationships such as 
hatred and distaste, fear and cowardice, loneliness and solitude, deception and error, 
bullying and neglect, in a word unhappiness in all its forms.  The problem he poses is 
the need to still affirm life even when taking its tragic contexts into account.  Nietzsche 
is not a pessimistic philosopher, but a tragic philosopher; as he puts it in Ecce Homo, in 
the chapter „The Birth of Tragedy‟: „In this sense I have the right to understand myself 
as the first tragic philosopher – that is to say the extremist antithesis and antipodes of a 
pessimistic philosopher‟ (Nietzsche, 1992, p.51).  The Superman is one who has the 
strength to face the darker side of life and appear unafraid; perhaps even sometimes to 
laugh in the face of danger – if the Superman‟s favourite colour of sadness is purple, 
„purple melancholy‟ (Nietzsche, 2003, p.240), then perhaps his favourite colour of 
humour is black.  For Nietzsche, it is precisely naivety to the darker side of human 
relationships that causes their failure; and the free spirit represents his attempt to 
counteract this naivety.  In Human, All Too Human the concept of the free spirit is 
introduced in the fifth chapter, „Tokens of Higher and Lower Culture‟: 
 
In any event, however, what characterizes the free spirit is not that his opinions are the more correct but 
that he has liberated himself from tradition, whether the outcome has been successful or a failure.  As a 
rule, though, he will nonetheless have truth on his side, or at least the spirit of inquiry after truth: he 
demands reasons, the rest demand faith (Nietzsche, 1996, p.108). 
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The unfree spirit, what Nietzsche calls the „fettered spirit‟ (p.108), passively goes 
through the motions of their daily routine without consideration for the conditions in 
which the routine itself has formed into its present existence – and so they do not seek 
improvement or betterment of their living conditions for the future.  It is precisely 
because the free spirit acts in the name of this improvement that Nietzsche says that he 
has „truth on his side‟.  It is not that the free spirit has no routine, but that they actively 
make continual improvements to it such that it never remains the same routine; for it is 
constantly changing and evolving. 
Nietzsche‟s names or nicknames for the „free spirit‟ are Dionysus, Zarathustra, 
and Superman.  The spirit of the free spirit rests in the will to become a genius.  
Mediocrity is not an option for the Superman.  In this rests Nietzsche‟s pro-individualist 
anti-socialism, as he puts it in „Tokens of Higher and Lower Culture‟: 
 
The Socialists desire to create a comfortable life for as many as possible.  If the enduring homeland of 
this comfortable life, the perfect state, were really to be attained, then this comfortable life would destroy 
the soil out of which great intellect and the powerful individual in general grows: by which I mean great 
energy (Nietzsche, 1996, p.112). 
 
For Nietzsche, a „comfortable life‟ is the origin of mediocrity, and „unfavourable 
circumstances‟ (p.115) are the origin of genius as the individual must strive to 
overcome the adversity posed by these circumstances, and in the process overcome 
themselves.  In this rests the paradoxical moral problem for humankind that his 
philosophical psychology of the all-too-human poses.  On the one hand, one can work 
to rid the world of the worst evils of human inequalities of power, but in so doing one 
will also rid the world of the conditions which facilitate genius, which is also one of the 
conditions for some of the greatest goods in the world.  Or on the other hand, one can 
preserve the conditions which facilitate genius, and so the condition that facilitates some 
of the greatest goods, but at the expense of maintaining the greatest evils of the world.  
At the same time, Nietzsche is sceptical of the concept of „genius‟ because it is an 
enigmatic term whose objectivity is questionable due to the role played by individual 
judgement and taste.  Indeed, the designation „genius‟ also hides the force of becoming 
which underpins the formation of the artist‟s work, as he puts it in the chapter in 
Human, All Too Human, „From the Souls of Artists and Writers‟: „But no one can see in 
the work of the artist how it has become; that is its advantage, for wherever one can see 
the act of becoming one grows somewhat cool‟ (p.86). 
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By referring to Nietzsche‟s thought as „pro-individualist‟, this should not be 
confused, as socialists might be inclined to think, as complicity with individualism in 
the modern democratic-capitalist sense: i.e., with an emphasis both on the autonomy of 
the individual in private affairs and on the individual as an agent for profit-producing 
consumerism for privately owned businesses in public affairs.  Instead, it is meant 
merely in the existential, and therefore psychological (as distinct from politico-
economic), sense of a concern for the predicaments that occur in the life of the 
individual.  Here, existentialism is one of the key (post)modern philosophies for 
understanding human subjectivity in biographical and autobiographical terms.  As 
Nietzsche puts it in the final chapter of the first volume of Human, All Too Human, 
„Man Alone with Himself‟: „No matter how far a man may extend himself with his 
knowledge, no matter how objectively he may come to view himself, in the end it can 
yield to him nothing but his own biography‟ (Nietzsche, 1996, p.182).  Whatever may 
be the problems, from a deconstructive perspective, with „the humanist-existentialist 
version of autobiography‟ (Smith, 1995, p.55) that Robert Smith addresses in Derrida 
and Autobiography, I think it is important here to make a distinction.  On the one hand, 
where Nietzsche‟s existential philosophy in the broader critical context of the history of 
metaphysical philosophy becomes complicit with and allied to Derrida‟s deconstructive 
philosophy; and on the other hand, where the subsequent and more recent history of a 
literary-critical popularization of humanist-existentialism within the newly developed 
genre of autobiographical theory is understood to contain metaphysical prejudices that 
require deconstructive literary criticism.  In the part of Derrida and Autobiography that 
matters most, „Clarifying Autobiography‟, it is suspicious that, on the one hand, Smith‟s 
first chapter in this part, „Worstward Ho: Some Recent Theories‟, positions 
deconstruction against existential-humanism while being inconveniently unclear about 
the essentialism/existentialism divide.  And on the other hand, in the second chapter of 
this part, „Labyrinths‟, he is very wary about distinguishing Nietzsche from Derrida 
even though in the previous chapter he took a zealous attitude against existentialism. 
Having made a distinction, then, between existentialism in the context of the 
history of metaphysical philosophy and existentialism in the context of the history of 
literary-critical autobiographical theory (the latter of which is considerably more recent 
and so covers a considerably shorter timescale), it becomes important to return to 
Nietzsche‟s aesthetic philosophy.  For the aesthetic ideas contained in his existentialist 
perspective in fact underpin deconstructive literary criticism.  The chapter in Human, 
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All Too Human, „From the Souls of Artists and Writers‟, is here a useful starting point.  
For Nietzsche, art is paradoxical.  On the one hand, generically throughout world 
history and specifically in German Romanticism it has become infected with a 
metaphysical hankering after the lost presence, perfection and goodness of humanity.  
The chapter begins by saying: „In the case of everything perfect we are accustomed to 
abstain from asking how it became: we rejoice in the present fact as though it came out 
of the ground by magic‟ (Nietzsche, 1996, p.80).  Nietzsche thus poses the question of 
becoming to the idea of artistic genius.  In posing this question, art is shown in the 
service of metaphysics: 
 
It is not without profound sorrow that one admits to oneself that in their highest flights the artists of all 
ages have raised to heavenly transfiguration precisely those conceptions which we now recognize as 
false: they are the glorifiers of religious and philosophical errors of mankind, and they could not have 
been so without believing in the absolute truth of these errors (p.102). 
 
It is interesting to note the way in which Nietzsche begins here: „It is not without 
profound sorrow‟.  Having had his intellectual upbringing in the culture of German 
Romanticism, in which art provided the means of escape from the harsh realities of the 
world, it must have hurt Nietzsche to consider the possibility that artists had become the 
„glorifiers‟ of metaphysical prejudice. 
On the other hand, through the question of becoming art is now representative of 
the symbolic world: it symbolizes the symbolic world; it becomes representative of the 
world of representation.  As Nietzsche says in „From the Souls of Artists and Writers‟:  
 
The finished and perfect art of representation repulses all thinking as to how it has become; it tyrannizes 
as present completeness and perfection.  That is why the masters of the art of representation count above 
all as gifted with genius and why men of science do not.  In reality, this evaluation of the former and 
undervaluation of the latter is only a piece of childishness in the realm of reason (Nietzsche, 1996, p.86). 
 
If the task of art is to represent reality, then the medium of its representation can no 
longer be considered neutral because of the metaphysical errors it has depicted.  Once 
this neutrality disappears, the relation of representation to the reality that it depicts no 
longer occurs in a straight line.  Interpretation becomes necessary, and reality becomes 
caught up the complex web of cultural systems of representation; systems which 
themselves require complex forms of interpretation so as to decode the codes that 
representation implies.  This returns us to Nietzsche‟s emphasis on language as 
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metaphor and rhetoric because metaphor supplies the code and rhetoric supplies the 
technical tools to decode the metaphorical codes of language.  For Nietzsche, the rule of 
rhetoric in the everyday life of human beings is part of what makes life so difficult to 
live, because it involves, as he put it in „On Truth and Lying in a Non-moral Sense‟, the 
„art of dissimulation‟ (in: Nietzsche, 1999, p.142).  The art of dissimulation involves 
various negative qualities of social interaction: „deception, flattery, lying and cheating, 
speaking behind the backs of others, keeping up appearances, living in borrowed finery, 
wearing masks, the drapery of convention, play-acting for the benefit of others and 
oneself‟ (p.142).  It is in the context of these negative qualities of social interaction that 
Nietzsche directs his demystification of the all-too-human to some of the key moral and 
psychological problems encountered in human relationships. 
 One of the key components of Nietzsche‟s understanding of rhetorical language 
is that it is infected with power.  If Clausewitz (1997) said that politics is war by other 
means, then Nietzsche‟s argument is that rhetoric is the politics of everyday life.  
Rhetoric is not physical warfare, but rather is psychological warfare in a war of words.  
Of course, while such wars can be fought in open dispute and disagreement, they can 
also be more subtle; saturated with insinuation.  Nietzsche‟s insight here is not a 
question of denouncing the workings of rhetoric itself.  Rather, as he argues in the 
chapter in Human, All Too Human, „On the History of the Moral Sensations‟, it is a 
question of demystifying the covert sadism and schadenfreude that can underpin the 
social intercourse of human relations: 
 
In the conversations of social life, three-quarters of all questions are asked, three-quarters of all answers 
given, in order to cause just a little pain to the other party; that is why many people have such thirst for 
social life: it makes them aware of their strength.  In such countless but very small doses in which malice 
makes itself felt it is a powerful stimulant to life: just as benevolence, disseminated through the human 
world in the same form, is the ever available medicine. – But will there be many honest men prepared to 
admit that causing pain gives pleasure? that one not seldom entertains oneself – and entertains oneself 
well – by mortifying other people, at least in one‟s own mind, and by firing off at them the grapeshot of 
petty malice? (Nietzsche, 1996, p.39). 
 
When social life is organized by such „conversations‟, saturated with negativity, it 
becomes necessary – for those free spirits who cannot keep up the pretence without 
going mad, or at least getting very stressed and upset – to temporarily escape from the 
hubbub of social life and find solace in solitude.  This is what, in „Tokens of Higher and 
Lower Culture‟, Nietzsche calls „the genius of meditation‟ (p.132).  At any rate, this is 
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one of his most pervasive psychological recommendations: if the alliance with another 
is already broken with little hope of fixing it, then sever it completely and try to actively 
forget it so that you have the space to get on with your own life in a more affirmative 
manner.  In this recommendation is the Dionysian philosophy of creation through 
destruction.  Of course, life circumstances can dictate that this may not always be 
possible or practical.  But if it is doable, in the long run it can be healthier for oneself; 
and as he puts it in the „Preface‟ to Human, All Too Human, it is this „will to health‟ 
(p.8) that directs his interpretation of the free spirit.  Much like in Augustine and 
Rousseau, the connection is made between moral problems and the problems of 
psychological health.  However, in Nietzsche‟s thought it is the underlying Dionysian 
foundation of this connection that is different and that makes it radical – and as we saw 
earlier, his prescription for health in small doses means that the will to health is only 
necessary in unhealthy circumstances. 
 Before turning to Derrida‟s relation to Nietzsche, and returning to the riddle 
from Nietzsche‟s Ecce Homo that this chapter began with, let us briefly consider Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra.  Two insights made by Zarathustra are in particular a fundamental 
feature of Nietzsche‟s conceptual repertoire: will to power and eternal recurrence.  The 
concept of will to power, which is articulated in the section „Of Self-overcoming‟, is 
distinguished from two other sorts of will: the will to truth of the classical philosophers, 
and the will to life articulated in more recent thinkers like Schopenhauer and Darwin.  
At stake in these latter two concepts is an account of what it is that drives human nature 
(knowledge and survival).  For Nietzsche, it is rather the will to power which is the 
most powerful force of human nature: „The will of the weaker persuades it to serve the 
stronger; its will wants to be master over those weaker still: this delight alone it is 
unwilling to forego‟ (Nietzsche, 2003, p.138).  Because the will to power is a force 
within oneself, it is oneself that is to be overcome – hence the term „self-overcoming‟.  
One only balances power by first balancing the will to power within oneself.  But to 
balance power within oneself takes a considerable amount of willpower on one‟s own 
behalf: i.e., paradoxically the will to power becomes directed against itself as one is 
pitted against oneself as if in a war.  For Nietzsche, to manage this war within oneself 
effectively involves affirmation of what one has become in one‟s own life; an 
affirmation that is contained in the concept of eternal recurrence, which is articulated in 
the section „The convalescent‟. 
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Like in Buddhism, the wisdom of Zarathustra is that life is suffering: „I, 
Zarathustra, the advocate of life, the advocate of suffering‟ (Nietzsche, 2003, p.233).  
The wisdom of concept of eternal recurrence is the wisdom that it becomes necessary to 
affirm life, to affirm one‟s own life, as if one were to live it identically over and over 
again to infinity – with all of the pain it has thrown at us.  It is to know thyself as one 
has felt and dealt with painful events, and still say „Yes‟ to life.  Truly a task for the 
Superman, Nietzsche becomes the advocate of the tragic affirmation of one‟s life 
without self-pity.  The self-knowledge that he advocates is not therefore to know who 
one is in one‟s essence, but rather is that given in biographical knowledge: i.e., of 
knowing what one has become in one‟s life and in one‟s reactions to its events, as the 
subtitle says to Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is.  Nietzsche does not avoid 
the „who‟ altogether, indeed the „Foreword‟ to Ecce Homo begins with reference to it in 
the fact that it is his autobiography: „Seeing that I must shortly approach mankind with 
the heaviest demand that has ever been made on it, it seems to me indispensible to say 
who I am‟ (Nietzsche, 1992, p.3).  It is not that there is no essence, but paradoxically 
that essence has become.  In the chapter „Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone 
and No One‟ in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche says: „The whole of Zarathustra might perhaps 
be reckoned as music; – certainly a rebirth of the art of hearing was a precondition of it‟ 
(p.69).  The fact that Nietzsche‟s Dionysian philosophy is based on this rebirth is 
something that Derrida addresses in The Ear of the Other and elsewhere.  So let us turn 
now to Derrida‟s undoubtedly Nietzschean interpretation of Nietzsche (for any 
Derridean interpretation of Derrida must account for his Nietzschean interpretation of 
Nietzsche). 
As we have seen, from Human, All Too Human to Ecce Homo Nietzsche‟s 
thought is concerned with the (auto)biographical not merely as a mode of self-
knowledge, but more generally as a mode of self-relation: i.e., in which one does not 
merely possess a disinterested self-knowledge, but where one has an interested stake in 
the self-improvement of one‟s life.  In his thought is undoubtedly a sceptical response to 
a Rousseau-inspired Romantic autobiography, prevalent in his day, in which the 
individual is considered naturally good but becomes corrupted by the responsibilities 
and pressures of unnatural modes of relation taught in the cultures of civil society.  Such 
is the „fettered spirit‟ in Nietzsche‟s own thought, which perhaps highlights the 
influence of Romanticism within it.  However, there is much that he would be crit ical of 
in Romantic autobiography, and by the time of Ecce Homo he explicitly mocks what he 
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interprets as an egocentric self-congratulatory attitude at work in autobiographical 
writing.  This occurs in the titles of the three opening chapters – „Why I Am So Wise‟, 
„Why I Am So Clever‟, and „Why I Write Such Good Books‟ – which also, ironically, 
repeat the very thing that they mock.  But one needs finely-tuned ears in order to hear 
this silent irony, and this is something that Derrida addresses near the beginning of his 
essay on Nietzsche in The Ear of the Other, „Otobiographies‟.  Speaking of 
autobiography Derrida says: „I must ask you to shift its sense a little and listen to it with 
another ear.  I wish to take a certain pleasure in this, so that you may learn this pleasure 
from me‟ (Derrida, 1988a, p.4).  Here we can see Derrida‟s Nietzschean mode of 
teaching: where the teacher asks their pupils to listen to what they say at the present 
time so as to understand at some future time what was meant when the pupil has taken 
the time to think for themselves about what was meant (an „active‟ hearing). 
What Derrida offers particularly in the first part of „Otobiographies‟, „Logic of 
the Living Feminine‟, is a Nietzschean elaboration on the theme of autobiography, in 
which it is asked of us „to shift its sense a little and listen to it with another ear‟.  But 
what ear?  Let us consider a couple of Derrida‟s scholars on The Ear of the Other in 
order to consider this point: Christopher Norris‟s essay „Deconstruction Against Itself: 
Derrida and Nietzsche‟, and Robert Smith‟s chapter in Derrida and Autobiography, 
„Labyrinths‟.  In „Deconstruction Against Itself‟ Norris addresses the Anglo-American 
reception of deconstruction into the institution of literary criticism, in which Nietzsche‟s 
inclination for metaphor and rhetoric is often cited as the overriding inspiration for 
Derrida‟s own thought.  He thereby emphasizes the meaning of the „teaching of 
Nietzsche‟ in Derrida‟s subtitle to „Otobiographies‟ as referring to the teaching 
institution.  Indeed, there is textual warrant for this interpretation as the second part of 
„Otobiographies‟, „The Otograph Sign of State‟, moves from a reading of Ecce Homo to 
a reading of a much lesser-known book by Nietzsche called On the Future of Our 
Educational Institutions (Nietzsche, 2004).  In „Otobiographies‟ as a whole there is, 
then, a curious interconnection of the autobiographical and political themes of Derrida‟s 
thought, which hinges on the idea of teaching (particularly regarding the problem of 
how to teach Nietzsche‟s in the context of his appropriation by the Nazis) – although, of 
course, the political aspect of the essay is not the concern here.  Likewise, Norris‟s 
interpretation does not concern itself with the autobiographical dimension of 
„Otobiographies‟, and so its influence here can only be marginal.  As such, his 
interpretation of „the ear‟ in Derrida‟s reading of Nietzsche is given political rather than 
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psychological significance: „What emerges from this reading is a series of ambivalent 
but intensely political meditations on “the ear,” developing the theme of cultural 
decadence brought about by the overdependence on passive hearing‟ (Norris, 1986, 
p.64).  Later on I will instead argue for a more psychological emphasis on the Derrida‟s 
notion of the ear. 
But Norris‟s essay does offer more general arguments regarding the relation 
between Nietzsche and Derrida that it is useful to consider briefly.  In particular, Norris 
uses the opportunity of Derrida‟s discussion of the problems of how to teach Nietzsche 
with his own discussion of the problems of how to teach Derrida.  These are problems 
that have multiplied as a result of Derrida‟s assimilation into the discipline of literary 
criticism, in which it is the „rhetorical‟ Nietzsche that has been most appealing: 
 
For there is one version of Nietzsche that has proved highly acceptable to adepts of deconstruction, 
including (previously) Derrida himself.  This is the „rhetorical‟ Nietzsche, arch-debunker of Western 
metaphysics, he who undermined the truth-claims of philosophy from Socrates to Hegel by insisting that 
all concepts came down to metaphors in the end; that „truth‟ itself was merely a product of our willing 
bewitchment by language, or our subjection to the vast, unrecognized powers of tropological persuasion 
(Norris, 1986, p.62). 
 
In such a context Norris suggests that Nietzsche‟s own concepts, such as will to power 
and eternal recurrence, become „dangerous themes‟ (p.62) for a deconstruction 
appropriated to literary criticism – for the force of their very conceptuality would 
construct an impasse with the force of Nietzsche‟s metaphorical insight, an impasse 
between philosophy and literature rather than the victory of the latter over the former.  
The latter‟s victory he understands as a correct reading of the „rhetorical‟ Nietzsche but 
a misreading of Derrida, particularly in the light of The Ear of the Other, where he says: 
„it is important to see how Derrida has shifted his ground in relation to Nietzsche‟ 
(p.68).  Derrida might „(previously)‟, in his early work, particularly „Structure, Sign, 
and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences‟, „the text most often cited by Anglo-
American converts to the cause‟ (p.62), have been amenable to the „rhetorical‟ 
Nietzsche, but in The Ear of the Other „Derrida has shifted his ground‟.  But if Derrida 
has shifted his ground, were there not also grounds for the literary critical interpretation 
of his thought? 
As for Nietzsche, it would seem that the main problem for Norris is that he is 
offered as one of the grounds for modern or postmodern irrationalism (one of the main 
charges made against Derrida‟s thought).  Norris argues that in The Ear of the Other 
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Derrida‟s reading of Nietzsche, „blocks the way to any straightforward indictment of 
Nietzsche, any reading that attempts (like Lukacs in The Destruction of Reason) to 
identify his thought as the source and inspiration of modern irrationalism‟ (Norris, 
1986, p.66).  At this point, coming towards the end of his essay, Norris invokes the 
reading of Nietzsche given by Richard Rorty, arguing that: „Rorty‟s is a thoroughly 
Nietzschean reading of Derrida, if the name “Nietzsche” is taken to signify a break with 
all received (enlightened) ideas of argumentative consistency and truth‟ (pp.66-67).  For 
Norris, Rorty‟s interpretation of Derrida is the one that has done the most damage since 
it is both pro-Derrida and pro-irrational (or at least, it blocks the conditions to any 
rational argument); and it is therefore the interpretation that has facilitated Derrida‟s 
appropriation into the discourse of literary criticism that avoids the philosophical 
significance of his thought.  Personally, I think that what Norris is really good at doing 
is highlighting the tensions that are prevalent in the discipline of deconstructive enquiry 
and research.  But I do not think that The Ear of the Other represents a „shift‟ in 
Derrida‟s thought from an early Derrida who was an advocate of Nietzsche‟s apparent 
eristic irrationalism to a later Derrida who was not an advocate.  I think that the impasse 
between literary rhetoric and philosophical concept was always there in Derrida‟s 
thought – and indeed, was always there in Nietzsche‟s thought also. 
Norris seems to spend his time arguing: defending Derrida‟s philosophical 
thought against either its attacks from more traditional rationalist philosophers or its 
assimilation into a form of literary criticism which may have become a representative of 
eclectic postmodern irrationalism (although the danger in this latter judgement is that 
„literary criticism‟ becomes a sort of straw man).  But it is often better, not to mention 
better for oneself (i.e., healthier), to forget petty arguments and instead spend your time 
constructing what you yourself think is the philosophical significance of a thinker.  
What Norris seems to forget is that the subtitle to „Otobiographies‟ which says the 
„teaching of Nietzsche‟ can also refer to Nietzsche‟s own philosophical teaching 
regarding the psychological problems of humankind.  If The Ear of the Other is 
understood in this context, then Derrida‟s own philosophical thinking is significant 
because it becomes an heir of precisely these problems: problems which, as the present 
study is arguing, find their point of application in his conceptualization of 
autobiography.  Let us turn, then, to Smith‟s chapter in Derrida and Autobiography, 
„Labyrinths‟.  In biological science the word „labyrinth‟ is a name given to the twisting 
passages of the inner ear, and so Smith structures his chapter into thirteen sections all 
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entitled „turning‟ but distinguished numerically.  Before the „First Turning‟, he begins 
the chapter by saying: „Having in the previous chapter [„Worstward Ho‟] made some 
general remarks about autobiography today, I would like now to look at Derrida‟s 
reading of two specific autobiographical texts, Nietzsche‟s Ecce Homo and Michael 
Leiris‟s Biffures‟ (Smith, 1995, p.75).  Derrida‟s reading of the latter text occurs in one 
of his earliest considerations of the ear, „Tympan‟ in Margins of Philosophy.  Again 
from biology, the word „tympanum‟ refers to the eardrum, which separates the outer ear 
from the middle ear. 
Smith begins with reference to the problem of hearing-oneself-speak, the 
metaphysical problem of self-presence and self-identity via auto-affection, that 
Derrida‟s thought poses.  If, on the one hand, „auto-affection as “presence” and “life” 
are practically synonymous‟ (Smith, 1995, p.77), then on the other hand, as Smith puts 
it a moment later: „Presence will be at the heart of autobiography (a form of “the history 
of life”) considered as a subjectivism‟ (p.77).  In other words, Derrida‟s 
autobiographical thought must first call into question the problem of subjectivism 
within the very idea of autobiography itself.  Since this problem hinges on the motif of 
hearing-oneself-speak, the critical questioning of subjectivism in autobiography must 
address the problem of the ear.  The selfsameness of human subjectivity becomes called 
into question in the necessity of communication with others: „In order for the ear to get 
its message back from the mouth it must run the risk of allowing that message to be 
broadcast beyond the circle of self‟ (p.78).  Hearing-oneself-speak cannot guarantee the 
self-presence of human subjectivity because the voices we hear even inside our own 
head can always be those of the others around us who are part of our lives, and who 
form part of our life history: „a chance alterity associates itself with subjectivity at its 
origin‟ (p.78).  Once this „chance alterity‟ becomes inscribed into human subjectivity, 
there rests the problem of communication between self and other.  If autobiography is to 
do anything, it must address the history of the communications and relationships that 
one has had with others in one‟s life – which is less of an auto-affection and more of a 
hetero-affection.  It is one thing to discuss, as Rousseau does, how one oneself feels; but 
when those feelings are themselves an effect of one‟s communications in one‟s 
relationships, or at least so intricately bound up with them such that one does not know 
what is the cause and what is the effect, to do justice to autobiography it becomes 
necessary to consider the mode of communication rather than the truth of one‟s feelings.  
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It is out of consideration for this mode of communication that Smith finds the 
significance of Derrida‟s neologism of otobiographies, a term which synthesizes 
„autobiography‟ with „otology‟ (the science of the ear).  Smith says: „Otobiographies is 
written in the plural, for the circuit from mouth to ear is also an a priori open or public 
thoroughfare, the messages sent along it taking the form not so much of a sealed and 
esoteric letter as a postcard for all and sundry to read‟ (Smith, 1995, p.78).  In other 
words, autobiography is riddled with the problem of documenting the communications 
that one has had with others in one‟s life; and as such, is less concerned with hearing-
oneself-speak and more concerned with hearing-others-speak; through which arises the 
further problem of miscommunication.  This invokes the altogether Nietzschean 
problem of perspective and interpretation.  For autobiography is not merely one‟s own 
life story (i.e., it is not merely biography), but rather is a story that is told from one‟s 
own perspective.  The problem is that since each and every one of us is capable of 
telling our own life story (indeed cannot live without doing so), there arises the problem 
of understanding what is communicated, for what is communicated is done so from a 
particular perspective but is interpreted from another‟s perspective.  In autobiography, I 
might tell myself my life – „And so I tell myself my life‟ (Nietzsche, 1992, p.7), as 
Nietzsche puts it in his brief prologue, „On This Perfect Day...‟ – but particularly in 
everyday life, it is not necessarily me who is listening: „Listen to me! for I am thus and 
thus.  Do not, above all, confound me with what I am not!‟ (p.3), as Nietzsche puts it in 
his „Forward‟.  I will return to Smith in a moment, but I would first like to consider the 
significance of this latter citation from Nietzsche. 
In this latter citation, Nietzsche is saying, to paraphrase: please do not 
misunderstand me, for being misunderstood is what I hate the most about social 
intercourse with others when they do not take the necessary time to reaffirm back to me 
what I affirm about myself, and instead respond with a negation of me as they try to 
mould me in their own image (much like a thoughtless family member).  This is why, 
for Nietzsche, despite the problem of perspective that it poses, the idea of autobiography 
also carries significant utility: it gives one the space and the opportunity to become 
oneself; that is, so that one can begin to affirm oneself instead of being constantly 
moulded by others.  Autobiography is not for others but is for me, as Derrida says of 
Nietzsche in The Ear of the Other: „He indeed says: I tell my life to myself; I recite and 
recount it thus for me‟ (Derrida, 1988a, p.12).  When Derrida asks us to hear the very 
idea of autobiography with another ear, the ear of the other, he does so from a 
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Nietzschean perspective that holds in reserve the affirmative space of becoming-oneself 
in the context of the negation of others.  And yet, for Derrida it logically follows that 
one oneself is also capable of giving others the very negation that one does not like to 
receive from them; and so his phrase „the ear of the other‟ becomes a proposition of 
communication ethics in which one must become sensitive to the other‟s otherness – 
which is an extravagant way of saying that one must remember to consider things from 
the other‟s perspective.  As such, The Ear of the Other articulates a paradoxical relation 
to Nietzsche: on the one hand, Nietzsche‟s own position is adopted wholeheartedly; on 
the other hand, Derrida supplements Nietzsche‟s position with his own, such that it 
becomes impossible to say that he wholeheartedly adopts Nietzsche‟s position.  This 
simultaneous adoption and supplementation of Nietzsche is seen in Derrida‟s double-
affirmative structure: „yes, yes, amen, amen‟ (p.14). 
Against Norris, I would argue that this does not mean that there has been a 
„shift‟ from Derrida‟s early statements on Nietzsche compared with what is said in The 
Ear of the Other.  For the very term „deconstruction‟ already implies this simultaneous 
adoption and supplementation of Nietzsche.  On the one hand, deconstruction can be 
construed as a synthesis of the two aspects of Dionysian philosophy of construction 
through destruction.  On the other hand, deconstruction can also be construed, qua 
synthesis, as somewhat less spontaneous and more thoughtful than the purely Dionysian 
free spirit.  That is, in Derrida‟s adoption of the Dionysian philosophy from Nietzsche 
there remains a trace of the Apollonian which supplements it; and so it becomes a 
matter of ad hoc judgement which attitude best suits which circumstances.  Indeed, this 
is also what Smith implicitly argues in the „Fifth Turning‟: „A convergence of 
Dionysian frenzy and discord with Apollonian orderliness and regulation forms the 
marriage circle‟ (Smith, 1995, p.83).  However, Smith‟s argument on this point is at 
times quite unclear.  For example, when, in the „Eighth Turning‟, he discusses Derrida‟s 
relation to Zarathustra, on the one hand he says: „Zarathustra is antithetical, an 
“Antichrist” whose vocation is opposition.  Despite Nietzsche‟s refrain that he is 
opposed to dialectics, Zarathustra‟s position remains dialectical, ironically perhaps, by 
doing just that‟ (p.88).  But on the other hand, a moment later he says: „Derrida is more 
non-dialectical than anti-dialectical – but then, so perhaps was Zarathustra, whose 
opposition was an opposition beyond opposition, an overturning of the pig-headedness 
and vulgarity of the affront‟ (p.88).  Is Zarathustra „non-dialectical‟ or „anti-dialectical‟?  
And given Derrida‟s thought is so influenced by dialectical manoeuvres, is it right to 
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hastily characterize it as „non-dialectical‟?  In what way is it „non-dialectical‟?  As 
Gasché pithily notes in his chapter „Deconstructive Methodology‟ in The Tain of the 
Mirror, regarding dialectics Derridean deconstruction: „maintains contradiction and 
resists its sublation into a higher unity‟ (Gasché, 1986, p.151).  As such, it depends on 
precisely what is meant by the term „dialectical‟. 
If „dialectical‟ is merely, and perhaps more colloquially, the initial moment of 
juxtaposition, and the paradoxical impasse that results, then deconstruction could 
perhaps be termed „dialectical‟ rather than „non-dialectical‟.  The „sublation into a 
higher unity‟ to which Gasché refers is a more technical philosophical definition arising 
in particular from the thought of Plato and Hegel.  Indeed, the „dialectic‟, or in Derrida‟s 
term „aporia‟ (which acts as an intermediary, without sublation, between the very 
opposition dialectic/non-dialectic), between temporality and structure is a notable one in 
Derrida‟s thought; and it is one that Smith himself alludes to in his interpretation of 
Nietzsche‟s riddle concerning the mother and the father.  After quoting this riddle 
himself, in the „Fourth Turning‟ Smith says: 
 
Otobiographies writes itself out across this quotation.  There is a relation of two things – two 
chronologies, rather – which, through the figure of the child, both belong to and are separable from each 
other.  One (the mother) is the figure of a temporal excess over the other (the father).  Though temporal, 
the excess exists not in time, for that would be to become subject to mortality.  It pertains rather to a 
„structure‟ of temporal difference, embodied in the child, between the time of the mother and that of the 
father.  As structural, it is infinite and ageless.  But it is also finite in that it is a structure (Smith, 1995, 
p.80). 
 
Smith is quite insightful here, for a few reasons.  Firstly, he highlights how the riddle is 
made from the perspective of „the child‟; since the riddle is made with reference to the 
mother and the father, it becomes as if it were articulated by their child.  This, of course, 
is not to say that the child in question is still a child: perhaps they have passed on into 
adolescence or even adulthood; nonetheless they remain „the child‟ of their parents 
(such is the anachronism contained in the very concept of „child‟ as it transgresses the 
biological stage of „childhood‟).  Secondly, since the father is identified with death and 
the mother with life, there is „a temporal excess‟ of the latter over the former.  And 
thirdly, this temporal excess is argued, by Derrida, to be a structural feature of 
temporality itself; and therefore „exists not in time‟, but rather as the essence of time, or 
perhaps rather as the essence of the so-called human experience of time. 
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So far the opposition of self/other has been emphasized in the interpretation 
given here of The Ear of the Other.  Before concluding, I will consider in more detail 
this temporal structure in the opposition life/death that Derrida addresses from 
Nietzsche‟s riddle in „Otobiographies‟.  This will deepen what Smith says above, since 
he does not stay on this point for very long.  Indeed, Derrida refers to his account in 
„Logic of the Living Feminine‟ as a „discourse on life/death‟ (Derrida, 1988a, p.4).  
Underlying this discourse is Nietzsche‟s emphasis on ill-health, as he explains 
immediately following the articulation of his riddle: 
 
This twofold origin, as it were from the highest and the lowest rung of the ladder of life, at once decadent 
and beginning – this if anything explains that neutrality, that freedom from party in relation to the total 
problem of life which perhaps distinguishes me.  I have a subtler sense for signs of ascent and decline 
than any man has ever had, I am the teacher par excellence in this matter – I know both, I am both. – My 
father died at the age of thirty-six: he was delicate, lovable and morbid, like a being destined to pay this 
world only a passing visit – a gracious reminder of life rather than life itself.  In the same year in which 
his life declined mine too declined: in the thirty-sixth year of my life I arrived at the lowest point of my 
vitality – I still lived, but without being able to see three paces in front of me (Nietzsche, 1992, p.8). 
 
In this extract, also cited by Derrida, Nietzsche invokes ill-health, his own but also in 
general, as the intermediary between life and death: ill-health is why life is never full(y) 
life.  Life is never life itself pure and simple („of life rather than life itself‟), and is 
therefore why death becomes inscribed within it a priori: life and death become allies.  
As Derrida says: „The alliance that Nietzsche follows in turning his signature into 
riddles links the logic of the dead to that of the living feminine‟ (Derrida, 1988a, p.17). 
 Throughout the bulk of world history, it has been the husband who has left home 
to work or to fight wars and the wife who has stayed at home to nurture the family.  The 
family structure is at once the underlying fabric of so-called „civil society‟ as that which 
gives it its power, and is powerless or passive in relation to the cultural traditions of 
civil society itself.  But when the alliance between life and death represents the divide 
between mother and father, that which holds so-called „family life‟ together becomes 
that which breaks it apart (which is also to juxtapose the civil with the uncivil; for in 
civilization civility begins at home).  In a strange statement, something along these lines 
seems to be going on in how Derrida interprets Nietzsche‟s riddle with respect to the 
trajectory of his own thought: 
 
Elsewhere, I have related this elementary kinship structure (of a dead or rather absent father, already 
absent to himself, and of the mother living above and after all, living on long enough to bury the one she 
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has brought into the world, an ageless virgin inaccessible to all ages) to a logic of the death knell (glas) 
and of obsequence.  There are examples of this logic in some of the best families, for example, the family 
of Christ (with whom Dionysus stands face to face, but as his specular double).  There is also Nietzsche‟s 
family, if one considers that the mother survived the „breakdown‟.  In sum and in general, if one „sets 
aside all the facts‟, the logic can be found in all families (Derrida, 1988a, pp.17-18). 
 
Derrida can „set aside all the facts‟ here because, although Nietzsche is speaking of his 
own family, he is doing so, as he puts it a moment earlier: „symbolically, by way of a 
riddle: in other words, in the form of a proverbial legend, and as a story that has a lot to 
teach‟ (p.16).  Because the riddle is symbolic the brute facts of each individual‟s family 
life do not matter – perhaps it is the mother who dies before the father (as in Rousseau‟s 
case) – in relation to the principle or logic that the riddle teaches.  As such, „the logic 
can be found in all families‟.  But what, precisely, is the logic that is at work here? 
 The logic that is at work, as some of Derrida‟s opening statements in „Logic of 
the Living Feminine‟ address, is one that concerns the problem of the philosophy of life.  
For Derrida, Nietzsche is one of the few thinkers in the history of philosophy – „with the 
possible exceptions of Freud and, in a different way, Kierkegaard‟ (Derrida, 1988a, p.6) 
– who has presented his philosophy as a philosophy of life.  And yet, he has done so at 
the expense of the philosophical idea of life itself pure and simple.  For Derrida, 
Nietzsche shows life in its complexity; and as such shows it without a simple polar 
metaphysical opposite that would work to oversimplify it: 
 
What one calls life – the thing or object of biology or biography – does not stand face to face with 
something that would be its opposable ob-ject: death, the thanatological or thanatographical.  This is the 
first complication.  Also, it is painfully difficult for life to become an object of science, in the sense that 
philosophy and science have always given to the word „science‟ and to the legal status of scientificity.  
All of this – the difficulty, the delays it entails – is particularly bound up with the fact that the science of 
life always accommodates a philosophy of life, which is not the case for all other sciences, the sciences of 
nonlife – in other words, the sciences of the dead (p.6). 
 
On the one hand, life „does not stand face to face‟ with its „opposable ob-ject‟ because it 
is allied with it.  On the other hand, life is distinguished from death insofar as it 
becomes impossible to have a science of life that is free from all perspective, ideology, 
bias, etc: i.e., „life always accommodates a philosophy of life‟.  The attempt to liberate 
oneself from such biases is not only difficult; but in being so becomes painful, 
„painfully difficult‟.  For Derrida, and perhaps also for Nietzsche, the autobiographical 
becomes allied to the thanatographical or heterothanatographical since the ears with 
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which one discovers the laws of life, giving life itself a hearing as we are put through its 
painful trials, cannot be one‟s own but rather must come from the other. 
The logic or law of the living feminine is thus a law which alludes to a different 
form of relation to the so-called „other sex‟ as the condition of the future to come.  The 
logic of the living feminine refers not to the bulk of the paternal past of world history 
(now dead although not buried and forgotten), but rather to a feminine future that is yet 
to come and that for the time being remains enigmatic.  At once a designation saturated 
with both the grandiosity of world-historical significance (in the political question of 
how families should be structured) and the specificity of the autobiographical context of 
family life (where the significance applies itself to one‟s own experience of one‟s own 
family), the logic of the living feminine is a haunted logic: a hauntology.  Haunted both 
by the past which is dead but remembered in mourning, and by the future which is 
anxious about the living present for occurring in ill-health as a consequence of the past 
death.  Some might consider this dour and negative, but for both Nietzsche and Derrida, 
the idea of affirmation carries more significance if it occurs against a surrounding 
negative context.  For to affirm when circumstances are all good and happy requires no 
effort; it is even instinctual.  But to affirm when it seems impossible to do so is a test of 
the power of affirmation itself; not to mention a test of character.  At any rate, one must 
always remember that when circumstances are all good and happy they are also fragile 
(feminine) in this state and so violently changeable from it: all that is good and happy 
can quickly become inverted, meaning that one must constantly guard against 
complacency.  But the moment one has one‟s guard up one realizes that not all is good 
and happy; and that there can be a fine line between violence and nonviolence, evil and 
good, unhappy and happy, pain and pleasure.  Let us conclude now by considering the 
implications of all these autobiographical riddles. 
 
Conclusion 
In „Why I Am So Clever‟ Nietzsche turns to the meaning of his subtitle to Ecce Homo: 
How One Becomes What One Is.  At the heart of it is his underlying critique of morality 
(i.e., his immoralism) in which he positions selfishness at the origin of the idea of living 
for others: 
 
At this point I can no longer avoid actually answering the question how one becomes what one is.  And 
with that I touch on the masterpiece in the art of self-preservation – of selfishness ... For assuming that the 
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task, the vocation, the destiny of this task exceeds the average measure by a significant degree, there 
would be no greater danger than to catch sight of oneself with this task.  That one becomes what one is 
presupposes that one does not have the remotest idea what one is.  From this point of view even the 
blunders of life – the temporary sidepaths and wrong turnings, the delays, the „modesties‟, the seriousness 
squandered on tasks which lie outside the task – have their own meaning and value (Nietzsche, 1992, 
p.34). 
 
Selfishness is immorally positioned at the heart of altruistic morality by making what a 
moment later he calls: „these little things – nutriment, place, climate, recreation, the 
whole casuistry of selfishness‟ (p.36), these little things form, „the fundamental affairs 
of life‟ (p.36).  For Nietzsche, life is comprised of its „little things‟ which act as a 
fundamental distraction from the very idea of living with others.  Everyday life is 
comprised of: we go to sleep at night, wake up in the morning, get ready for work, 
work, go shopping for food, go home and eat, rest and relax in our own way, etc.  The 
affairs of life are organized in such a way that one becomes wrapped up in one‟s own 
little life as if it were the whole world.  Within which we also think about what we want 
from our life, and in trying to put it into practice become self-enclosed even more.  And 
yet, for Nietzsche, there is nothing wrong with this – it is even good to be selfish in this 
way and further oneself in the world, for then at least one does not become a burden to 
others.  The entire attitude of the „free spirit‟ is invented in order to liberate us from 
false burdens. 
 In this chapter I have argued that in Derrida‟s thought there is both an adoption 
and a supplementation of Nietzsche‟s thought: from an affirmation of life to a double 
affirmation of death and the other.  Within this reaffirmation, there is, then, an 
adjustment of Nietzsche‟s immoralist stance as the trace of Apollonian order partially 
tames the Dionysian wildness of the free spirit.  Indeed, if Nietzsche is going to point 
towards the „fundamental affairs‟ of life, then he must also include within this the 
fundamental responsibilities of life.  For example, what if the free spirit were a parent?  
It is one thing to invent a riddle that appears as if it were from the perspective of the 
child, but what about when the child itself has a child?  Are the responsibilities of 
parenthood included within the perspective of Nietzsche‟s free spirit?  Or does the idea 
of the free spirit speak only to the rebellious adolescent?  Such questions imply, as does 
the trace of Apollo (and indeed the trace of Rousseau‟s adjustment of the golden rule), 
that the free spirit, though a useful and even necessary psychological invention, can 
never entirely liberate itself from the fettered spirit.  Indeed, one of the things that the 
present study has more generally been arguing, since the first chapter, is the case for 
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Derrida‟s „autobiographical agnosticism‟ – in which the singularity of the life is 
accounted for.  This must also include the life of the fettered spirit as much as that of the 
free spirit.  It also works to temper Nietzsche‟s notably aggressive atheism.  For 
example in „Why I Am So Clever‟ he says: „I have absolutely no knowledge of atheism 
as an outcome of reasoning, still less as an event: with me it is obvious by instinct‟ 
(Nietzsche, 1992, p.21).  In contrast, Derrida does not have a problem with the 
reasoning for atheism; but rather with its passion, which mimics religious passion, as it 
is, precisely, a passion to attack religion: „I am by nature warlike.  To attack is among 
my instincts‟ (p.16), as Nietzsche puts it in „Why I am so wise‟, as he attempts to „wage 
war on Christianity‟ (p.18). 
 If there is a difference between Nietzsche and Derrida it is that the latter is more 
reserved and less inclined to lash out than the former: it is a difference of attitude.  As 
Nietzsche puts it in „Why I Am So Clever‟, he has „an instinct for self-defence‟ 
(Nietzsche, 1992, p.33).  But where Nietzsche perhaps thinks that the best form of 
defence is attack; in contrast, Derrida perhaps thinks that the best form of defence is the 
counterattack: i.e., one waits for the other to make the first move, to draw first blood, 
and judges the level of the other‟s aggression before responding.  For in the logic of the 
counterattack the instinct for self-defence is actually heightened: since afterwards, one 
can point to the other as the one who drew first blood for no reason, whereas one‟s 
response can be deemed a reasonable reaction in relation to the initial action it was 
responding to.  But there can of course be dangers to the logic of counterattacking, such 
as overreaction.  Another danger is that one becomes reactive in one‟s attitude, thereby 
becoming an unwitting fettered spirit.  Nietzsche‟s solution here is: „Another form of 
sagacity and self-defence consists in reacting as seldom as possible and withdrawing 
from situations and relationships in which one would be condemned as it were to 
suspend one‟s “freedom,” one‟s initiative, and become a mere reagent‟ (p.33).  There is 
an affinity here with what Derrida says regarding „nonresponse‟ in his essay, „Passions: 
An Oblique Offering‟: „It will perhaps be said that this nonresponse is the best response, 
that it is still a response and a sign of responsibility.  Perhaps‟ (in: Derrida, 1995a, 
p.19). 
Like Zarathustra‟s retreat into the solitude of his caves, the simple removal of 
oneself from the negative circumstances in question can be a powerful form of self-
defence (although being simple does not necessarily make it easy to do).  And though 
things get passed over in silence in this solitude, this silence can nonetheless speak 
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volumes – which can become necessary especially when we feel that others do not 
listen: the deaf of the other.  As Nietzsche puts it in „Why I Am So Wise‟: „I have need 
of solitude, that is to say recovery, return to myself, the breath of a free light playful 
air... My entire Zarathustra is a dithyramb on solitude or, if I have been understood, on 
cleanliness‟ (Nietzsche, 1992, p.18).  In the irrational social context of the other‟s 
deafness, Zarathustra‟s advice is that it may become necessary to retreat from the 
psychological warfare of social intercourse into the safety of one‟s own solitude.  
Zarathustra‟s irony, however, is such that, in one‟s solitude, one may find that the 
deafness was also one‟s own.  In „Why I Am So Clever‟, after referring to the „blunders 
of life‟ in the extract which began this conclusion, Nietzsche continues: „They are an 
expression of a great sagacity, even the supreme sagacity: where nosce te ipsum would 
be the recipe for destruction, self-forgetfulness, self-misunderstanding, self-diminution,  
-narrowing, -mediocratizing becomes reason itself‟ (p.34).  The logic of solitude is 
therefore to aid and increase self-understanding and self-knowledge when we feel too 
lost in the herd of social intercourse.  It is a logic based on the value of self-defence. 
 One of Derrida‟s more obscure works on self-defence is his short essay, „Che 
cos‟e la poesia?‟ [„What is Poetry?‟].  Here he discusses the strange self-defence 
technique of the hedgehog, which curls itself up into a ball to show its spikes, but as it 
does so: „It blinds itself.  Rolled up in a ball, prickly with spines, vulnerable and 
dangerous, calculating and ill-adapted (because it makes itself into a ball, sensing the 
danger on the autoroute, it exposes itself to an accident)‟ (Derrida, 1991, p.233).  Where 
on earth might Derrida get the idea from, to discuss the paradoxical self-defence 
technique of the hedgehog?  From the very same page of Ecce Homo we have just been 
citing.  Nietzsche says: „Would I not in face of it have to become a hedgehog? – But to 
have spikes is an extravagance, a double luxury even if one is free to have no spikes but 
open hands...‟ (Nietzsche, 1992, p.33).  At stake in this analogy with self-defence 
techniques and attitudes is the boundary between apology and apologia.  Which perhaps 
provokes the following question: Is an immoralist capable of apology?  Does the free 
spirit, in seeking to preserve their strength, understand apology as a sign of weakness?  
Or is there courage in humility?  If we are discussing self-defence then we are 
discussing apologia, in which case we are discussing the boundary between apologia 
and apology, self-defence and other-defence, arrogance and humility, egoism and 
altruism, etc.  For both Nietzsche and Derrida, a life lived in the cultures of civil society 
means that one‟s domestic upbringing will become infused with a moralizing that seeks 
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to inhabit the „fundamental affairs‟ of everyday life.  But unlike Derrida, Nietzsche is 
very quick to preface these moral habits with the character of „falsehood‟.  Derrida‟s 
undecidable hesitation on this point marks a difference between himself and the one 
philosopher he mimics the most through his reaffirmation. 
 Right at the end of The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas, on the 
final page of the third Appendix, Simon Critchley says of Levinas: „As Levinas was 
fond of putting it, the entirety of his philosophy can be summarized in the simple words, 
“Après vous, Monsieur”; that is, by everyday and quite banal acts of civility, hospitality, 
kindness and politeness that have perhaps received too little attention from philosphers‟ 
(Critchley, 1999a, p.287).  Although Derrida undoubtedly adopts the Levinasian 
manners of „After you, sir‟, I think he also supplements it with the question: „How are 
you?‟  That is, in the problem that Nietzsche poses between the „who‟ and the „what‟ of 
oneself, it is the „how‟, the anagram of the „who‟, that acts as the fundamental 
intermediary of this opposition.  This concern with the „how‟ will be considered in the 
following chapter. 
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Autobiographical Speculation: Freud & Derrida 
 
Introduction 
If, as the present study has been arguing, the conceptualization of autobiography in 
Derrida‟s thought occurs in the direction of the reconceptualization of subjectivity, then 
this direction must address the problem of the nature and development of the subject‟s 
psychical experience throughout the course of their life.  Conceptually speaking, 
autobiography is of interest because it economically places the self and the life, the 
internal mind and the external body, alongside one another.  As we have seen, in the 
broad historical context of the discourse of philosophy it takes until Rousseau before the 
heart‟s feeling is given priority over the mind‟s thought; and it takes until Nietzsche 
before life is tragically rethought in its relation to death.  However, despite their insights 
and their reversals, neither of these thinkers provides a systematic approach to the 
nature of the human psyche; it takes until Freud before such a systematic approach is 
offered.  The relation between Freud and Derrida is an enigmatic one, for it can become 
a question of where the boundary rests between the similarities and differences of their 
respective movements: psychoanalysis and deconstruction.  This is enigmatic because 
Derrida himself forces us to think differently about psychoanalysis.  In this chapter, of 
course consideration of this question of the similarities and differences between 
psychoanalysis and deconstruction is unavoidable.  But what is unique about the way in 
which this consideration will here be approached is its occurrence through the theme of 
the autobiographical – what, in his essay „To Speculate – On “Freud”‟, in The Post 
Card, Derrida calls „autobiographical speculation‟ (Derrida, 1987, p.305). 
 Derrida forces us to think differently about Freud.  In his essay „Freud and the 
Scene of Writing‟, in Writing and Difference, he reinterprets the text of Freudian 
psychoanalysis according to the topic of writing.  That is, on the one hand according to 
a topic that one would normally think is barely of concern in Freud‟s thought (barring 
the short essay of Freud‟s that Derrida reads, „A Note upon the “Mystic Writing-pad”‟ 
(in: Freud, 2001b)), and on the other hand according to a topic that dominates Derrida‟s 
thought.  The reinterpretation occurs in the fact that, for Derrida, Freud‟s „A Note upon 
the “Mystic Writing-pad”‟ is symptomatic of the tightrope that psychoanalysis walks 
along between metaphysics and its deconstruction.  Qua symptomatic, there is an 
underlying reliance in Freud‟s oeuvre on the metaphor of writing, which ranges from 
The Interpretation of Dreams (where one must write down one‟s dreams in order to 
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remember them) to his „Note‟, and beyond: „From now on, starting with the 
Traumdeutung (1900), the metaphor of writing will appropriate simultaneously the 
problems of the psychic apparatus in its structure and that of the psychic text in its 
fabric‟ (Derrida, 1978, p.206).  Far from being a topic that barely occurs in Freud, 
writing is instead a topic that preoccupied him.  What Derrida calls the „scene of 
writing‟ is something of a mise en scène: the writing apparatus sets the stage for an 
analogy with psychical apparatus, particularly with the scene of the unconscious.  Freud 
calls psychoanalysis „depth psychology‟, as it interprets the dynamics of the deeper 
processes that occur in the unconscious mind (of which dreams are the evidence).  But 
typical writing instruments (e.g., paper or slate) have only their surface, which is why 
the layered organization of the Mystic Pad intrigued him. 
 Paradoxically, at the same time that Derrida invokes a certain proximity of 
psychoanalysis and deconstruction, he also simultaneously calls for a certain distance.  
On the opening page of „Freud and the Scene of Writing‟ he says: 
 
Despite appearances, the deconstruction of logocentrism is not a psychoanalysis of philosophy. 
These appearances: the analysis of a historical repression and suppression of writing since Plato.  This 
repression constitutes the origin of philosophy as epistēmē, and of truth as the unity of logos and phonē. 
Repression, not forgetting; repression, not exclusion.  Repression, as Freud says, neither repels, nor flees, 
nor excludes an exterior force; it contains an interior representation, laying out within itself a space of 
repression (Derrida, 1978, p.196). 
 
It is customary to say of Derrida‟s deconstructive operations on binary oppositions that 
one term in the opposition is „privileged‟ and the other „excluded‟.  But here, Derrida is 
precise with the relation of phono-logocentrism to writing that it is a relation neither of 
exclusion, nor of forgetting (the latter invoking Heidegger‟s notion of the „forgetting of 
Being‟ which opens Being and Time (Heidegger, 1962)), but rather of repression.  
Derrida assimilates Freud‟s concept, but applies it to a different object: viz., the 
metaphysical tradition rather than the individual person.  Which begs the question: Why 
is this „not a psychoanalysis of philosophy‟?  It is not a psychoanalysis of philosophy 
for two reasons.  First because Freud‟s terms are themselves understood by Derrida to 
be a part of the metaphysical tradition, a tradition that Freud spends very little time 
distinguishing himself from.  And second because there is too much attention to detail 
of the text of philosophy (and other discourses) in deconstruction – what in „Freud and 
the Scene of Writing‟ Derrida calls the „originality of the literary signifier‟ (Derrida, 
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1978, p.230) – to adhere to the methodology of psychoanalysis (the latter of which, for 
Derrida, moves too hastily towards the meaningful signified). 
 As we can see, there is thus a change of terrain made by Derrida in 
distinguishing himself from Freud: from the nature of the individual person to the nature 
of the metaphysical tradition.  However, since the idea of autobiography cannot but 
emphasise the psychoanalytic object, the psychological development of the individual 
person, does Derrida‟s autobiographical thought return to the perspective of 
psychoanalysis?  How can Derrida‟s autobiographical thought be consistent with his 
earlier ambitions?  Undoubtedly, as this chapter will argue, the deconstruction of 
logocentrism is only the first stage of Derrida‟s thought.  There is more to 
deconstruction than the safety net of the point of reference of the „metaphysical 
tradition‟.  But if the assumptions contained in psychoanalytic concepts are problematic 
from the perspective of deconstruction – „all these concepts, without exception, belong 
to the history of metaphysics‟ (Derrida, 1978, p.197) – nonetheless, it is also 
problematic for deconstructive theory to avoid the psychoanalytic object from the safety 
net of another point of reference.  The task of this chapter is therefore to set the 
groundwork to think the psychoanalytic object better than psychoanalysis itself, and to 
do so from a Derridean perspective (the conditions for which have already been set up 
in the present study by the way in which the conceptualization of autobiography 
provokes the reconceptualization of subjectivity in his thought).  This is an impossible 
yet necessary task: for it is relatively easy to problematize the psychoanalytic 
terminology by changing terrain (as is customary in deconstructive scholarship), but it is 
considerably more difficult to do so in such a way that reconceptualises the human 
subject by making improvements upon psychoanalysis itself. 
However, I would argue that this is what is demanded by a deconstructive 
philosophical criticism.  In this way, this chapter is analogous to the Marx one, in which 
the very identification of the proletariat qua proletariat was put into question.  Similarly, 
this chapter will initially consider the foundational concepts of Freudian psychoanalysis 
in order, later on in the chapter, to show the way in which Derrida argues how Freud 
himself counteracts these foundational concepts.  With this in mind, towards the end of 
the chapter I will move into a critical reading of an essay by Bennington, „Circanalysis 
(The Thing Itself)‟.  Here the very relation between deconstruction and psychoanalysis 
will be considered in more detail, but will occur via a criticism of Bennington‟s change 
of terrain from the psychoanalytic object to the metaphysical tradition.  Instead, utilising 
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the concept of autobiography as the basis for rethinking the traditional theory of 
subjectivity given in psychoanalysis, it will be argued that deconstructive philosophy is 
capable of rethinking the psychoanalytic object since this object is that of philosophy 
itself.  Before turning to these difficulties, let us turn to Freud‟s thought in more detail. 
 
Autobiographical Speculation 
Freud‟s thought begins with the therapeutic impetus to cure, or at least alleviate and 
improve, the neurotic illnesses (or „psychoneuroses‟) of human beings.  This occurs by 
diagnosing the neurotic symptoms from which the illnesses in question are made 
visible.  And understanding neurotic symptoms and illnesses requires a theoretical 
account – which Freud argued was derived from scientific observation – of the nature 
and development of the human psyche itself.  As he pithily put it in his essay „The 
Question of Lay Analysis‟, the point of psychoanalysis is „to understand a neurosis and 
to cure it‟ (in: Freud, 1991, p.62).  Freud‟s originality was based in the fact that, as he 
understood it, the origin of neurotic symptoms and illnesses was grounded in the 
different ways in which the sexual instinct (or „libido‟) of humans can become 
obstructed and displaced in the biological and biographical development of an 
individual person.  He says: „factors from sexual life play an extremely important, a 
dominating, perhaps even specific part among the causes and precipitating factors of 
neurotic illness‟ (p.27).  Before turning to Freud‟s notion of psychosexual development, 
let us first consider the theoretical dynamics of the psychical apparatus itself (or 
„metapsychology‟). 
 Freud‟s essay „The Question of Lay Analysis‟ addresses the question of to what 
degree a layperson can become a professional psychoanalyst, in an effort to counteract 
the charge that psychoanalytic practitioners were quacks.  It therefore concerns itself 
with the „analytic situation‟ (in: Freud, 1991, p.8) between doctor and patient which 
organizes the institution of psychoanalytic practice.  Freud writes himself in dialogue 
with an Impartial Person, an educated but sceptical questioner of the principles of 
psychoanalysis, here playing the part of the layperson.  From early on, what becomes 
apparent is that psychoanalysis attempts to offer the very foundations for psychology, 
foundations which are considerably lacking: 
 
Have you not noticed that every philosopher, every imaginative writer, every historian and every 
biographer makes up his own psychology for himself, brings forward his own particular hypotheses 
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concerning the interconnections and aims of mental acts – all more or less plausible and all equally 
untrustworthy?  There is an evident lack of any common foundation.  And it is for this reason too that in 
the field of psychology there is, so to speak, no respect and no authority.  In that field everyone can „run 
wild‟ as he chooses.  If you raise a question in physics or chemistry, anyone who knows he possesses no 
„technical knowledge‟ will hold his tongue.  But if you venture upon a psychological assertion, you must 
be prepared to meet judgements and contradictions from every quarter.  In this field, apparently, there is 
no „technical knowledge‟.  Everyone has a mental life, so everyone regards himself as a psychologist.  
But that strikes me as inadequate legal title.  The story is told of how someone who applied for a post as a 
children‟s nurse was asked if she knew how to look after babies.  „Of course‟, she replied, „why, after all, 
I was a baby once myself‟ (p.14). 
 
Simply being a person oneself and having one‟s own psychical experience does not 
constitute a solid basis from which to begin making psychological observations and 
judgements.  Freud is thus attempting to do for the discipline of psychology what 
Aristotle did for the discipline of philosophy: just as Aristotle classified the different 
branches of philosophical knowledge, from which the so-called „big questions‟ in 
philosophy are derived (to which he gave his own answers), Freud classifies the 
different problems of psychology as the psychological problems of human experience 
(to which he gives his own diagnoses). 
 In order to account for the general aetiology of the variety of neurotic illnesses 
(e.g., hysteria, paranoia, anxiety, schizophrenia, melancholia, megalomania, 
hypochondria, etc) Freud‟s initial argument regarding the nature of the psyche is that it 
cannot have the simple singular surface layer of consciousness as its underlying core.  
Neurotic illnesses derive from the fact that one has become absent from oneself, which 
requires the hypothesis of the existence of the unconscious.  Within the dynamic 
between the conscious and the unconscious, there is a psychological conflict between 
what Freud calls the id and the ego.  The id is the instinctual drive for pleasure in its 
various guises within each individual, each of which requires immediate satisfaction; 
the ego is the rationalization of how to go about compromising with the fact that not all 
of the id‟s pleasures can be satisfied immediately.  Since the ego imposes postponement 
on the id, there develops an internal psychical conflict within each individual person: 
 
In the id there are no conflicts; contradictions and antitheses persist side by side in it unconcernedly, and 
are often adjusted by the formation of compromises.  In similar circumstances the ego feels a conflict 
which must be decided; and the decision lies in one urge being abandoned in favour of the other.  The ego 
is an organization characterized by a very remarkable trend towards unification, towards synthesis.  This 
characteristic is lacking in the id; it is, as we might say, „all to pieces‟; its different urges pursue their own 
purposes independently and regardless of one another (in: Freud, 1991, p.18). 
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The id is thus akin to what Freud generally calls the pleasure principle; and the ego is 
akin to what he calls the reality principle.  That is, the id seeks the satisfaction of its 
various pleasures regardless of the real world circumstances it might be in; and the ego 
tries to find the most economical way for the id to go about its business in the actual 
circumstances of the real world. 
 In the relation between the two levels of conscious experience and unconscious 
dynamics, the ego and the id have different locations.  The id remains entirely in the 
unconscious, while the ego can move between the two levels, as Freud says in „The 
Question of Lay Analysis‟: „All that is true is that everything that happens in the id is 
and remains unconscious, and that processes in the ego, and they alone, can become 
conscious.  But not all of them are, nor always, nor necessarily; and large portions of the 
ego can remain permanently unconscious‟ (in: Freud, 1991, p.19).  Insofar as the ego 
can become conscious, there is thus a third level, the preconscious, which acts as the 
preparatory point of transition from unconscious to conscious, as Freud says in his essay 
„The Unconscious‟: „In consideration of this capacity for becoming conscious we also 
call the system Cs. the “preconscious”‟ (p.148).  Insofar as the ego can move towards 
consciousness, it becomes capable of moving towards the mind‟s perception of the 
outside world.  At this point, the ego realizes that, as well as passively receiving the 
living conditions from the outside world, it is also partially capable of actively 
intervening in it and changing it according to its own intent, as Freud says in „The 
Question of Lay Analysis‟: 
 
It is also possible to intervene in the external world by changing it, and to establish in it intentionally the 
conditions which make satisfaction possible.  This activity then becomes the ego‟s highest function; 
decisions as to when it is more expedient to control one‟s passions and bow before reality, and when it is 
more expedient to side with them and to take arms against the external world – such decisions make up 
the whole essence of worldly wisdom (p.22). 
 
The function of the ego is to find out the best possible way in which to satisfy the id‟s 
desires; but it must do so by maintaining its alliance with the external world.  Conflict 
arises between the ego and the id, sparking the formation of a neurosis: „A neurosis is 
thus the result of a conflict between the ego and the id‟ (p.24).  And this is because the 
ego must repress the id‟s desires: „The ego [...] institutes a repression of these 
instinctual impulses‟ (p.23). 
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 A major factor in the dissatisfaction of the id is that the external world comes 
hardwired with moral rules and codes, which as youngsters we learn from our family 
and as we grow into adulthood we learn are implicit within our cultural traditions and 
modes of behaviour.  The internalization of these rules forms within our psychical 
apparatus what Freud calls the superego: „the super-ego is the vehicle of the 
phenomenon that we call conscience‟ (in: Freud, 1991, p.42), as he puts it in „The 
question of lay analysis‟.  Just as the duality of the unconscious and the conscious is 
mediated by the third term of preconscious, so the ego and the id are mediated by the 
third term of superego.  For Freud, both the ego and the superego form the general 
narcissism of human beings.  In his essay „On Narcissism: An Introduction‟ he 
describes what he calls the „narcissistic attitude‟ (in: Freud, 2001c, p.73) as the 
condition within which the ego, instead of attending to the outside world, turns back 
onto itself in the formation of its own ideals.  These ego ideals themselves have a dual 
element: „The ego ideal opens up an important avenue for the understanding of group 
psychology.  In addition to its individual side, this ideal has a social side; it is also the 
common ideal of a family, a class or a nation‟ (p.101).  In other words, as one grows 
into adulthood, one becomes concerned with achieving certain life goals.  Those life 
goals can be either one‟s own, in the ego‟s attempt to satisfy the id; or they can be 
specific ones within the community within which one grew up, in the ego‟s attempt to 
satisfy the superego. 
 With Freud, it is almost impossible to abstract an account of the nature of the 
psychical apparatus from that of psychosexual development.  For the relation between 
the id, the ego, and the superego, is one that he argued to develop at specific stages of 
the life cycle – particularly in the formative years from infancy to puberty.  Indeed, the 
psychical apparatus itself is sexualized by Freud insofar as the id is synonymous with 
the libido: i.e., the sexual instinct of human beings.  At this point, it might be useful to 
ask: How, then, do we account for the fact that ego ideals can be non-sexual?  The 
answer to this question is in Freud‟s concept of sublimation.  Sublimation is the process 
by which the energy of the id becomes directed away from a sexual object onto some 
other object, as Freud explains in „On Narcissism: An Introduction‟: 
 
We are naturally led to examine the relation between this forming of an ideal and sublimation.  
Sublimation is a process that concerns object-libido and consists in the instinct‟s directing itself towards 
an aim other than, and remote from, that of sexual satisfaction; in this process the accent falls upon 
deflection from sexuality (in: Freud, 2001c, p.94). 
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Freud goes on to say that, since the ego ideal idealises a particular object or objective, 
the work of idealization is distinct from the work of sublimation: for where the former 
displaces the sexual object and becomes fixated on other objects and objectives, the 
latter displaces the sexual instinct itself.  On the one hand, sublimation is thus a key 
process by which people become normalized into the practicalities of civilized culture, 
as we substitute sexual activity for other non-sexual activities.  On the other hand, it is 
precisely the high demands of civility that creates these almost unattainable ego ideals, 
which play their part in the repression of the id and the formation of neuroses – „the 
neuroses of civilization‟ (in: Freud, 1991, p.65). 
 The idea that civilization is the cause of neuroses perhaps shows an influence 
from Rousseau: Freud‟s (1961) Civilization and its Discontents might have been called 
Discourse on the Origin of Neuroses.  In this analogy, Freud‟s unprecedented „Three 
Essays on the Theory of Sexuality‟ could be seen as a psychoanalytic reworking of 
Émile.  The first essay, „The Sexual Aberrations‟, outlines the various perverse 
deviations that work against so-called „normal‟ sexuality: „The relation between these 
deviations and what is assumed to be normal requires thorough investigation‟ (in: 
Freud, 1991, p.281).  From the outset it should be noted that, from a contemporary 
garden-variety politically correct perspective, the language of „normality‟ that Freud 
uses here could be seen as morally bankrupt; as if he were making a value judgement 
against one version of what constitutes „normal‟ sexual life.  Perhaps there is a danger 
of this; but such is the difficulty of Freud‟s task in this first essay.  In his day 
particularly in the context that he was working in, „normal‟ and „abnormal‟ would have 
connoted a medical classification.  In our day of postmodern identity politics (which 
tends to maintain an ironic distance from Freud), the terms „normal‟ and „abnormal‟ are 
used with more moral connotations.  In fairness to Freud, I think it is important to take 
him on his own meaning here: indeed, that the very word „neurosis‟ connotes 
„psychological abnormality‟ implies that „normal‟ and „abnormal‟ are terms hardwired 
into the dynamics of the psychical apparatus, and into the goal of psychoanalysis, and 
so they are terms we have already been using without using them directly.  Also, it is 
not entirely clear in this first essay to what degree Freud himself is calling into question 
the very idea of „normal‟ sexuality, and to what degree he thinks that sexual 
„abnormalities‟ need to be therapeutically transformed back into „normal‟ ones again.  
Undoubtedly arguments could be made for both sides.  At any rate, in this first essay 
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Freud himself says, „how inappropriate it is to use the word perversion as a term of 
reproach‟ (p.304). 
 By „normal‟ sexuality Freud thus means the heterosexual act of sexual 
intercourse without deviation from the meeting of the two genitalia.  He initially divides 
his account between deviations in terms of the sexual object (i.e. concerning 
heterosexuality), and then deviations in terms of the sexual aim (i.e., concerning the 
sexual act itself).  His account of the deviations of the sexual object thus begins with the 
simple inversion of heterosexuality, in homosexuality, which he calls „inversion‟ (in: 
Freud, 1991, p.282); between which he identifies different gradations, such that we can 
identify bisexuals, whom he refers to as „amphigenic inverts‟ (p.282).  He then offers a 
discussion on the nature-nurture debate in relation to heterosexuality and its levels of 
inversion, arguing that both factors play their part: „The nature of inversion is explained 
neither by the hypothesis that it is innate nor by the alternative hypothesis that it is 
acquired‟ (p.286).  His account of the deviations in the sexual aim is dependent on a 
feature which is described later in the first essay, namely, that the human body contains 
numerous „erotogenic zones‟ (p.311); and not just the genitalia.  He thus begins his 
account of deviations in the sexual aim by referring to the kiss: „the kiss [...] is held in 
high sexual esteem among many nations (including the most highly civilized ones)‟ 
(p.294).  Such begins Freud‟s interest with the body‟s orifices as providing a major 
route for sexual deviations.  In terms of the deviations themselves, in particular he refers 
to voyeurs and exhibitionists (i.e., those who like to see and those who like to be seen); 
sadists and masochists (i.e., those who like to inflict pain on others and those who like 
to have pain inflicted on themselves); and sexual frigidity and sexual overexcitement 
(i.e., an underactive and an overactive libido). 
 The second essay on sexuality, „Infantile Sexuality‟, contains his theory of the 
stages of „psychosexual development‟ (in: Freud, 1991, p.337).  His general proposition 
is that human sexuality does not begin in puberty, but rather, begins in infancy with the 
infant‟s incestuous attachment to its parents – in particular, in the case of a boy, with the 
boy‟s attachment to his mother.  Such is the famous Oedipus complex first alluded to in 
The Interpretation of Dreams.  The boy thus considers his father a threat with respect to 
the acquisition of his mother, and fears he will be castrated: he develops the „castration 
complex‟ (p.334).  In contrast, in the case of a girl, the girl notices the lack of her penis 
and becomes envious: „envy for the penis‟ (p.334).  There are five stages of 
psychosexual development that Freud alludes to: oral, anal, phallic, latency, and 
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puberty.  The first three, Freud says, „begins between the ages of two and five‟ (p.338).  
With the oral stage the baby becomes anxious as it is drawn away from breastfeeding, 
and substitutes it with activities such as thumb sucking.  With the anal stage the baby 
becomes anxious as it must go through a period of toilet training.  And with the phallic 
stage begins a period of what Freud calls „infantile masturbation‟ (p.329), where the 
young child‟s exploration of their own genitals leads them to auto-erotic activity.  
However, since such activity becomes discouraged by parents, from the ages of five to 
around twelve there is a period of latency until sexual feelings are reawakened in 
puberty.  In other words, the Oedipus complex only appears in childhood development 
between the age of two and five.  This is because the ego in the young child has not yet 
begun to form; this formation begins in the latency period, towards the end of which, at 
the beginning of the puberty period, the superego has begun to develop. 
The Oedipus complex occurs, and recurs in puberty in a different form, because 
from the period of latency onwards the ego succeeds in repressing the child‟s id.  The 
third essay on sexuality, „The Transformations of Puberty‟, articulates the „new sexual 
aim‟ (in: Freud, 1991, p.345) of the adolescent: i.e., to find a sexual object that is 
neither one‟s family nor oneself.  This new sexual aim leads to a paradox: on the one 
hand, a dramatic increase in auto-erotic activity; and on the other hand, a desire for 
hetero-erotic activity rather than auto-erotic activity.  One theme that runs through all 
three essays is the concern with sexual prohibition.  For Freud, if almost all neuroses 
originate in the cathartic libido and its sublimations and substitutions, then disturbances 
of sexual development are of primary importance in psychoanalysis.  One important 
factor of such disturbances becomes the way in which the sexual prohibition of a child‟s 
development is managed by their parents.  For such prohibitions involve the 
development of what in the second essay Freud calls mental dams: „the mental dams 
against sexual excesses – shame, disgust and morality‟ (p.331).  One of the difficulties 
of puberty is thus coping with the incest taboo of civilization: for infantile sexuality 
knew nothing of it, meaning that each of us has an unconscious childhood memory of 
having felt incestuous desires.  In puberty, the new sexual aim is new precisely because 
it cannot have an old familial aim as an outlet.  As Freud says in the third essay: „the 
moral precepts which expressly exclude from his object-choice, as being blood-
relations, the persons whom he has loved in his childhood‟ (p.360). 
 One of the factors that led Freud to come to the conclusion of the incest taboo as 
the structure of the Oedipus complex is not merely that it is an unwritten moral law of 
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civil cultures, but also because, he argues, it is a more prevalent feature of our nightly 
dreams than we would like to admit.  His essay „On Dreams‟, which summarizes the 
main themes of The Interpretation of Dreams, begins with reference to the cross-
cultural significance given to dreams in mythological history: here, the superstitions 
associated with the „ancient overvaluation of dreams‟ (in: Freud, 1991, p.82) is 
contrasted with the modern undervaluation of dreams in scientific circles.  In his own 
theory of dreams, they are given the intermediate valuation that they carry psychical 
significance for understanding the unconscious processes of waking life.  He 
distinguishes between the „manifest content of the dream‟ (p.88) (i.e., the events of the 
dream), and the „latent content of the dream‟ (p.88) (i.e., the underlying significance of 
the dream‟s events), continuing: „I shall describe the process which transforms the latent 
into the manifest content of dreams as the “dream-work”‟ (p.89).  That is, the dream-
work is the process of the interpretation of dreams in which the psychoanalyst unpicks 
the underlying significance of the dream‟s events.  Here, the significance in question 
applies itself only to the dreamer themselves.  In studies of children‟s dreams, Freud 
came to the conclusion that nightly dreaming is a consequence of daily wishful 
thinking.  In dreams we fulfil the wishes that were unfulfilled during the day: „The 
common element in all these children‟s dreams is obvious.  All of them fulfilled wishes 
which were active during the day but had remained unfulfilled.  The dreams were 
simple and undisguised wish-fulfilments‟ (p.91).  As such, Freud‟s emphasis on 
dreaming, and on the interpretation of dreams, opens the psychological gateway to the 
concern with what it is we fantasize about in daily life. 
 The emphasis on the boundary between fantasy and reality is undoubtedly one 
of the key components of psychoanalytic theory, particularly as it plays its part in the 
diagnosis of various neurotic disorders in which an ability to distinguish clearly one 
from the other has become distorted.  Freud‟s hypothesis that the dream-work 
demonstrates the underlying symbolic sexual connotations of dreams is, today, perhaps 
exaggerated and caricatured in the various outlets of pop culture.  However, this does 
not mean that there are no grounds for this caricature.  For example, towards the end of 
„On Dreams‟ Freud says: 
 
The majority of dream-symbols serve to represent persons, parts of the body and the activities invested 
with erotic interest; in particular, the genitals are represented by a number of often very surprising 
symbols, and the greatest variety of objects are employed to denote them symbolically.  Sharp weapons, 
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long and stiff objects, such as tree-trunks and sticks, stand for the male genital; while cupboards, boxes, 
carriages or ovens may represent the uterus (in: Freud, 1991, p.123). 
 
That Freudian psychoanalysis so readily connects a non-sexual signifier with a sexual 
signified is undoubtedly problematic.  Psychoanalysis offers a theory of displacement, 
or sublimation, by which attention is turned from the singular concern with sex to the 
plethora of other disseminated concerns.  Perhaps one of the reasons why 
deconstruction institutes a displacement of psychoanalysis itself is because the language 
within which it claims to make its interpretations pays little attention to the work of 
language itself.  In „Freud and the Scene of Writing‟ Derrida says: „writing is the stage 
of history and the play of the world.  It cannot be exhausted by psychology alone‟ 
(Derrida, 1978, p.228).  The problem here is that, once psychology begins to offer 
interpretations of what an event in someone‟s life symbolizes to them, a theory of the 
organization of the psychical apparatus by itself is inadequate.  In Derrida‟s Writing 
and Difference Sarah Wood says: „If psychoanalysis is necessary for Derrida, it is not 
enough‟ (Wood, 2009, p.116).  One must also account for the linguistic apparatus 
through which this symbolization itself occurs, and through which the various 
apparatuses of reality itself are mediated.  With this in mind let us turn our attention 
more directly to a dialogue between Freud and Derrida, and return to the theme of 
autobiographical speculation. 
 Derrida‟s essay „To Speculate – On “Freud”‟, in The Post Card: From Socrates 
to Freud and Beyond, provides a deconstructive interpretation primarily of Freud‟s 
essay „Beyond the Pleasure Principle‟.  In this essay Freud develops the concepts of 
repetition compulsion and the death drive.  For Freud, the experience of pleasure only 
ever offers a temporary alleviation of the onset of a feeling of unpleasure or pain.  As 
such, there develops in the id the need to constantly repeat the experience of pleasure.  
In the unconscious mind this means that the id‟s need is experienced as a compulsion 
that returns eternally within each individual person, requiring them to continually repeat 
the attempt to satisfy the need.  The repetition compulsion invokes a strange paradoxical 
experience; one of simultaneous pleasure and unpleasure, as Freud describes: „the great 
part of what is re-experienced under the compulsion to repeat must cause the ego 
unpleasure, since it brings to light activities of repressed instinctual impulses‟ (in: 
Freud, 1991, p.230).  On the one hand, the repetition compulsion causes pleasure by 
continually replenishing the id‟s feeling of the lack of pleasure which develops once the 
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temporary experience of pleasure has begun to dissipate.  On the other hand, the 
repetition compulsion causes unpleasure in the ego by reminding it that its activities are 
reinforcing the repressions which underlie the id‟s continual need for temporary 
alleviation.  For instance, in the transition from one stage of development to the next, a 
particular mode of relating to oneself must be given up in favour of another; and this 
sense of giving up the old for the new inscribes anxiety into the repetition compulsion. 
In such predictably rough transitions, Freud argues that a „narcissistic scar‟ 
develops: „Loss of love and failure leave behind them a permanent injury to self-regard 
in the form of a narcissistic scar‟ (in: Freud, 1991, p.230).  This loss of love he 
interprets as already prepared for in the game of fort-da („there-gone‟), or peekaboo, 
played by adults with young children: a game which is understood to lessen their 
separation anxiety later in life.  In a footnote to his description of this game, he provides 
an account of an observation of a child who began to play this game by themselves with 
a mirror: 
 
One day the child‟s mother had been away for several hours and on her return was met with the words 
„Baby o-o-o-o!‟ which was at first incomprehensible.  It soon turned out, however, that during this long 
period of solitude the child had found a method of making himself disappear.  He had discovered his 
reflection in a full-length mirror which did not quite reach to the ground, so that by crouching down he 
could make his mirror-image „gone‟ (p.225). 
 
Indeed, this specular aspect of the fort-da game is undoubtedly implied by Derrida‟s 
essay title of „To Speculate – On “Freud”‟, in French, „spéculer‟.  In her chapter 
„Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis‟, in Derrida: Deconstruction from Phenomenology 
to Ethics, Christina Howells says of this word: „It refers to Freud‟s anxieties about his 
relation to speculative philosophy, but also carries echoes of financial and economic 
“speculation,” as well as the “specular” or mirroring effect whereby Freud‟s text enacts 
what it describes – specifically the fort-da principle‟ (Howells, 1998, p.107).  On the 
initial point that Howells refers to here, it is clear that Freud‟s intention was always to 
present psychoanalytic theory as derived from empirical observation.  However, he did 
at times acknowledge, against himself, that he was speculating – for example, in 
„Beyond the Pleasure Principle‟ itself he refers to his „metapsychological speculations‟ 
(in: Freud, 1991, p.238). 
 For Freud, the repetition compulsion is the first stage, a stage within the ego, 
which begins to overpower the id‟s pleasure principle: „there really does exist in the 
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mind a compulsion to repeat which overrides the pleasure principle‟ (in: Freud, 1991, 
p.232).  As the ego‟s reality principle develops, and learns that the external world can be 
a dangerous place, it does not merely attempt to negotiate the id‟s pleasure principle 
with the demands of the external world, but also by itself develops an instinct for self-
defence: „Protection against stimuli is an almost more important function for the living 
organism than reception of stimuli‟ (p.236).  Here, „the ego‟s instinct for self-
preservation‟ (p.221) involves the creation of a „protective shield‟ (p.236), the ego‟s 
defence mechanisms.  In „Beyond the Pleasure Principle‟ Freud becomes concerned that 
the ego‟s reality principle does not by itself take us beyond the pleasure principle 
because it fundamentally works to satisfy the id‟s pleasure principle as best as it can, if 
only via its unpleasurable postponements: „the replacement of the pleasure principle by 
the reality principle can only be made responsible for a small number, and by no means 
the most intense, of unpleasurable experiences‟ (p.221).  Freud‟s insight that the ego 
develops a repetition compulsion, which is at once devoted to satisfying the id‟s 
pleasures and devoted to protecting itself against the unpleasurable dangers of the real 
world, becomes the basis of his development of the death drive.  As he puts it: „The 
upshot of our enquiry so far has been the drawing of a sharp distinction between the 
“ego instincts” and the sexual instincts, and  the view that the former exercise pressure 
towards death and the latter towards a prolongation of life‟ (p.250). 
The ego contains not only the reality principle but also the death drive; with the 
latter derived not only from the fact that reality can be a dangerous place, but also 
because death is hardwired into life itself: „all living substance is bound to die from 
internal causes‟ (in: Freud, 1991, p.251).  The ego‟s instinct for self-preservation is also 
equally an instinct for self-destruction, insofar as the compulsion to repeat can repeat 
traumatic instances as equally as it can pleasurable instances.  Freud‟s initial evidence 
for this is in the observation of patients who, having suffered traumatic experiences, 
relive those experiences in their dreams.  On the evidence of trauma dreams, or perhaps 
rather nightmares, Freud concedes in „Beyond the Pleasure Principle‟ that he must, 
„admit for the first time an exception to the proposition that dreams are fulfilments of 
wishes‟ (p.240) – a counterproposition to that put forward in title of the third chapter of 
The Interpretation of Dreams, „The Dream as a Wish-fulfilment‟ (Freud, 1997).  
Wishing for something does not make it so.  Towards the end of „Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle‟ Freud returns to the standard psychoanalytic argument that perversions in 
sexual aims, of which sadism is exemplary as it appertains to mastery of the world 
149 
 
around it, are the origin of neuroses as they rest on the boundary between the ego and 
the id: 
 
But how can the sadistic instinct, whose aim is to injure the object, be derived from Eros, the preserver of 
life?  Is it not plausible to suppose that this sadism is in fact a death instinct which, under the influence of 
the narcissistic libido, has been forced away from the ego and has consequently only emerged in relation 
to the object?  It now enters the service of the sexual function (in: Freud, 1991, p.259). 
 
The problem that sadism has is that, though it is at once a symbol of both the life and 
death instincts, it cannot actually master either of them, despite its efforts.  Such is the 
weight that Freud put on the game of fort-da as a foundation for the early acceptance of 
loss, separation, and death. 
 In the „Envois‟ [„Sendings‟] section of The Post Card, Derrida says: „I have 
never understood why psychoanalysis is so hung up on such a backward technology of 
the fort:da or of “direct” discourse‟ (Derrida, 1987, p.44).  The reference to direct 
discourse is perhaps to the analytic situation in the institution of psychoanalytic 
practice, imagined by Freud that the patient will express themselves to the analyst with 
complete candour.  As he says in „The Question of Lay Analysis‟: „We call on him to be 
completely straightforward with his analyst, to keep nothing back intentionally that 
comes into his head, and then to put aside every reservation that might prevent his 
reporting certain thoughts or memories‟ (in: Freud, 1991, p.11).  Without complete 
candour, the patient is understood by Freud to be resisting analysis – a resistance which 
much of his thought conceptualizes, culminating particularly in his short essay, „The 
Resistances to Psycho-analysis‟ (in: Freud, 2001b).  In contrast to this psychoanalytic 
situation, Derrida‟s allegorical and circumlocutionary writing style, in „Envois‟ and in 
„Circumfession‟ (and undoubtedly elsewhere, but the latter text invokes the former as its 
main predecessor), is often an attempt on his part to implicitly perform the very 
principle in his writing that it neglects to explicitly state.  As such, with Derrida, often 
the point of his thought is implicit rather than explicit in the text within which it is 
articulated.  As we have seen in previous chapters, the reason for this is Derrida‟s 
overriding concern with the strange dynamic between the work of concepts (signified) 
and the work of articulation (signifier) in the texts that form the discourse of 
philosophy.  Indeed, „Freud and the Scene of Writing‟ already refers to: „An attempt to 
justify a theoretical reticence to utilize Freudian concepts, otherwise than in quotation 
marks‟ (Derrida, 1978, p.197). 
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Clearly, for Derrida, the status of the key concepts in psychoanalysis are 
problematic and open to revision.  This is so even if they are deemed to possess an 
explanatory power perhaps to an unprecedented degree in the context of the history of 
philosophy (and undoubtedly in the subsequent history of academic psychology, which 
has regressed somewhat since Freud‟s foundations).  If „Freud and the Scene of 
Writing‟ calls for all the concepts of Freudian psychoanalysis to be placed within 
quotation marks, then „To Speculate – On “Freud”‟ places Freud‟s name itself into 
quotation marks.  Howells notes that this latter essay of Derrida‟s „puts quotation marks 
around Freud‟s name because it is concerned with autobiography and questions of the 
relationship between “man” and “work”‟ (Howells, 1998, pp.106-107).  I would like to 
make a more radical claim than this: I would argue that Derrida puts quotation marks 
around Freud‟s name because, in a situation in which all of the concepts of 
psychoanalysis have already been put in quotation marks by Derrida, it then becomes 
necessary to transform the psychoanalytic project and object itself.  Just as „Freud and 
the Scene of Writing‟ picks out Freud‟s essay „A Note upon the “Mystic Writing-pad”‟ 
in order to radicalize how we think of Freud‟s key concepts by arguing that writing is 
one of them, so „To Speculate – On “Freud”‟ picks out Freud‟s essay „Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle‟ as a way of radicalizing the psychoanalytic project and object itself.  
Indeed, the „Envois‟ section of The Post Card acts as a preface to the essay that follows 
it, „To Speculate – On “Freud”‟, because in this preface Derrida invents what he calls 
the „postal principle‟ (Derrida, 1987, p.27) as a counter-concept to Freud‟s concept of 
the pleasure principle.  In The Post Card Derrida tries to set up the conditions for a 
more effective manner of going „beyond the pleasure principle‟. 
Derrida‟s notion of the postal principle has two central meanings.  First, like any 
mail in general that is sent in the post, there is always a danger that it might not arrive at 
its destination, what Derrida in „Envois‟ calls adestination: „The condition for it to 
arrive is that it ends up and even that it begins by not arriving.  This is how it is to be 
read, and written, the carte of the adestination‟ (Derrida, 1987, p.29).  With this first 
meaning of the postal principle Derrida deconstructs the teleological nature of human 
experience.  According to this teleological nature, we would like to know where we are 
going (in life), where our destination is, and both if and when we will arrive there.  We 
would like to know this because we would like to know when our next pleasurable 
experience will be, and how long it will last for.  To deconstruct the teleological nature 
of human experience is therefore to call into question the eventuality of the pleasurable 
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experience.  And second, like a postcard in particular that is sent in the post, it 
articulates the fact that it is „half-private half-public‟ (p.62).  With this second meaning 
Derrida deconstructs the psychological nature of human experience.  According to this 
psychological nature, like Freud, we would like to be able to articulate and 
conceptualize the nature of the human mind; the internality of the psychical apparatus.  
The problem is – as Freud is aware, as Derrida notes in „Freud and the Scene of 
Writing‟ where he argues that Freud also, „wants to respect simultaneously the Being-
in-the-world of the psyche‟ (Derrida, 1978, p.212) – that psychological experience is 
situated in the external world: in given historical epochs; in given political and 
technological conditions; in given national, cultural and linguistic traditions; and in 
given countries, cities, towns, villages, roads, houses, and family dynamics.  To 
deconstruct the psychological nature of experience is therefore to call into question very 
placement of the psyche in the externality of both the immediate world around it and the 
mediate world at large. 
Here I would like to pose the following hypothesis: viz., that Derrida‟s notion of 
the postal principle is a metaphor for the apparatus of communication, particularly 
insofar as it acts as an intermediary between the internality of the psychical apparatus 
and the externality of the various apparatuses of the real world.  Here, on the one hand, 
adestination represents the problem of miscommunication, as the communicative 
situation contains within it the possibility of both its success and failure.  And on the 
other hand, half-public half-private represents the problem historical inaccuracy, as the 
process of historical dating contains within it the possibility of contamination from the 
infinite rehearsal of the psyche‟s memory and imagination.  From Derrida‟s perspective, 
the idea of the communicative apparatus is therefore what is most lacking in Freud‟s 
thought – particularly as the miscommunications of everyday life become rehearsed in 
one‟s memory as one tries to figure out whether someone was being nice or nasty to 
them.  For communication breakdown is a key component in the formation of 
psychological problems – as, for example, the influential psychotherapist Carl Rogers 
noted (Rogers, 1961).  Derrida‟s emphasis on the ear is an emphasis on listening; and 
the idea of listening is about interpolating preventative measures into the structures of 
language that call attention to the problem of miscommunication.  For instance, in 
Limited Inc Derrida conceptualizes this interpolation under the name „mistype‟ 
(Derrida, 1988b, p.39).  The difficulty of interpreting the meaning of what others say to 
us, judging their tone, implies a priori that even so-called „everyday language‟ is 
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capable of being indirect.  Everyday language is not necessarily candid language.  In 
Portrait of Jacques Derrida as a Young Jewish Saint Hélène Cixous says: „I cannot 
emphasize enough that his whole philosophy is a consequence of the displacement of 
everyday language‟ (Cixous, 2004, p.59).  When it comes to language, Derrida is not 
merely interested in the literary context, but also the everyday context, for in both 
contexts rests the problem of rhetorical indirectness and misdirection.  Indeed, it could 
perhaps be argued that situated in the intermediary space of the communicative 
apparatus is Derrida‟s pragrammatology. 
Take, for example, the nicknames that Derrida utilizes throughout his work (e.g., 
„Sarl‟ in Limited Inc): these are as much a feature of everyday language as they are of 
literary language.  The displacement of the proper name is not reserved merely for the 
literary perspective.  But the assimilation of Derrida‟s thought in literature departments 
tends to sideline his emphasis on his applicability to everyday life in favour of his 
applicability to literary texts.  Perhaps this issue is even more pertinent in the relation of 
deconstruction to psychoanalysis, where psychoanalysis has itself experienced as much 
flourishing in literature departments as deconstruction, which is perhaps due to the 
popularity of Lacan and essays by him such as „Seminar on “The Purloined Letter”‟ (in: 
Lacan, 2006).  Today, Freud is probably read, and his poignancy understood, more in 
literature departments than in both philosophy and psychology departments.  So I 
disagree with a half sentence in the „Introduction‟ by William Kerrigan and Joseph H. 
Smith to an influential book in the field that they edited, Taking Chances: Derrida, 
Psychoanalysis  and Literature: „if for Lacan there was too little philosophy in Freud, 
for Derrida there is too much‟ (Kerrigan & Smith, 1984, p.xiv).  Here they are briefly 
summarizing the argument of the essay by Alan Bass in their book, „The Double Game: 
An Introduction‟ (Bass, 1984), so perhaps it is a little unfair to attribute ownership of 
this sentence entirely to them.  At any rate, undoubtedly there is an allusion in this 
citation to the fact that Derrida inscribes Freud‟s concepts into the history of 
metaphysics.  However, in the context in which this citation is made it gives the reader 
the impression that Derrida‟s main point of relevance and applicability is to the literary 
text.  In contrast, I would argue that it is to everyday life; and also that the 
conceptualization of autobiography in his thought goes as much in the direction of the 
everyday as it does in the direction of the literary (for the latter, see Robert Smith‟s 
Derrida and Autobiography). 
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Let us turn more directly to the theme of autobiography, then, in „To Speculate – 
On “Freud”‟.  This essay contains four chapters.  The first chapter, „Notices 
(Warnings)‟, begins by conceptualizing Nietzsche‟s double theme of life and death into 
the term „life death‟ (Derrida, 1987, p.259).  Since this is not Nietzsche‟s own concept 
as such, but is rather the conceptualization of a Nietzschean theme, one can see the 
transformative work of reaffirmation involved in Derrida‟s simultaneous adoption and 
supplementation of Nietzsche‟s thought (which was articulated in the previous chapter).  
Ultimately, in „To Speculate – On “Freud”‟, Derrida uses this concept in order to 
provoke a similar sort of reaffirmation of the themes of life and death in Freud‟s 
„Beyond the Pleasure Principle‟.  But this is in order, precisely, to put psychoanalysis 
into question by arguing that the development of its new concepts (repetition 
compulsion and death drive) impinges radically on the status of its old ones.  However, 
in Derrida‟s essay as a whole there are various detours in the making of this point.  In 
„Notices (Warnings)‟ he quotes from Freud‟s „An Autobiographical Study‟ (in: Freud, 
2001a) to the effect that, on the one hand, Freud notices a resemblance to 
psychoanalysis in prior philosophers, particularly Schopenhauer and Nietzsche; but on 
the other hand, he also warns that they played such a small part in his intellectual 
development that they should not be understood as his intellectual predecessors.  The 
issue, for Derrida, is thus the inheritance that Freud owes to the philosophical tradition 
at the precise moment of his disavowing of that very inheritance: „whether he analyses it 
or not, Freud submits to an imperative which prescribes that he interrupt the chain and 
refuse the inheritance.  And that he thereby found another genealogy‟ (Derrida, 1987, 
p.266).  One of the main features of Derrida‟s deconstruction of Freud is thus to think 
the gap between intellectual and institutional psychoanalysis; between psychoanalytic 
theory and psychoanalytic practice. 
For as Freud puts it in his essay, „On the History of the Psychoanalytic 
Movement‟: „psychoanalysis is my creation‟ (in: Freud, 2001c, p.7).  As his creation, 
there is an epistemological break with the philosophical tradition; an avoidance of 
philosophical speculation as psychoanalytic theory is made after observation rather than 
before it.  And yet, as we saw earlier, in „Beyond the Pleasure Principle‟ he also utilizes 
the very language of speculation.  In „Notices (Warnings)‟ Derrida asks: „Did Freud 
give himself over, abandon himself to speculation?‟ (Derrida, 1987, p.265).  The 
problem here is that, where the early Freud seemed empiricist, the later Freud seems 
speculative; and yet, while speculative, he becomes more dismissive of his 
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philosophical inheritance.  For Derrida, psychoanalytic practice is grounded in the 
theme of the patient‟s resistance to analysis via an evasive periphrasis.  So the problem 
for deconstruction is in identifying what psychoanalysis itself resists at the theoretical 
level; and it seemed to resist philosophical speculation.  Hence, Derrida argues that 
Freud, „defends himself against [philosophy] by avoiding it‟ (p.266).  And yet, in later, 
more reflective works, Freud appears to „give himself over‟ to speculation; but 
paradoxically, while doing so, for example in his „An autobiographical study‟, avoiding 
his philosophical inheritance even more.  In order to return, towards the end of „Notices 
(Warnings)‟, to the theme of life death (which is already inscribed in différance), 
Derrida rethinks this speculative structure in relation to différance itself: „the graphics 
of différance belongs neither to science nor to philosophy in their classical limits‟ 
(p.288).  He thus proposes a hypothesis: „the speculative structure has its place and its 
necessity in this graphics‟ (p.285). 
These latter citations from Derrida provoke a paradox regarding speculation.  On 
the one hand, it is impossible to philosophize about death, and about the relation of life 
to death, and of the temporality of this relation, without a certain logic or law of 
speculation at work.  On the other hand, it is also impossible for this graphical 
speculation inscribed within différance to conform to the laws of logic that define the 
limits of classical philosophical speculation.  Although, to some, philosophical 
speculation seems too free insofar as it can hypothesize the existence of God, and the 
existence of anything else that one cares to think of in some so-called „thought 
experiment‟; in contrast, for Derrida, it is also the case that there is an element in which 
philosophical speculation is too constrained by the laws of thought that underlie it.  
Once the law of non-contradiction is put into question, once logical paradoxes begin to 
make their mark, the philosophy of life can no longer avoid the problem of death; 
instead, this problem would have to be posed a priori.  Having already opened an 
autobiographical space in the first chapter by citing from Freud‟s „An Autobiographical 
Study‟, in the second chapter, „Freud‟s Legacy‟, Derrida embarks upon a curious 
analysis of Freud‟s game of fort-da involving a strange and complex autobiographical 
speculation.  By reading into some implicit judgements that Freud makes regarding the 
child he is observing in this game, Derrida suggests that the child in question is a family 
relation to Freud.  As Howells notes: „Derrida observes in Freud‟s tell-tale signs of a 
very personal involvement: the child, he is sure, is Freud‟s grandchild, son of his 
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daughter Sophie who died shortly before the essay was completed‟ (Howells, 1998, 
p.108). 
Before Derrida gives a discussion of this scene that Howells pithily describes, he 
articulates what he understands to be the general law of autobiographical speculation 
itself: 
 
To go forward in my reading, I now need an essential possibility whose chance, if it can be put thus, will 
have been momentous: it is that every autobiographical speculation, to the extent that it constitutes a 
legacy and the institution of a movement without limit, must take into account, in its very performance, 
the mortality of the legatees.  As soon as there is mortality, death can in principle overtake one at every 
instant.  The speculator then can survive the legatee, and this possibility is inscribed in the structure of the 
legacy, and even within this limit of self-analysis whose system supports the writing somewhat like a 
grid.  The precocious death, and therefore the mutism of the legatee who can do nothing about it: this is 
one of the possibilities of that which dictates and causes to write (Derrida, 1987, p.305). 
 
There are three points to note here.  First, that „autobiographical speculation‟ refers here 
to a mode of interpretation, perhaps even a judgement, which is applied to someone‟s 
life (including potentially one‟s own).  One must therefore be in a position to know a 
few disconnected facts about the person‟s life and work, and try to connect the dots in 
such a way that makes sense, but for which there is little obvious evidence.  In this 
sense, autobiographical speculation happens every day: for example when we wonder 
about someone‟s mode of communication towards us, attempt to interpret their 
intentions, and make judgements about their character based on the conclusion we come 
to about them.  Second, regarding Derrida‟s argument that the condition of any 
autobiographical speculation is „the mortality of the legatees‟ (that is, the mortality of 
those that one is speculating about): this is so because the problem of autobiographical 
speculation is that, generally speaking, like any communicative context, it can come to 
an end because of the possibility of „precocious death‟.  And third, the structure that 
Derrida speaks about here with respect to the legatees would also, in principle, apply 
itself to the speculator themselves, such that death could come along to interrupt the 
moment of speculation itself. 
Before concluding, I would like to utilize this autobiographical emphasis to 
prepare a critical reading of the essay in Geoffrey Bennington‟s book Interrupting 
Derrida called „Circanalysis (The Thing Itself)‟ – the „critical‟ part of the reading will 
occur in the conclusion, firstly I will briefly recount its main themes.  In this essay, 
Bennington uses Derrida‟s „Circumfession‟ as a springboard to discuss the more general 
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relationship between psychoanalysis and deconstruction.  His neologism of circanalysis 
is thus invented in order to point to a circumnavigatory manoeuvre in Derrida‟s relat ion 
to psychoanalysis.  Towards the end of his essay Bennington offers a definition of his 
neologism: „Derrida‟s circanalysis, his way of turning around psychoanalysis without 
ever getting round it or claiming to have completed the tour, would be the only way to 
be fair with Freud, to give oneself the time (which will, alas, always be lacking) for the 
thing itself in its stealing away‟ (Bennington, 2000, pp.108-109).  This metaphor of 
„turning around‟ is also alluded to at the beginning of the essay: „Freud is never named 
in “Circumfession”.  This text, which seems – more than any other text of his, perhaps – 
to turn around psychoanalytic themes, as though offering itself to a psychoanalytic 
reading, does so without any direct reference to Freud‟  (p.93).  It will be recalled from 
the first chapter, on „Circumfession‟, that Derrida there utilizes a statement towards the 
end of „Envois‟ regarding this phrase to turn around: „Cover of the first of the notebooks 
preparatory to a book on circumcision, “The Book of Elijah,” projected from 1976.  End 
of the Envois section of The Postcard (1979): “I shall wonder what, from my birth or 
thereabouts, to turn around has meant”‟ (Derrida, 1993, p.89).  Bennington, who, of 
course, is himself a character in „Circumfession‟, is thus alluding to this intertextuality 
of „Envois‟ and „Circumfession‟: the former addresses Freud, and one would have 
thought that the latter ought to address Freud but it does not even mention him by name. 
It will also be recalled that in „Circumfession‟ Derrida documents his mother‟s 
last days; he writes for his mother in a work of mourning before her death in 
anticipation of it.  The seventh period in „Circumfession‟ opens with a reference to the 
guilt Derrida feels at publishing his mother‟s last days: 
 
If it is invulnerable, this matrix, and some would say that that‟s its defect, what on earth can happen to it, 
from what wound is it waiting for me, me who, among other remorse with respect to my mother, feel 
really guilty for publishing her end, in exhibiting her last breaths and, still worse, for purposes that some 
might judge to be literary, at risk of adding a dubious exercise to the „writer and his mother‟ series, 
subseries „the mother‟s death‟, and what is there to be done, would I not feel as guilty, and would I not in 
truth be as guilty if I wrote here about myself without retaining the least trace of her (Derrida, 1993, 
pp.36-37). 
 
What is it to write about one‟s own mother, and to publish that writing in the public 
domain for all to read?  On the one hand Derrida feels guilty for „publishing her end‟; 
on the other hand he also argues that, given he is writing his (semi-)autobiography, he 
would „be as guilty‟ if he wrote only about himself without reference to his mother.  
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Such is the difficult moral problem with writing an autobiography (and which is partly 
why Derrida only writes a semi-autobiographical text), addressed in the second chapter 
on Rousseau, namely that autobiography is about the others in one‟s life as much as it is 
about oneself in one‟s life.  Even so, the guilt remains. 
At any rate, the reference here of Derrida‟s to „the “writer and his mother” 
series, subseries “the mother‟s death”‟, is as much an allusion to the psychoanalytic 
literature on the subject.  The much parodied line of psychoanalysis, „Tell me about 
your mother‟, is also alluded to by Derrida here in „Circumfession‟.  As Bennington 
says, „Circumfession‟ appears to „turn around‟ psychoanalytic themes, and yet never 
names Freud – while naming him indirectly by referring back to The Post Card, his 
monumental book on Freud.  Bennington continues, quoting „Circumfession‟ near the 
beginning of this extract: 
 
Derrida speaks, for example, of himself as „author of more or less legitimate writings about Plato, 
Augustine, Descartes, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Benjamin, Austin‟ [Derrida, 1993, 
p.115)], but omits Freud from his list, which is striking in the context of the list, given that Derrida is 
saying that he is the only philosopher who will have dared to described his own penis.  This marked 
absence of Freud works as though he was saying: „Here, analyse me, I‟m happy to lend myself to it, I 
even demand it, I‟m giving you something to work on, you see – unlike the patient Freud talks about at 
the beginning of the text on negation, I don‟t even say “It is not my mother” so you can immediately 
mutter “So it was his mother”, I say myself, without waiting, “It‟s my mother, I speak only of her, you 
ought to know what that means”; and look, to make life easier for you, I‟m not even going to speak of 
analysis or Freud in this text, I‟m not even going to begin to call into question the concepts you will not 
fail to invoke in your analysis.  I expose myself in all innocence to your ear‟ (Bennington, 2000, p.93). 
 
In Freud‟s brief text „Negation‟, which Bennington refers to here, Freud observes a 
patient negating that someone in the dream symbolizes his mother: „“You ask who this 
person in the dream can be.  It‟s not my mother.”  We amend this to: “So it is his 
mother”‟ (in: Freud, 2001a, p.235).  According to Bennington, Derrida is in agreement 
with Freud that it is his mother, but also posing Freud the semi-rebellious question: So 
what are you going to do about it that I cannot figure out for myself?  A moment later 
Bennington continues: „The scene thus played by “Circumfession” is like the 
exasperation of a situation so well described by Serge Leclaire almost thirty years ago: 
how to analyse, once the patient already more or less shares the analytic knowledge of 
the analyst?‟ (Bennington, 2000, pp.93-94).  It is this penetrating question, and a critical 
reading of Bennington‟s own answer to it in „Circanalysis‟, that the conclusion will now 
address. 
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Conclusion 
Bennington‟s answer to the above question, as he refers enigmatically to „the troubled 
history of the relations between psychoanalysis and Jacques Derrida‟ (Bennington, 
2000, p.94), involves the aid of a declaration that Derrida made about psychoanalysis, 
vocally (i.e., it is undocumented), after a lecture given by René Major in 1988: „I have 
never subscribed to any proposition of psychoanalysis‟ (Derrida, in: Bennington, 2000, 
p.95).  With the help of this declaration behind him, Bennington makes the following 
hypothesis: 
 
My hypothesis today will be that the relationship Derrida entertains with psychoanalysis is an original 
one, i.e. that on the one hand this relationship is his alone (no-one else has that relationship with 
psychoanalysis), and on the other hand that this relationship is not the same as the relationship he 
entertains with other authors or currents of thought he reads, so that he would not make this declaration 
about Heidegger or Lévinas or Nietzsche.  And also, no doubt, that the relationship of Derrida with Freud 
is original in the sense that it is there at the origin, from the start, that there is, and would have been, no 
Derrida without Freud (p.96). 
 
In emphasizing „original‟ in this manner, Bennington is implying that the relationship 
Derrida has with Freud is singular: i.e., that much like a relationship of everyday life – 
of family member, a friend, a lover, a colleague, an enemy, etc – it has its own dynamic.  
What Bennington is alluding to is that psychodynamics are embedded not so much in 
the internality of the psychical apparatus, but rather in the half-private half-public (or 
half-internal half-external) dynamics of the communicative apparatus of the specific 
relationship itself: perhaps what one could call a relatio-dynamics rather than a psycho-
dynamics. 
 However, if Bennington appears to imply this in the above articulation of his 
hypothesis, ironically it is not something that seems to concern the rest of 
„Circanalysis‟.  Instead, he becomes concerned with making his own declaration 
regarding the very identity of deconstruction in relation to psychoanalysis: 
„deconstruction is not psychoanalysis, and is so much not psychoanalysis that it is 
deconstruction‟ (Bennington, 2000, p.97).  Bennington is one of those very partisan 
Derrideans, known for giving corrective readings not only of Derrida‟s critics but also 
his other followers.  Indeed, the latter occurs in the third part of Interrupting Derrida: in 
the final chapter, „An Idea of Syntax‟, he reviews Marian Hobson‟s (1998) book 
Jacques Derrida: Opening Lines, and says, rather oddly: „She eschews any 
deconstructive coquetry or stylistic ambition in her own writing, and often prefers, 
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perhaps strategically in view of the reader she is hoping for, the robust if unsatisfactory 
use of common-sense descriptions‟ (p.181).  Bennington seems to think that to be a 
Derridean is to write like him – but some of us just like his ideas so much we like to 
explain them as clearly as we can. Surely Derrida would allow others the space to write 
how they want to write?  And anyway, is there only one deconstructive writing style; or 
is there more than one?  Perhaps we should all write like Paul de Man, who is 
considerably more monotonic than Derrida.  One could probably say that, if Derrida is 
the founder of deconstruction, Bennington is the founder of Derridean orthodoxy – of 
what makes a Derridean a Derridean.  But Interrupting Derrida is a false title, for there 
is no „interruption‟ to speak of.  Bennington‟s „Introduction‟ tries to force the issue by 
paradoxically positing, „an “other than” other than the “other than” that inhabits 
Derrida‟s writing already‟ (p.2).  But is there only one „other than‟ in Derrida‟s writing; 
or is there (already) more than one?  For me, Bennington‟s pseudo-interruption implies 
the present need to interrupt Bennington himself, and properly. 
 To return to „Circanalysis‟, Bennington‟s arguments become superior: for they 
move from an identification of deconstruction in contradistinction to psychoanalysis to 
the fact that deconstruction knows more than psychoanalysis.  The reason for this is that 
deconstruction is more aware of the inherited status of the concepts that it utilizes: 
 
Like any thinker, including Derrida, Freud must draw his concepts from the metaphysical tradition; and 
like any thinker who thinks something new, who invents something, he must invent on the back of these 
inherited concepts.  And Freud does so.  But what he does not do is to reflect this double necessity: he 
fails, then, in this double reflection, and fails in it doubly, on the historical as much as on the theoretical 
level. [...] And so this is, it would appear, essentially what distinguishes deconstruction from 
psychoanalysis: not really thinking through both the necessary belonging of its concepts to the history of 
metaphysics and its necessary strategic displacement of those concepts, psychoanalysis understands less 
than deconstruction (Bennington, 2000, p.101). 
 
I think that Bennington has got it wrong on this point: deconstruction cannot be superior 
to psychoanalysis merely by invoking the inheritance of its concepts from the 
metaphysical tradition, because this would change the topic of conversation, and then 
psychoanalysis and deconstruction would be talking at cross purposes.  If 
„psychoanalysis understands less than deconstruction‟, and ergo deconstruction 
understands more than psychoanalysis, then they have to be talking about the same 
thing.  Otherwise nobody is in a position of understanding anybody about anything, and 
there develops a radical confusion; the sort of confusion that, in everyday life, causes 
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communication breakdown which will eventually lead to a relationship breakdown.  
Then, the allegedly „original relationship‟ that Derrida has with Freud and 
psychoanalysis will simply become embittered.  If there is a „troubled history‟ there, 
then who is causing the trouble?  Who is not making their case clear; and who is not 
listening? 
 I would argue that, if deconstruction is to understand more than psychoanalysis, 
then it has to rethink the psychoanalytic object better than psychoanalysis itself.  
Hopefully this chapter, indeed the present study as a whole, has begun to address what it 
is in Derrida‟s thought that at least sets up the groundwork for rethinking this object: 
viz., his idea of the autobiographical grounded in what, in „To Speculate – On “Freud”‟, 
he calls the „heterothanatographical‟ (Derrida, 1987, p.273).  The life of the self 
grounded in the death of the other.  Derrida‟s radicalization of Freud‟s „Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle‟, indeed of psychoanalysis generally, seems Nietzschean on this 
point.  On the one hand, the whole concept of „life death‟ invokes the Dionysian 
philosophy of creation through destruction.  On the other hand, the resistance to the 
„analytic situation‟ of psychoanalysis, perhaps then to the institution of psychoanalysis, 
is grounded in Zarathustra‟s advice to the free spirit to go and find themselves in their 
own way rather than become a mere follower of him.  From the final section of the first 
part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, „Of the Bestowing Virtue‟, quoted by Nietzsche 
himself at the end of his „Foreword‟ to Ecce Homo: 
 
You say you believe in Zarathustra?  But of what importance is Zarathustra?  You are my believers: but 
of what importance are all believers? 
You had not yet sought yourselves when you found me.  Thus do all believers; therefore all belief is of so 
little account. 
Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves; and only when you have all denied me will I return to you. 
Truly, with other eyes, my brothers, I shall then seek my lost ones; with another love I shall then love you 
(Nietzsche, 2003, p.103). 
 
If one shares the analytic knowledge of the psychoanalyst, then perhaps there is no need 
for an actual therapy session with a so-called „expert‟ (since one already has the 
capability to self-diagnose; although, of course, another ear can help).  But this does not 
mean that one will not have one‟s own psychological problems to tend to.  To put into 
question the concepts of psychoanalysis by addressing their problematic inheritance 
does not make the psychological problems of everyday life magically disappear.  And if 
the problem of the relation between the inheritance problems and the psychological 
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problems were left unaddressed, then it could be construed as avoiding the latter by 
changing the topic of conversation.  Indeed, since most people of the world do not have 
the analytic knowledge of the psychoanalyst, what would be Bennington‟s proposal for 
the majority of folk (rather than for the intellectual elite)? 
„Circanalysis‟ has a strange ending.  Bennington takes a hyperbolic literary 
critical approach to Derrida‟s thought, suggesting that it might all be a fiction: 
 
I have often wondered what would change if, by an extraordinary discovery, it turned out that everything 
Derrida puts forward about the metaphysical tradition were a fiction.  Let us imagine that he had invented 
a novel about philosophy, with characters called Plato, Kant, Hegel, etc.  And within this fiction about a 
fiction, one could then wonder what would happen if such and such a character were removed from the 
story (Bennington, 2000, p.109). 
 
I am not entirely sure where Bennington wants this literary thought experiment to go.  
Perhaps this is the key moment in Interrupting Derrida of his actual, proper 
interruption: the fictionalization of Derrida.  But as with standard philosophical thought 
experiments, the question I would ask to Bennington here is: What for?  Such thought 
experiments are too frivolous for me.  „Let us imagine‟, instead, that Derrida‟s thought 
actually matters to the real world; to the plights of existence and experience; and to the 
psychological problems of humankind.  Let us imagine that deconstruction is concerned 
with the welfare of humankind; that it is concerned with how people are.  In such a case, 
in what way does Derrida‟s thought help us to understand these problems?  This is the 
sort of question that, for me, underlies his conceptualization of autobiography.  For 
although these problems are the explicit address of psychoanalysis, Derrida‟s argument 
is that the psychoanalytic object just is the philosophical object.  Here the difference 
between Derrida and Freud is perhaps analogous to that between Heidegger and 
Levinas.  Just as Heidegger‟s notion of Being is a universal designation and Levinas‟s 
notion of the Other is singular, similarly, where Freud‟s familial structure is 
universalized in the Oedipus complex, Derrida‟s familial structure is organized around 
his consideration of autobiographical singularity.  In terms of the reconceptualization of 
subjectivity that it provokes, perhaps we have seen a clue to this in the idea of the 
singularity of relatio-dynamics, but I will leave the groundwork for this to the 
conclusion which follows. 
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Conclusion 
 
Paradoxes of Subjectivity 
In the main body of the present study I have presented scholarly arguments in the area 
of Derrida‟s autobiographical thought.  Throughout the chapters there has been an 
insistent and consistent argument for the conceptualization of autobiography in his 
thought, and that the reason for this conceptualization is to provoke the 
reconceptualization of subjectivity.  In this conclusion I would therefore like to 
succinctly synthesize the main insights from the chapters in order to turn in a more 
systematic manner towards this question of the reconceptualization of subjectivity. 
 We have seen from the first chapter that Derrida‟s thought presents an 
ambiguous relationship to the conflict between religion and atheism.  What he tends to 
do is to change the terrain of the argument from being about whether or not God exists 
to being about the conflictive nature of the argument itself.  Derrida calls for a lessening 
of the passions in this conflict by arguing for what I called a radical agnosticism, which 
is perhaps better understood as a transcendental agnosticism opening the very condition 
of articulation with which God‟s name is invoked.  Here, agnosticism is not an 
empirical-experiential state of unknowing, a state which promotes the charge of „sitting 
on the fence‟; rather, it is a deconstructive intervention into the passionate way in which 
the argument traditionally occurs, in order to call for a more intellectually driven debate.  
The reason for this is that the violence contained in the passion tends to do an injustice 
to the other side before the argument has even properly begun (hence why it was also 
called a „tolerant agnosticism‟ in the Marx chapter).  To this degree, as we saw, 
Derrida‟s transcendental agnosticism can have proponents that are either atheists or 
theists.  In the first chapter radical agnosticism was articulated as an autobiographical 
agnosticism.  Here, the openness of radical agnosticism to both sides of the debate 
becomes transposed to the more extended domain of everyday life experience, which 
involves a plethora of individual differences that are impossible to classify.  In the final 
chapter of „To Speculate – On “Freud”‟, called „Paralysis‟, Derrida invokes this 
impossible taxonomy: „Everything is due to the difficulty of properly naming the thing 
itself.  Actually this difficulty is an impossibility, a difficulty whose limits can only be 
indefinitely put back‟ (Derrida, 1987, p.382).  Ultimately, deconstruction is a general 
openness to the infinitude of these individual differences, impossibly accounting for the 
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singularity of the circumstances and the characteristics at work in everybody‟s 
autobiography. 
 In „Circumfession‟ Derrida argued that God is the origin of tears.  Of course, 
„tears‟ can be understood in both senses: as a rip or a cut; and as the result of crying.  
God would be the origin of tears in the first sense because of circumcision.  But 
circumcision is a theme within Derrida‟s own autobiography; and it was not the 
intention of the first chapter to become overly concerned with his autobiography in 
particular, as it was rather more philosophically oriented towards the condition for 
everybody‟s autobiography.  As such, the latter sense of „tears‟ was emphasized, and 
interpreted as symbolic of emotion or feeling more generally (for one can cry from an 
experience of both intense pain and intense pleasure), and therefore as undermining the 
priority of the Augustinian cogito.  Also, this interpretation led neatly into the following 
chapter, since Rousseau‟s thought is a key moment for Derrida in the history of 
metaphysics in which feeling is given priority over thought.  For Rousseau, the relation 
between feeling and action, or rather emotion and motion, calls for a transformation of 
the „golden rule‟ of morality: from „do unto others as you would have them do unto 
you‟ to „do what is good for you with as little harm as possible to others‟.  However, it 
was argued that, since in his Confessions Rousseau – apparently hypocritically – 
himself hurts the feelings of others, this is one of the key reasons why Derrida‟s 
autobiographical thought is circumlocutionary.  For Derrida, circumlocution is not 
merely the basis of an immoral manipulation, but paradoxically is also the basis of a 
moral apologia of the other: i.e., a protection of the other by not unnecessarily revealing 
their secrets to the world. 
 The reading of Derrida‟s pivotal chapter in Of Grammatology, „That Dangerous 
Supplement‟, offered an original interpretation that was sceptical of the pervasive 
literary critical interpretation in which Derrida‟s key concepts of text and supplement 
are primarily given a literary point of reference.  Instead, it was argued that these 
concepts should be understood philosophically: i.e., as having a „metaphysical‟ point of 
reference.  This deepened the argument concerning the nature of feelings, by 
highlighting the way in which they can be substituted and supplemented when they are 
left unsatisfied, so as to leave open the space for a partial satisfaction by other means.  
The scepticism around the literary critical interpretation of Derrida led, in the following 
chapter, to a reinterpretation of his thought as a form of philosophical criticism.  Here, 
by philosophical criticism is meant that Derrida‟s thought works by placing into 
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question the very foundations and underlying premises of a mode of thinking.  In 
particular, since deconstruction is the unbalancing of the metaphysics of self-presence, 
one of its key components is therefore to put into question the underlying conception of 
human subjectivity that is at work in a mode of thinking.  In this chapter the target was 
Marx‟s thought, in which the identification of the proletariat qua proletariat (that is, as a 
revolutionary class) is demonstrated to be more complicated and problematic than Marx 
himself envisaged.  Marx wanted the proletariat to „unite‟.  But since this is only 
possible in a political context, Marx disallowed the psychological space for considering 
the person as an individual entity – in effect reducing psychology to political economy.  
It was argued that, against Marx, Derrida‟s half-Rousseauian half-Nietzschean 
watchword of learning to live allowed this space to be rethought. 
 In allowing the space for the psychological consideration of the individual, it 
was argued in the following chapter that Derrida‟s most prominent philosophical 
forebear was Nietzsche, whose emphasis on existentialist individuality is an inspiration 
for deconstructive philosophy.  Derrida‟s simultaneous adoption and supplementation of 
Nietzsche‟s thought offered a reaffirmation of Nietzschean affirmation.  Indeed, the 
very concept of deconstruction involves the simultaneous adoption and supplementation 
of Nietzsche‟s Dionysian philosophy of the force of construction through the force of 
destruction.  As adoption, it synthesizes the two forces; but as supplementation, the 
figure of Apollo is held in reserve.  In his essay „Force and Signification‟ in Writing and 
Difference Derrida says: „The divergence, the difference between Dionysus and Apollo, 
between ardour and structure, cannot be erased in history, for it is not in history.  It too, 
in an unexpected sense, is an original structure: the opening of history‟ (Derrida, 1978, 
p.28).  For Derrida, deconstruction is not simply about the forces of construction and 
destruction, but also about the question of what force mediates between these forces at 
the very opening of historical formation and transformation.  As such, he invokes 
Nietzsche‟s earlier designation of the different artistic styles of Apollo and Dionysus.  
For even if it turned out that the later Nietzsche is correct in saying that the Dionysian is 
more psychologically insightful than the Apollonian, it nonetheless matters that people 
themselves in everyday historical life are not always psychologically insightful, as 
Nietzsche himself argued.  Hence, in accounting for the origin of historical reality, as 
Derrida attempts, one must consider with fairness the taming forces of Apollonian 
civilization. 
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Nietzsche had his distinctive style of criticism, and his powerful Dionysian 
perspective which gave that criticism its force.  But there is more than one style to 
consider, and the thought of Nietzsche itself contains the trace (in German, spur) of 
these other styles.  In Spurs: Nietzsche‟s Styles Derrida invoked the connection between 
the English word „spur‟ (impetus) and the German word „spur‟ (trace) in order to 
reconsider the relation between an underlying impetus (i.e., what the substantial truth of 
something is), and the way in which that impetus is manifested (i.e., the different styles 
of presentation that contain a trace of their underlying substance, but which through that 
trace are also capable of creating a gap (in French, écart) between style and substance).  
This concerns autobiography because it implies the difference between genuineness and 
disingenuousness; and the problem of how one goes about making a judgement, and the 
way in which that judgement applies itself towards any particular person.  We would 
like to think we know someone; but how can we be sure that they are not wearing a 
mask for social life?  And if we do not entirely know someone, then they are a potential 
threat to our existence; where, in such circumstances it is only wise to learn self-
defence.  In Spurs Derrida says: 
 
In the question of style there is always the weight or examen of some pointed object.  At times this object 
might be only a quill or a stylus.  But it could just as easily be a stiletto, or even a rapier.  Such objects 
might be used in a vicious attack against what philosophy appeals to in the name of matter or matrix, an 
attack whose thrust could not but leave its mark, could not but inscribe there some imprint or form 
(Derrida, 1979, p.37). 
 
In Spurs Derrida picks out an isolated fragmentary aphorism from Nietzsche‟s works, „I 
have forgotten my umbrella‟.  Here, the umbrella could be construed as yet another 
attacking object that Nietzsche alludes to – e.g., in Twilight of the Idols he professes to 
philosophize with a hammer (Nietzsche, 1990); or in Ecce Homo in the chapter on 
„Beyond Good and Evil‟ he says: „From now on all my writings are fish-hooks‟ 
(Nietzsche, 1992, p.82).  For Derrida, it seems, Nietzsche remembers his attacking 
objects but forgets his defensive ones.  The umbrella is at once a „pointed object‟, 
shaped like a fish-hook, but it also shields us from the weather. 
Perhaps an analogy between deconstruction and martial arts would not be out of 
place here (particularly as this analogy would impinge on the question of style as a 
result of the debate in martial arts theory of which art offers the best style of self-
defence).  And in the following chapter on Freud, the ego‟s protective shield, its defence 
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mechanisms against the potentially threatening forces from the external world, 
implicitly continues the analogy of self-defence given at the end of the chapter on 
Nietzsche.  In „To Speculate – On “Freud”‟ Derrida argues that Freud tries to defend 
himself against philosophical speculation; but that he also ends up using this all-too-
philosophical method of enquiry into the psychological phenomena he purports to have 
discovered through observation.  This is so in particular with respect to the fort:da, as 
Derrida argues at the end of the second chapter „Freud‟s Legacy‟, which becomes 
subsumed by „an auto-bio-thanato-hetero-graphic scene of writing‟ (Derrida, 1987, 
p.336).  Derrida argues that, in „Beyond the Pleasure Principle‟, Freud seeks only the 
one step beyond the pleasure principle, the death drive, but instead takes many other 
steps (including the fort:da).  He notices that Freud uses the phrase, a „step further‟, too 
many times to have only one step: „Freud uses this expression ten times – only to take it 
back in advance‟ (p.336).  For Derrida, the scene of writing is not an analogy which sets 
the stage for Freud‟s multilayered metapsychological structure; rather it is an analogy 
for the way in which the written mode of communication betrays the structure itself by 
the creation of its own scene.  For Derrida, the scene of writing is therefore the stage or 
the step beyond the pleasure principle; the scene of writing is the shield of 
deconstruction against the idea of the psychical scene set up by psychoanalysis. 
At the same time, as Derrida articulates it, the very idea of the scene of writing 
itself sets the stage for another metapsychological theory in terms of what Derrida calls 
the „auto-bio-thanato-hetero-graphic‟.  Here, it is perhaps the case that Derrida leaves 
the space open for his own „metapsychological fable‟ (Derrida, 1978, p.228).  Unlike 
Freud, the two conceptual oppositions to be considered are not the 
conscious/unconscious and the ego/id, but rather are the two involved in the 
deconstruction of autobiography: self/other and life/death.  If the core problem of the 
Freudian psychical apparatus is that it represses the communicative apparatus, then the 
process of bringing the latter apparatus to the surface must impinge upon the structure 
of the psychical apparatus itself – if it can still be said that there is such a thing (perhaps 
in this space remains the whole complex relation between Derrida and Lacan).  This 
returns us to the central argument of the present study made in the introduction: viz., 
that Derrida‟s conceptualization of autobiography provokes the reconceptualization of 
subjectivity.  This reconceptualization is presented here under the title of „Paradoxes of 
subjectivity‟, in which the general paradoxical manner of deconstructive enquiry 
becomes applied specifically to the problem of human subjectivity.  The two main 
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conceptual oppositions in the word „autobiography‟, auto/heteros and bios/thanatos, 
offer the initial opening into these paradoxes (for the „graphy‟ see the final chapter of 
Robert Smith‟s Derrida and Autobiography).  However, once the implications and the 
consequences of these oppositions are drawn out, as we will see they open themselves 
up to further paradoxes. 
With regards to the nature and experience of human subjectivity, the 
autos/heteros opposition applies itself to the spatial part of subjectivity (as the relation 
between oneself and another implies proximity and distance), and the bios/thanatos 
opposition applies itself to the temporal part of subjectivity (as the relation between life 
and death implies beginning and end).  For Derrida, space and time are implicated 
within one another: for example, in „Différance‟ he speaks of, „the becoming-time of 
space and the becoming-space of time‟ (Derrida, 1982, p.8).  Hence, the objectivity 
created by space and time is constantly in motion, in a process of becoming, and so is 
radically unstable qua objectivity: not only do things themselves change, but as they 
change so does the language that refers to them, and so the names for the things also 
change.  Part of the reason for this instability is that Derrida is already thinking of 
objectivity not only as it is in itself, but also and perhaps more importantly as it is 
experienced through human subjectivity.  The problem that human subjectivity poses to 
objectivity is that, if objectivity is already by itself made unstable via its own process of 
motion, then this instability becomes increased through the activity and reactivity of 
human emotion.  The forces which underpin objective motion (which are studied by 
physics) therefore constitute a miniscule problem for humans themselves when 
compared with the forces which underpin their own subjective emotion.  Indeed, this 
begs the question: if physics is the sole discipline that has always studied the forces of 
objective motion, then what discipline has the sole patent to study the forces of 
subjective emotion?  Today there would like to be only one such discipline 
(psychology): but for Derrida, the problem is that the discipline of psychology inherits 
too many problematic assumptions from the philosophical disciplines of metaphysics, 
logic, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and jurisprudence; as well as from other 
humanities disciplines such as anthropology, history, biography, and of course the 
recent resurgence in autobiographical theory. 
There is, then, more than one discipline that has a stake in human emotion, and 
this is one of Derrida‟s objections to Freud.  In „Freud and the Scene of Writing‟ he 
says: „But we must think of this scene in other terms than those of individual or 
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collective psychology, or even of anthropology.  It must be thought in the horizon of the 
scene/stage of the world, as the history of that scene/stage.  Freud‟s language is caught 
up in it‟ (Derrida, 1978, p.229).  A citation like this one appears to distance Derrida‟s 
interest from the problem of „individual or collective psychology‟.  Coupled with the 
emphasis which tends to be given in deconstructive literary theory that „Freud and the 
Scene of Writing‟ institutes the „originality of the literary signifier‟ (p.230), this 
distance seems even further away as this latter emphasis itself postpones the rethinking 
of the problem of individual or collective psychology.  However, Derrida‟s statement 
concerning the originality of the literary signifier is only the third of four domains that 
Derrida expresses interest in as opening up other fields of research that call for the 
rethinking of psychoanalysis: the second of the four is a „history of writing‟ (p.230).  
But the other two (the first and the last) actually call for a return to psychoanalytic 
themes, but in such a way that counteracts some of Freud‟s assumptions.  The first field 
that Derrida refers to is: „A psychopathology of everyday life in which the study of 
writing would not be limited to the interpretation of the lapsus calami‟ (p.230).  And the 
last field he refers to is: „a new psychoanalytic graphology‟ (p.231).  As such, Derrida‟s 
thought does not try to close off the possibility of psychoanalytic research on 
„individual or collective psychology‟; but rather seeks to open it up in a manner that is 
more wary of the metaphysical assumptions that traditional psychoanalysis inherits and 
performs. 
Before concluding, let us return to the two oppositions in question more directly 
so as to develop the idea of the deconstructive paradoxes of subjectivity.  In Derrida‟s 
thought writing is symbolic of communication more generally (the counter-concept of 
arche-writing covers all forms of communication).  In the chapter on Freud it was 
argued that what is repressed in Freudian psychoanalysis is the idea of the 
communicative apparatus as the means through which the internality of the human 
psyche comes to relate to the externality of the historical world.  In Derrida‟s thought 
this very opposition between inside and outside is placed into question by arche-writing; 
and an extension of this opposition is that between self and other.  But what is at stake 
in this placing-into-question?  On the one hand, there is the metaphysical element in 
which it is deemed possible to separate a domain of inner psychical space from the outer 
space of the world.  In this respect, Freud is correct that the entire philosophical 
tradition before him tends to privilege consciousness as the constitution of this 
psychical space.  However, Derrida‟s objection to Freud on this point is that, although 
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the designation of the unconscious brings fresh psychological insights, it is still 
grounded on the idea, which is ultimately metaphysical, in which it is possible to 
separate a domain of psychical space.  That is, although the meaning of the word 
„unconscious‟ implies an absence of self, to position the unconscious itself in a domain 
of psychical space is to act as if there was in fact a psychical substance that was present 
within the self (only without the self‟s own knowledge).  It would appear that Derrida‟s 
thought is thus grounded on the impossibility of a psychical space, as it would 
presuppose the metaphysics of a psychical substance – whether that substance was 
conscious or unconscious or both would not matter.  The paradox here is the need to 
discuss the psyche on the one hand, but on the other hand to do so without acting as if it 
were an actual substance.  How do we discover the nature of something that cannot exist 
(in the metaphysical sense of the word)? 
On the other hand, there is the moral element concerning the very relation of 
between self and other, a relation mediated by the communicative apparatus.  This 
relation is moral because it is the site of potential violence between people; or indeed, 
between humans and animals.  And since the communicative apparatus is itself the 
means through which this relation is mediated, what interests Derrida about language is 
that before any specific communicative act occurs this general capacity for violence is 
contained in all forms of communication – which is why, in Of Grammatology, he 
names an „arche-violence‟ at work in arche-writing (Derrida, 1976, p.112).  This is 
perhaps the main reason why Derrida is so careful with his language in all of the texts 
that he writes; particularly so since the texts that he writes are always in relation to 
another text of another thinker.  At any rate, the emphasis on the relation of self (autos) 
and other (heteros) invokes the problem of autonomy and heteronomy.  The 
metaphysical tradition relies on an underlying moral notion of the autonomy of the 
individual person in social life: i.e., that one is responsible for one‟s actions in one‟s 
relation to others.  The problem that Derrida‟s thought poses here is contained in the 
question: at what point in one‟s life does one become responsible?  The idea of 
individual autonomy and responsibility sounds good for the majority of so-called 
mature adults, but one is born neither mature nor an adult.  Furthermore, the general 
position of one‟s birth is beyond one‟s own autonomous control: from one‟s 
socioeconomic living conditions, to the characters of one‟s parents, to the characters of 
one‟s schoolmates, to one‟s own potential physical disabilities, and even to one‟s own 
emotions and passions.  How are we to be responsible for our actions when we are not 
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even in control of what our own passions are; the very same passions which drive our 
actions?  Derrida‟s thought here involves a general emphasis on the various real world 
modes of heteronomy, including those that affect us internally, particularly regarding 
the way in which they paradoxically both undermine the idea of autonomy and yet call 
for it with an even stronger intensity. 
In any relation between self and other, which includes the relation to both the 
other‟s other and to the other within oneself, there develops the dynamics of the 
relationship (what in the chapter on Freud I called relatio-dynamics).  To this degree, 
each relationship is singular and has its own dynamic which occurs through its own 
unique mode of communication.  Since each person is capable of presenting themselves 
differently to different people, in a way, what matters is less the general character of 
someone and more the specific dynamics at work in the mode of communication that is 
used in relation to specific people.  For one must leave the space open to account for 
secrets, feigned affections, and social masks.  In such circumstances, different people 
will have different versions of the same person – and since these versions will be moral 
ones, this is no small matter in people‟s lives.  Judgements will be made for and against 
specific people, and these judgements may be countered by the people who receive 
them; such that in the „truth‟ of matters, of who is right and wrong, of who is in the right 
and who is in the wrong, it becomes almost impossible to take an objective stance.  And 
yet we act as if we can: caught up in the heat of this potential war of words, one only 
has access to how one feels about the specific relationship in question.  It is almost 
impossible to live life without this communicative confusion at work in the dynamics of 
our relationships.  The paradoxical concern is that it is equally almost possible to live 
life with this communicative confusion, for in this space of the relatio-dynamics rests 
the play of misrepresentations (lies) and misinterpretations (errors) in the game of what 
Nietzsche calls the will to power.  Based on the mode of communication, the proximity 
and distance in our relation to others becomes not merely spatial, but more importantly, 
emotional: i.e., intricately connected to the dynamics at work in the rhetorical activity of 
our everyday communicative interrelations. 
In amongst these complications to life‟s relationships, the spectre of death 
haunts our very existence; and is perhaps symbolic of these very complications.  Such is 
the complex interrelation of life and death; what Derrida calls, paraphrasing Nietzsche 
and Freud, „life death‟.  Here it is perhaps noteworthy that in his essay, „Immanent 
Death, Imminent Death‟, David Farrell Krell loses the gap between them, calling it by 
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the strange portmanteau term, „lifedeath‟ (Krell, 1994, p.152).  For if the problem that 
Derrida poses in the concept of lifedeath is that it means that death can arrive at any 
moment, then this unpredictability must be accounted for: not only as part of the chance 
occurrence of the future events of one‟s life, but also in one‟s relation to oneself insofar 
as an implicit knowledge of one‟s death impinges on one‟s relation to one‟s life and the 
decisions one makes about its course.  As Krell notes: „An arrival that could only be 
imminent, that is, always merely on the verge of coming to presence, and immanent, 
ensconced in the innermost interior of a fortress-like crypt‟ (p.152).  The first sense is 
Heideggerian, which accounts for the objective philosophical structure of Being-
towards-death.  The second sense is Freudian, which accounts for the subjective 
psychological concern with death after the event of traumatic experience.  Indeed, 
perhaps the second sense is also Nietzschean; in the „Preface‟ to Human, All Too 
Human Nietzsche says: „“Better to die than to go on living here” – thus responds the 
imperious voice and temptation: and this “here,” this “at home” is everything it had 
hitherto loved!‟ (Nietzsche, 1996, p.7).  Such are the words of the free spirit who 
experiences the pain of liberation from the fettered spirit; for, „such bad and painful 
things are part of the history of the great liberation‟ (p.7).  If one has the need to liberate 
oneself, to make oneself more autonomous, then it is from the heteronomy of life 
circumstances that are at once painful to inhabit yet painful to transcend. 
In his psychological theory Derrida deepens the existential understanding of 
human subjectivity as concerned with the anxieties of everyday life and relationships, 
and with the anxieties over our living conditions with their potential proximity to pain 
and death.  If deconstruction circumvents psychoanalysis, it cannot simultaneously 
proclaim to understand more than psychoanalysis unless it offers its own rethinking of 
the psychoanalytic object.  But the psychoanalytic object of study is prima facie the 
same as the existential object – or rather subject.  Derrida thus utilizes the idea of 
existential subjectivity in order to deepen it with his deconstruction of autobiography; 
and this deconstructive deepening of existentialism impinges on psychoanalysis.  On the 
one hand, the emphasis on autobiographical singularity undermines the psychoanalytic 
version of universal family relations.  It does not reduce the events and experiences of 
this or that family context to some notion of hypostatized universality.  Instead it 
considers the complex web of practicalities at work in each specific context; the 
dynamics not of the psyche but of the relationships themselves; and not so much the 
stages of life as the difficult process of transition from one stage to the next.  On this 
172 
 
latter point, the psychoanalytic generalization of the neuroses that occur at these points 
of transition when they do not happen smoothly is oversimplified and requires 
rethinking.  On the other hand, the deconstruction of autobiography, for example with 
its emphasis on heterothanatography as its very condition of possibility, invokes the key 
conceptual oppositions that are at work in the reconceptualization of subjectivity 
(self/other and life/death).  As such, it sets up the conditions through which one could 
rethink in a more general way the stages of life and the neuroses that can develop in the 
difficult process of transition. 
But although Derrida does this groundwork by deepening the existential 
understanding of life through the general paradoxes of subjectivity, there is little in his 
thought that offers much in the way of practical advice for this rethinking of life‟s 
development.  Indeed, perhaps his emphasis on autobiographical singularity precludes 
it, and declares such a rethinking impossible.  From the perspective of deconstruction, 
for the present at least, psychoanalysis remains necessary yet inadequate – but can be 
both circumvented and supplemented via a deepening of the existential outlook.  The 
impossibility of adequately rethinking the stages of life, and the psychological problems 
which occur at the onset of each stage, is perhaps a consequence of Derrida‟s more 
general arguments concerning the impossibility of taxonomic classification.  This is the 
key problem for any psychological theory: How is one to classify something that is 
singular?  When that singularity must account for, as Jacob A. Riis put it, How the 
Other Half Lives (Riis, 1997), then one must also inscribe the possibility of economic 
poverty in the outer world into the problem of constructing a psychological theory of 
the inner world.  And yet, that very same singularity is also what undermines Marxist 
collectiveness: for Derrida, like psychoanalysis, Marxism becomes necessary yet 
inadequate.  Consequently, the deconstructive deepening of existentialist subjectivity 
thus operates an impossible balancing act between competing factors which impinge 
upon any psychological theory.  For there can be multiple causes to people‟s 
psychological problems; and in each singular case those causes can have different 
locations within each individual‟s own life history.  Attentiveness to this difference of 
location is the ultimate psychological insight of Derrida‟s autobiographical thought.  
Like a sort of radical existentialism, one must be flexible to the dynamics at work in 
individual circumstances, rather than operate with speculative theories of universalized 
psychodynamics (like traditional sort of psychoanalysis). 
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Due to the triadic relation between time, language, and subjectivity, at work in 
his thought, Derrida‟s psychological insight begins with the paradoxical relationship 
between rhetorical language and historical reality.  The problem of the relation between 
rhetorical activity and historical activity is that they radically impinge on one another, 
creating an impasse.  On the one hand, rhetorical activity imposes itself on history, and 
history becomes passive to its constructions; but on the other hand, historical activity 
imposes itself on rhetoric, and rhetoric becomes passive to its circumstances.  History 
cannot but operate in relation to the rhetorical language that constructs it; and rhetorical 
language cannot but operate in the circumstances that surround it.  Within this space 
between the two, there is a transmission that is capable of becoming blocked or diverted 
or even perverted (to use a Freudian term).  This perversion of the active performance 
occurs on the very boundary between events and their description (since the activity in 
question is both rhetorical and historical), and in „Envois‟ Derrida refers to this in his 
neologism, the „perverformative‟ (Derrida, 1987, p.136).  This neologism is of course 
addressed to the ordinary language pragmatists who claim to study the pragmatics of 
language use.  For Derrida, what they fail to theoretically account for is the relationship 
between language, objective event and subjective experience; as they operate with a 
wishy-washy theory that gives all the credence to language so as to give the appearance 
of, as we saw him put it in an earlier chapter, mastering history.  But what is it to master 
history?  To master history is Derrida‟s coded terminology for the metaphysics of 
autonomy: it is the idea that one is, or at least is capable of being, in complete control of 
one‟s life.  The adherents to ordinary language believe they are being critical of the 
metaphysics of historical objectivity, but they do so by covertly operating with one of 
the most uncritical metaphysical prejudices concerning human subjectivity. 
This general emphasis on pragmatics is popularly referred to, deriving from the 
pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty, as the „linguistic turn‟ (Rorty, 1967).  Instead, 
Derrida‟s emphasis on writing creates what Arthur Bradley has called the „scriptural 
turn‟ (Bradley, 2008, p.52).  But even if the triadic relationship between language, 
event, and experience, is poorly theorized in the pragmatic perspective, nonetheless its 
potential insights into the inner workings of language itself should not be dismissed.  
Derrida acknowledges this in his neologism of pragrammatology.  In principle, then, 
through the notion of pragrammatology, coupled with the perverformative, there ought 
to be at work a more radical deconstructive understanding of this triadic relationship.  
When Derrida approaches the concepts of „event‟ and „experience‟ in his work, it is 
174 
 
most often from the quasi-transcendental perspective of impossibility; and first and 
foremost, impossibility designates a hyperbolic difficulty.  So at stake is a dimension of 
human experience organized around events, and structures – e.g., social, political, and 
legal structures; historicity comes not only in distinction from rhetoricity but also from 
what Derrida calls structurality (see: Derrida, 1978, pp.278-293) – that are very difficult 
for its participants and spectators to comprehend.  Given that what concerns us here is 
the dimension of subjective experience given in the idea of autobiography, I will restrict 
my theorizing on this point to the domain of individual life history rather than, say, 
world political history.  The question then becomes: Generally speaking, what sorts of 
life events are difficult for someone to comprehend?  But perhaps this question should 
be prefaced by another: At what point in someone‟s life does one need to begin to 
comprehend events that one will find difficult to comprehend? 
Freudian psychoanalysis is grounded in the hypothesis that neurotic disorders 
have their origin in sexual problems – which can become non-sexual, or at least have 
the appearance of being non-sexual, through the work of sublimation, substitution, or 
displacement.  And because of its radical theory of infantile sexuality, psychoanalysis 
considers childhood to be the most important period of a person‟s life history, as any 
perversions in sexuality are interpreted as originating in this period via deviations from 
the proper development of the Oedipus complex.  But it is not childhood that organizes 
Derrida‟s interest in the autobiographical dimension of life history; rather, it is 
adolescence.  For example, in „Envois‟ he says: „As an adolescent, when I made love 
against the wall‟ (Derrida, 1987, p.13).  This takes him closer to a Nietzschean 
existential outlook in which the free spirit, the adolescent rebel, searches for their 
autonomy and independence in the context of heteronomous feelings of dependence on 
their parents.  Needless to say, the parents themselves, who are perhaps so used to 
communicating with their children qua children, then have a very difficult job.  Namely, 
of communicating with their adolescent children, who now have one foot in the door of 
adulthood, in such a manner that at once maintains their authority qua parents yet allows 
a certain space for the fostering of their adolescent child‟s adult autonomy.  Adolescents 
are known for being stroppy with their parents (amongst other people); but perhaps this 
is also because parents themselves continue to communicate with their adolescent 
children either as if they were still children (giving them too little autonomy), or as if 
they were fully-fledged adults (giving them too much autonomy): „you are so attached 
to your autonomy‟ (p.133). 
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For Derrida, adolescence is not merely a time when puberty begins, and so when 
the sexual object changes (from family in the incestuous infantile Oedipus complex to 
anyone but family members).  It is a paradoxical time when the sexual object is so 
overwhelmingly desirable yet so overwhelmingly unattainable.  And this, also, coupled 
with the paradox of it being a time of feeling so overwhelmingly dependent on one‟s 
family when an overwhelming desire for independence haunts our existence.  
Adolescence is a time when feelings themselves are overwhelming and so very difficult 
to comprehend.  As such, it is adolescence, not childhood, which offers that point in 
time that we need to comprehend but cannot – and so this is the period of life when 
neurotic disorders originate, generally speaking.  The ancient wisdom of philosophers 
for this period of life is perhaps to look to the guidance of one‟s elders and parents.  But 
when the parents themselves are not acting responsibly, or when for one reason or 
another there has developed a communication breakdown between parent and 
adolescent child, the adolescent will not necessarily have anyone there to look to for 
guidance.  At this point, what happens is as much down to chance as it is down to what 
any philosophy or speculative theory can offer: „I remain fascinated by the apparently 
totally chance character of the event‟ (Derrida, 1987, p.169), as Derrida puts it in 
„Envois‟.  In other words, adolescence is a time not only when one‟s own character is 
changing, but also when these changes are as much down to chance events as they are 
down to one‟s own autonomous decision-making.  Perhaps, if the opportunity presented 
itself to do what one wanted to do and become who one wanted to become, then one 
would take it with open arms.  But when the arrival of this opportunity is itself down to 
chance, the situation can become melancholically disheartening. 
If between Rousseau and Freud the task has been to understand the child qua 
child; then in contrast, between Nietzsche and Derrida the task is rather to understand 
the adolescent qua adolescent.  For when we grow into adults, it is the adolescent turn 
of events which haunts us, not the childhood Oedipus complex.  At the same time, it is 
important to note that this is a generic statement: autobiographical singularity dictates 
that one must be attentive to the specific circumstances of each individual‟s life history.  
Perhaps in this person it will be some childhood event which haunts them, in that person 
some adolescent event, and in the other person it might even be some adulthood event.  
Of course, it is impossible to know a priori.  Nonetheless, there is at least a nod towards 
adolescence made by Derrida‟s autobiographical thought that must be considered; and 
adolescence itself operates a nod towards adulthood; and adulthood a nod towards 
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dying.  The overwhelming feelings of adolescence have a strange sense of coming in 
relation to death (Nietzsche‟s, „it is better to die than to go on living here‟); every 
decision seems like a life-and-death decision; it is adolescents who are so nihilistically 
wayward.  Adolescents narcissistically find everything beyond themselves so difficult to 
comprehend; and everyone else finds adolescents themselves so difficult to 
comprehend.  Within the melancholic pleasure-seeking of the adolescent, the experience 
of the absence of the object of one‟s desire is felt as if it were a loss of something 
present.  The melancholy is thus a form of mourning.  Indeed, it is Freud who first 
broached this triadic relationship between melancholy, mourning, and narcissism in 
„Mourning and Melancholia‟: „Melancholia, therefore, borrows some of its features 
from mourning, and the others from the process of regression from narcissistic object-
choice to narcissism‟ (in: Freud, 2001c, p.250).  Derrida‟s critical relation to Freud here 
comes in his counter-concept of mid-mourning: „there is only twilight and mid-
mourning‟ (Derrida, 1987, p.195). 
To begin to consider this counter-concept, let us turn to „Circumfession‟, where 
Derrida refers to it as half-mourning: „if full mourning is half-mourning, what follows 
for the mourning of mourning?‟ (Derrida, 1993, p.167).  When Robert Smith considers 
this concept in Derrida and Autobiography he offers his own translation for it: 
 
I bear my own life in coming from the death of the other: auto-hetero-thanato-biography, or the Orphic 
first few steps of verse.  Strictly speaking, this is not mourning, then – mourning is classically an object 
idealisation – since my life is inspired by it; not mourning, but what Derrida calls „demi-deuil‟, or „mid-
mourning‟.  No one emotion need be associated with this such as grief, for it is ongoing, changing, 
transforming.  I propose to translate „demi-deuil‟ with a word from Finnegan‟s wake, which is „funferal‟: 
funeral, fun-for-all, fanfare, triunf (Smith, 1995, p.142). 
 
I think that there is a moment of insight and a moment of confusion at work in Smith 
here.  The moment of insight is where he says that, in Derrida‟s concept of mid-
mourning, „no one emotion need be associated with this such as grief, for it is ongoing, 
changing, transforming‟.  That is, whatever it is that haunts someone in their life is 
subject to their continuing activity not to be haunted by it, which may have moments of 
both success and failure that will be experienced differently at different points in time.  
Also, where he says that, „my life is inspired by it‟; perhaps this can be understood as: 
my life is inspired by that activity with which I try to negate that which haunts me, 
however this inspiration is not entirely a happy one because I remain haunted 
nonetheless.  However, I find his translation of mid-mourning as „funferal‟ confusing 
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and in need of clearer explanation.  To deepen Derrida‟s conception of mid-mourning, I 
would rather return to a text like „Circumfession‟ and explain it in terms of the 
adolescent feeling of loss before an actual loss has occurred.  Here Derrida‟s mother 
was dying but not yet dead.  In that experience, one anticipates the loss before it actually 
happens, and mourns for the loss before the proper „work of mourning‟, as Freud called 
it in „Mourning and Melancholia‟, is meant to occur. 
For Derrida, life is lived in the perpetual „work of mid-mourning‟ (Derrida, 
1987, p.335), as we anticipate the loss of something before the end of the thing in 
question.  This can also work with the experience of love.  On the one hand, one knows 
a priori that the loving relationship one is in is destined to come to an end with a loved 
one dying before another.  This experience Derrida articulates in numerous places, 
notably in Memoires for Paul de Man, where he refers to: 
 
[A] logic or an a-logic of which we can no longer say that it belongs to mourning in the current sense of 
the term, but which regulates (sometimes like mourning in the strict sense, but always like mourning in 
the sense of a general possibility) all our relations with the other as other, that is, as mortal for a mortal, 
with the one always capable of dying before the other (Derrida, 1989, p.39). 
 
On the other hand, this structure, of one dying before the other, can itself become 
symbolic of the way in which one‟s love for the other person can itself be lost before 
death comes to take the other person away from us: the experience of the death of love 
itself before the death of the loved other.  We become involved in loving relationships 
not only knowing a priori that one person in the relationship will die before the other, 
but also knowing a priori that it is possible that the very feeling of love for the other 
person might die before death itself arrives to take them away from us.  Indeed, this 
latter possibility is itself symbolic of the impossibility in designating the so-called 
„proper amount‟ of love that one is to give.  In „Circumfession‟ Derrida says: „I write 
that there is too much love in my life, emphasizing too much, the better and the worse, 
that would be true, love will have got the better of me, my faithfulness stands any test, I 
am faithful even to the test that does harm, to my euthanasias‟ (Derrida, 1993, p.157).  
To love too much is to feel the pain of love as equally as its pleasure.  Perhaps even, to 
be the recipient of someone who gives too much love is to receive it as if it were too 
little – as the perverformative of the „proper amount‟ can lead to idiosyncratic 
complications, let us say, rather than generalized neurotic disorders. 
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 How to conclude such a discourse as the present one?  Impossible, but 
necessary.  In his interview, „There Is No One Narcissism (Autobiophotographies)‟, 
Derrida says: 
 
There is not narcissism and non-narcissism; there are narcissisms that are more or less comprehensive, 
generous, open, extended.  What is called non-narcissism is in general but the economy of a much more 
welcoming, hospitable narcissism, one that is much more open to the experience of the other as other.  I 
believe that without a movement of narcissistic reappropriation, the relation to the other would be 
absolutely destroyed, it would be destroyed in advance.  The relation to the other – even if it remains 
asymmetrical, open, without possible reappropriation – must trace a movement of reappropriation in the 
image of oneself for love to be possible, for example.  Love is narcissistic.  Beyond that, there are little 
narcissisms, there are big narcissisms, and there is death in the end, which is the limit.  Even in the 
experience – if there is one – of death, narcissism does not abdicate absolutely (in: Derrida, 1995b, 
p.199). 
 
Here the more traditional moral discourse concerning selfishness and altruism is 
rethought in relation to the existential-cum-psychoanalytic concern with „narcissistic 
reappropriation‟.  For Derrida, altruism, or non-narcissism, „is in general but the 
economy of a much more welcoming, hospitable narcissism, one that is much more 
open to the experience of the other as other‟.  In other words, there are no good deeds 
that do not contain a trace of selfishness; however, this does not necessarily remove the 
goodness of the deed as it is partially inherent within the deed itself.  Narcissism is to do 
with the „image of oneself‟.  Traditionally autobiography is given a negative image, as 
if it were a vehicle for selfishness.  Derrida asks us to listen to its concept with another 
ear: perhaps this is that autobiography, because it is as much another‟s as it is mine, is 
also a vehicle for an improved mode of altruism which clears the space for considering 
the other‟s life from the other‟s perspective.  Rather than reduction of the other‟s 
otherness to the self‟s selfsameness, autobiography, because it involves the confession 
of the other, demands sensitivity in its relation to the other, in particular in the way in 
which it goes about articulating its confession.  The old moral adage says to put oneself 
in another‟s shoes, to look at things from another‟s perspective, but it does not tell us 
how to go about doing this.  Perhaps somewhere in the deconstruction of autobiography 
is the key to this „how‟ by offering a semi-practical location to find this key.  Indeed, it 
was suggested in the chapter on Nietzsche that Derrida‟s neologism of otobiographies is 
radically connected to this moral adage. 
 Indeed, but is it morality or madness that should have the last word in a 
discourse on subjectivity?  In another semi-autobiographical text of Derrida‟s, 
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Monolingualism of the Other; or, the Prosthesis of Origin, he says: „I have always 
suspected the law, as well as language, of being mad, of being, at any rate, the unique 
place and the first condition of madness‟ (Derrida, 1998, p.10).  The plurality that 
Derrida invokes here implies a plurality of linguistic and cultural rationalities; between 
which judgements can be made against each other to the effect that they can judge each 
other as irrational: „All culture is originally colonial‟ (p.39).  The violence of the 
judgement calls forth a strange relation of judgement to injustice; but also of judgement 
to irrationality.  Between the colonizer and the colonized there is the boundary which 
demarcates a space for the other that the colonizer transgresses, a transgression which is 
the mark of colonial violence.  But is colonial violence merely a cultural phenomenon?  
For example, is not the metaphor of colonization a useful one for considering the 
relation to the other as such?  Just as Derrida uses the metaphor of the „mother tongue‟ 
in Monolingualism of the Other to suggest a strange intertwining of cultural and familial 
concerns, similarly the metaphor of colonization can have a similar effect: the violence 
of colonialism addresses not merely the space of cultural tradition, but also the space of 
familial interaction.  One can colonize another‟s space merely by being too physically 
close to them; but the instrument of the tongue can colonize another‟s psychical space 
merely by saying something in the wrong way.  And then what is said is lost in history, 
only to be rehearsed in one‟s memory; a feature of life that disturbs rationality.  
For Derrida, how the tongue is utilized in everyday life is the condition of both 
morality and madness.  How is one to retain one‟s reason, and to survive the violence, 
of the mother‟s tongue?  For the mother‟s tongue can be both nurturing and neglectful – 
and of course, here the „mother‟ is a symbolic title for familial otherness more generally 
since she is always the origin of my birth, and so is always the origin of the „my life‟ 
which acts as the autobiographical point of reference.  Since this possibility (of the same 
figure being the origin of both nurture and neglect) is inscribed into autobiography a 
priori, Derrida‟s initial concern in the deconstruction of autobiography is not so much 
with the empirical specifics of „this or that‟ life, but is rather with the possibilities and 
impossibilities of subjective experience itself.  That is, Derrida‟s initial concern is with 
the quasi-transcendental conditions which mediate all so-called subjective experience.  
This is the radical role played by the communicative apparatus, here rethought in the 
familial-autobiographical context of the mother‟s tongue.  Such are the scars that are at 
work in the tongue of the other before one has even opened one‟s mouth to speak.  If it 
is only possible to consider the nature of the psyche as logically posterior to life, then it 
180 
 
is also only possible to consider life as logically posterior to death‟s alterity; which is 
ultimately symbolic of these scars.  In order to broach the nature of emotion in 
subjectivity – from the scars and scares to the joys and jubilations – it will perhaps 
become necessary to consider more deeply what Nietzsche calls the „spirit of music‟, 
since the tonal nature of music has a privileged place in the very language of emotion 
(on this point, perhaps it is notable that Augustine riddles his Confessions with citations 
from the „Book of Psalms‟).  Indeed, in today‟s highly mediated cultures music is no 
longer the only domain containing this tonality. 
So in conclusion, why is it through some idea of autobiography that the 
backbone of a deconstructive theory of subjectivity is approached?  The answer to this 
question depends upon the metaphysical properties that are traditionally ascribed to 
subjectivity in the first place – where one property in particular, autonomy, is implicit 
and pervasive.  For example, in the „Preface‟ to Totality and Infinity: An Essay on 
Exteriority, Levinas refers to: „the ideal of autonomy that guides philosophy‟ (Levinas, 
1969, p.25).  But while the figure of the child is powerless in comparison to their parent 
and in a position of absolute heteronomy; the figure of the adolescent is not yet a mature 
adult, and so is in a position of becoming-autonomous.  Here, both figures place the 
metaphysics of the autonomous subject into question.  Beyond the mature adult are the 
disabilities of old age and then the decay of death; which further places into question the 
metaphysical presupposition of personal autonomy.  Which begs the question: When, in 
the life of the human being, does autonomy actually happen?  Of course, such a 
question depends upon the specifics and practicalities of each individual case; of each 
person‟s life history.  This is the reason why autobiography is of interest: on the one 
hand, the autos of autobiography implies the metaphysics of autonomy at work within 
its concept; but on the other hand, if we listen to that concept with another ear, it is only 
through the autobiographical location that one makes contact with these heteronomous 
practicalities and life circumstances.  That is, it is only through the deconstruction of 
autobiography that the metaphysical presupposition of the autonomous subject is called 
into question and given a location not in the interior substance of the psyche, but rather 
in the events of life which are on the very boundary between interior and exterior. 
In this way, the deconstruction of autobiography radically undermines the 
metaphysics of life which makes of it a life-force.  Here, life is reduced to the power of 
the soul to give life to the body, or the power of the mind to overcome the body‟s 
impulses („mind over matter‟, as they say; but of course, in the end matter will have its 
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way).  That the soul is said, from the Platonic and theological tradition, to exist in itself 
becomes an important primary stage in the metaphysical ideal of human autonomy.  
This absolute separation of soul from body cannot be understood to be part of Derrida‟s 
autobiographical thought, where, in a Nietzschean manner, the forces of life undermine 
the very idea of a life-force.  In this tradition of radical existentialism, the soul is not an 
actually existing substance.  This is not to say that the concept of „soul‟ is not useful; for 
it is through this concept that we have an idea of our emotional experience; it is the 
basis through which we understand happiness and unhappiness; it is the basis through 
which we understand experiences as heavenly and hellish.  And just as the soul is not an 
actually existing substance, heaven and hell are not actually existing otherworldly 
places; rather, they are modes of experience in this world (which also explains why 
even an atheist calls to God‟s name in moments of intense pleasure and pain).  The 
problem for any notion of personal autonomy is thus grounded in the fact that those who 
experience hell on earth, or at least some level of it, cannot be said to have the 
opportunity to possess this autonomy.  As we saw earlier, the problem that 
deconstruction poses for any psychological theory is the difficulty in classifying 
autobiographical singularity.  But precisely because the events of life are on the very 
boundary between interior and exterior, this singularity is not necessarily so subjective 
that there is no objective element to them whatsoever. 
For the autobiographical location also makes transparent, up to a point at any 
rate, the living conditions, the life circumstances, the habitat, of an individual‟s life.  As 
such, perhaps one might not literally be able to put oneself in the shoes of the other, in 
the sense of feeling what they feel.  Nonetheless, considering things from another‟s 
perspective becomes at least partially possible to judge when taking into account the 
opportunity that their life circumstances have or have not given them to develop their 
own autonomy.  So while the classification of one‟s subjective psychical singularity 
becomes impossible, the autobiographical condition of this impossibility simultaneously 
makes possible the basis from which one can make partial contact with the more 
objective life circumstances through which the psyche itself is formed.  I believe that 
this is the radical insight into the paradoxes of subjectivity that Derrida‟s 
autobiographical thought presents. 
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